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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to explain the role of Government policy 
between 1946 and 1964 in removing the dangers of discontent 
concerning Africans on private estates in Nyasaland.
Introductory chapters outline the geographical and political 
environment, the original land alienation, the problem of Africans on 
private estates and attempted solutions, 1900-1945, against a 
background of rising labour demand, population pressure and 
discontent.
Chapter III covers the 1946 Abrahams Report which emphasised 
the political threat and recommended purchasing private land for 
resettlement from estates and trust land, and the 1947 Land Planning 
Committee Report which found serious flaws in Abrahams7 
recommendations preventing their full implementation, publicly 
recommended acquiring blocks of land in Cholo and confidentially 
recommended negotiating with the London Board for acquiring large 
areas of British Central Africa Company land.
Chapters IV-VI show how the new Governor in 1948 determined to 
acquire extensive areas not intended for early development, 
additional to those recommended earlier, concentrating on the BCA 
Company because of the political dangers. Early areas purchased did 
little to relieve overcrowding and discontent in the crucial Cholo 
area. Using the 1953 disturbances, he secured British policy 
agreement to progressive abolition of tangata and African 
resettlement by purchasing estate land not scheduled for early 
development, and he secured BCA Company agreement to negotiate 
acquisition of their Cholo land.
Chapters VII and VIII deal with the steps taken eventually to 
acquire 50,000 acres of BCA Company land and with resettlement, 
1955-1957. Disturbed political conditions halted this progress. The 
African Government in 1961 amended the law thereby inducing further 
sales, and in 1964 announced the end of resettlement acquisitions.
The Conclusion emphasises the racial conflict inherent in the 
problem of Africans on private estates, and summarises the steps 
taken to remove it before it could be disastrously used in the final 
assault on colonial rule.
-  3 -
TABLE? OF CONTENTS
Title Page 1
Abstract 2
Table of Contents 3
Maps 4
Note on Spelling and Currency 8
Preface 9
Chapter I Nyas aland and the Origin of Private 12
Estates
Chapter II The Problem of Africans on Private 25
Estates and Attempts to Solve it,
1900 - 1945
Chapter III The Abrahams Commission, 1946 and 76
The Land Planning Committee, 1947
Chapter IV Sir Geoffrey Colby7 s Early Reactions, 101
1948 - 1953
Chapter V The 1953 Disturbances and African 147
Reaction
Chapter VI The Policy of Progressive Abolition 163
of Thanoata. 1954
Chapter VII Negotiations with the BCA Company, 201
1954 - 1955
Chapter VIII Land Acquisition and Resettlement, 226
1955 - 1964
Chapter IX Conclusion 252
Notes 275
Sources 307
-  4 -
MAPS
Map I Nyasaland in Africa. 5
Map II Nyas aland in Central Africa. 5
Map III Nyas aland. 6
Map IV Southern Nyas aland. 7
-  5 -
Nyasaland
MAP I - Nyasaland in Africa
Tanganyika
Mocambique
r ~ NyasalandNorthern
Rhodesia
Southern
Rhodesia
SCALE
MAP II - Nyasaland in Central Africa
-  6 -
—  x* Fort
Hill
#\ Karonga
\  \
\  Nyika \
iHighlandV.
Mzuzu
Mz imba
Vipya
v— ^Plateau
Lake
Nyasa
Kota-
• Kasungu
Fort 
Johnston
jChiradzulu/
Lin be 
Mlanje .
“ “ ' W  /"
TOO mHes
i
MAP III - Nyasaland
-  7 -
\/ Fort 
•\ Johnston
Lake
Malombe
Lake j 
Chirwa /
lombai—i
SHIRE
HIGHLANDS
9 Magoraero 
Chiradzulu
Ntaja
\ Lunzu 
•Blantyre 
• Limbe 
« Bvumbwe
Chileka•
Mlanje
CholoChikwawa
;■ Port 
Herald
s c a l e
20 30
J____
MAP IV - Southern Nyasaland
-  8 -
NOTE ON SPELLING AND CURRENCY
The spelling of place names follows that used at the relevant 
time and no attempt has been made to render place names into their 
present form; e. g. Cholo and Mlanje are so spelled/ as in colonial 
days, rather than Thyolo and Mulanje as in their modem form.
The term thancrata is so spelled, in its modem form, rather than 
in its previous form of tanaata. save that the word when used in 
quotations remains in its original form.
The currency used is the pound sterling, undecimalised, with 
reference in some cases to shillings, but not pence. No attempt has 
been made to render the amounts into their Malawian equivalent in 
kwacha.
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PREFACE
If, in 1946, observers had been able to foresee the end of the 
colonial era in Nyasaland in less than twenty years as a result of a 
few years of strong, unified, and often violent African opposition to 
the Government and its policies, they might confidently have forecast 
that those leading this opposition would use an issue for attack 
which was readily available, and could rouse mass emotions, unite the 
African people, form a rallying point, and threaten the security and 
economy of the country and so help bring the colonial government to 
submission. That issue, that cudgel with which to beat the 
Government, was private estates.
In essence, there were huge estates, privately owned by 
Europeans, in the southern part of the country, many of which were 
both undeveloped and unoccupied, located in some of the most densely 
African populated land in the continent. Africans on Trust Land, 
with its depleted fertility, looked with envy on the unoccupied, 
frequently fertile, areas of. .private land. Those on private estates 
resented the social and economic restrictions placed upon them as 
tenants, the obligation to pay annual rent in either cash or labour, 
and the insecurity of their tenure. The resentment was aimed at the 
European estate owners and was intensified by the connection in the 
African mind, of land issues with white domination from Southern 
Rhodesia.
The final assault on colonialism was launched in 1958 when Dr. 
Banda returned to Nyasaland with three publicly avowed intentions in 
each of which, although he did not say so, land was involved: to 
secure independence, to abolish federation and to improve race
relations. ^  In the case of independence, one of the greatest fears
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of Europeans was that an African government would expropriate their 
land. Concerning federation, one of the greatest fears of Africans 
was that white Southern Rhodesians would deprive them of large areas 
of their land. Regarding race relations, the normal good relations 
were endangered by friction between European estate owners and 
Africans who lived on or near their estates.
Observers might also confidently have forecast that the cudgel 
would be picked up and wielded in precisely that compact area of 
southern Nyasaland where more than two thirds of the country's 
Europeans and almost one third of the Africans lived and where most 
of the active politicians of both races resided, an area also which 
contributed massively to the country s non-subsistence economy and 
whose vulnerability would endanger the whole of that economy.
Such forecasts as to the instrument, and its location, for 
attacking the colonial government would not have required any great 
intimacy of knowledge or any exceptional powers of prediction; the 
factors were well known and obvious.
Yet, when the time came, land and especially the question of 
Africans on private estates, was not a significant issue; it featured 
little, if at all, in the nationalist politicians' armoury of 
attack. It had been deprived of its explosive potential and was no 
longer the source of opposition, acute conflict and violence. Why 
was this? What part did Government policy play in removing this 
potential source of conflagration between 1946 and 1964?
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This thesis sets out to answer that question by a detailed study 
of the development of Government policy concerning Africans on 
private estates over the period 1946 to 1964. In so concentrating on 
a relatively narrow policy issue and studying the issue in detail, it 
throws new light on the policy process itself and illuminates the 
development of the actual policy and especially the Governor7 s role 
in it.
The years before 1946 are dealt with only in outline and only to 
set the scene, show the nature of the problem and highlight the 
essential elements of earlier attempts to solve it. In concentrating 
on the 1946 to 1964 period, it extends the work of Pachai whose 
focus was the history of agriculture through the acquisition, 
utilisation, exploitation and disposal of land largely from the point 
of view of the African population^, and of Ng7 ongola^ whose focus 
was the role of legislation in the administration of agrarian 
change. 5 Pachai, without access to archival material after 
1936, ^  was obliged to rely almost exclusively on the Nyasaland 
limes and the Proceedings of Legislative Council. Ng7 ongola, with
Q
access to Nyasaland archives only up to 1939 ^  relied almost 
exclusively on the Proceedings of Legislative Council and Parliament 
and on Ordinances and Acts. The present thesis has benefited 
overwhelmingly from full access to the records of the National 
Archives of Malawi, Zomba, up to 1957, with somewhat limited access 
up to 1964, and of the Public Record Office, London, up to 1960, 
together with the Colby and Armitage Papers which became available 
only in 1990.
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CHAPTER I
NYASALAND AND THE ORIGIN OF PRIVATE ESTATES
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Nyasaland, the pre-independence name for Malawi, is situated in 
the south-eastern part of Central Africa, 130 miles from the Indian 
Ocean. It is bordered in its northern half to the west by Zambia 
(formerly Northern Rhodesia) and to the east by Tanzania (formerly 
Tanganyika), and in its southern half by Mocambique both to the west
and to the east. It is a long, narrow country, 560 miles north to
south and 30 to 100 miles west to east. A quarter of its 46, 000 
square miles is covered by lakes. *
Its northern two-thirds are comprised of Lake Malawi (formerly 
Lake Nyasa) to the east, 11,000 square miles in extent, at 1,500 feet 
above sea level; and of high plateaux to the west, generally at 4,000
feet above sea level but rising to 8, 000 feet in the Nyika
Highlands. The southern one-third is comprised of the Shire River 
valley, descending from 1, 500 feet to 100 feet, with the 3, 000 feet 
Shire Highlands Plateau to the east, rising to over 10, 000 feet in 
the Mlanje Mountains, and the 3, 500 feet Kirk Range to the west. It 
is a country of varied landscapes, some with great natural beauty.
The climate is monsoonal, with a warm to hot main rainy season 
from November to March followed by late rains during April and May, 
and a cooler dry season from June to October. Mean temperatures vary 
with season and altitude. At Fort Hill (4,200 feet) in the extreme 
north the January mean is 69°F and the July mean is 62°F whilst 
at Port Herald (190 feet) in the extreme south the means are 81°F 
in January and 68°F in July. Over 90% of the rainfall occurs 
during November to March although there are " chiperone" mists and 
light rains during the "dry" season in certain mountain areas notably
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in the Shire Highlands. Annual rainfall varies from over 80 inches 
in the feu: north, the Nkata Bay area, Zomba and MLanje mountains, to 
less than 30 inches in the Mzimba and Kasungu plains and the Shire 
valley.
By African standards the country enjoys a relatively high 
proportion of fertile, intrinsically good, soils although their 
nutrient status varies widely, being more fertile in the south - 
especially in the Shire Highlands - than in the north. The steep 
terrain of many areas and the intensity of tropical rainstorms render 
soils very susceptible to erosion.
Given the absence of economically exploitable minerals, the 
economy has always been overwhelmingly based on agriculture, as the 
export trade history demonstrates. The period 1891 to 1904 was 
characterised by the rapid rise and then fall, due to disease, of 
coffee and the similar fate of rubber, and by the decline of ivory as 
a significant export. During this period these three items 
contributed over 90% to the country's export earnings. In 1904 the 
export trade was valued at £27, 500 of which 65%, £18,000, was derived 
from coffee as compared with peaks respectively of £78, 500 and 
£62,000 (79%) in 1900. The period 1905 to 1922 began to set the 
pattern which to a large extent has persisted ever since; competitors 
were eliminated until tobacco contributed £316,000 (70%), cotton 
£73,000 (16%) and tea £20,500 (5%) in a total of £450,000. The 
decade 1923 to 1932 saw tobacco contributing an even greater share to 
export earnings, and tea increasing as cotton declined: tobacco rose 
to £550,000 (84%), tea rose to £43,000 (7%) and cotton declined to
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£35,000 (5%) in a total of £656, 120. Daring the 1930s and 1940s tea 
grew further to rival tobacco so that in 1951, tobacco contributed 
£2,733,430 (47%), tea £2,028,866 (35%) and cotton £330,000 (6%). In 
the remaining years of the colonial era tobacco and tea continued to 
dominate and were joined by groundnuts and tung oil whilst cotton 
continued to decline. In 1963 tobacco exports were valued at 
£4,098,588 (39%), tea £3,464,737 (33%), groundnuts £1,876,006 (17%), 
tung oil £321,424 (3%), and cotton £188,707 (2%) out of a total of 
£10, 515, 574. The economy thus came to be dominated by two major 
crops: tobacco from the Southern and Central Provinces grown on 
European estates and on African village lands; and tea which was 
exclusively grown on European estates in the Shire Highlands.
African village small-holders occupied 95% of the country's 
agricultural land, predominantly producing maize as the staple food.
The African population grew from 900, 000 in 1901 to 3, 000, 000 in 
1964, the European from 600 to 9, 500 and the Asian with those of 
mixed race from 500 to 14, 500. In the post-Second World War period 
the vast majority of the Africans were subsistence farmers; the 
Asians were overwhelmingly engaged in trading and storekeeping; of 
the Europeans about a quarter were engaged each in Government 
service, mission work and agriculture and the remainder were in 
commerce or were dependants; the Euro-Africans and Indo-Africans were 
primarily occupied in trading, transport and agriculture. The 
population density was one of the highest in Africa, being 
particularly high in the Shire Highlands - where densities overall 
exceeded 200 and were over 800 to the square mile in a number of 
areas - and growing at a rate which doubled it every 25 years.
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There were three categories of land-holding: before the Native 
Trust Land Order in Council of 1936, land was classified into 
freehold land, land leased from the Crown and Crown Land. After 
1936, the term Crown Land applied simply to the land acquired by 
Government, whilst freehold and leasehold land, together with forest 
reserves and townships, became known as Reserved Land, and the 
remainder became Native Trust Land.
European influence developed after David Livingstone first 
reached Lake Malawi in August 1859. He was followed by the initially 
abortive Universities Mission to Central Africa at Magomero in the 
Shire Highlands in 1861, by the Free Church of Scotland at Cape 
Maclear on the southern Lake shore in October 1875 and by the Church 
of Scotland Mission at Blantyre, also in the Shire Highlands, in 
September 1876. The first resident British official was Captain Foot 
who, in October 1883, was appointed "Consul... in the districts 
adjacent to Lake Nyassa." Other consuls succeeded him and in 
September 1889 Buchanan declared a protectorate over the Shire 
Highlands to forestall a Portuguese advance into that area. This 
protectorate was extended in 1891 to cover the whole area which 
became British Central Africa whose first Commissioner was 
H. H. Johnston. ^
In 1904 responsibility for the Protectorate passed from the 
Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. Three years later the name of 
the country was changed to Nyasaland, the Commissioner was restyled 
Governor and Executive and Legislative Councils were created. Minor 
adjustments to the Councils were made and in 1946 Executive Council
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had five official and two non-official members/ all European, whilst 
Legislative Council had six official and six non-official members, 
also all European. In 1960 Executive Council had five officials, 
Europeans, and two African and two European non-officials;
Legislative Council had fourteen officials, Europeans, seven African 
and six European non-officials. Between 1960 and independence in 
1964 rapid changes to increase African and non-official membership of
c
both Councils occurred.
In summary, then, Nyasaland may be described as a relatively 
small country, somewhat off the beaten track, with scenery, climate 
and soils varying from the excellent to the indifferent or hostile.
At the end of the Second World War the country relied overwhelmingly 
on agriculture: peasant subsistence maize fanning with an export 
economy based almost exclusively on tobacco and tea, much of the 
value of both being the result of European enterprise on alienated 
land. The country was heavily populated and the soils were 
susceptible to heavy erosion. Of its 23,500,000 acres 5. 1% was 
freehold, 7. 65% was other Reserved Land, an insignificant proportion 
was Crown Land and 87. 25% was Native Trust Land. The Executive and 
Legislative Councils were exclusively European in composition and 
officials formed a majority in both. Few Governors before 1948 had 
been development-minded, the funding available to Government was 
severely limited and the country - "this Cinderella among the 
Protectorates" was sorely in need of development.
Within this general scenario, the Shire Highlands had a number 
of important features. It was a highland region in which Europeans
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had settled, finding the climate pleasant and healthy. Much of the 
land was fertile and with the adequate rainfall and " chiperone" mists 
was suitable for growing tea. The European owned estates produced 
tea and tobacco which were vital to the Protectorate's economy. The 
more peaceful conditions which European government and settlement 
brought, attracted large numbers who settled on both Trust Land and 
estates, many from Mocamhique early in the twentieth century. Here, 
also, were the expatriate urban centres of Blantyre and Limbe with 
the local headquarters offices of major companies including land 
holding companies. In 1945 652, 718 Africans, 31% of the African 
population, lived in the Shire Highlands which comprised only 11% of 
Nyasaland's land area; 173, 028 of these lived on private estates. 
Population densities on both Trust Land and estates were high and 
much of the land was heavily congested. Densities would have been 
higher had not a further 29, 699 African emigrant workers been absent 
in southern Africa. Congestion, steep slopes and heavy rainfall 
resulted in serious soil erosion which reduced subsistence crop 
yields and exacerbated the problem of population density. Even so, 
there were significant areas of alienated land which were both 
undeveloped and unoccupied. Many leading political figures, both 
European, including most of the early non-official members of
o
Legislative and Executive Councils, and African, lived in this 
area. It was a favoured area: the transportation system was more 
advanced than elsewhere, this was the area first served by the 
railways, the early road system was developed first here, ^  and it 
was here too that the first macadamised road surfaces were made. The 
Shire Highlands were of considerable economic and political 
significance to the Government and to the country.
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From the early 1880s a number of European individuals, 
companies, missionaries, traders, hunters and planters acquired land 
from African chiefs*0 most of which was then sparsely inhabited. 
Between 1887 and 1891 just under a million acres in the Shire 
Highlands passed into European hands, mainly unoccupied and 
uncultivated, and were registered by Consul Buchanan. Of this land 
372,000 acres passed to Sharrer - later to become British Central 
Africa (BCA) Company property - 176, 448 to A.L Bruce, 168,000 to 
Buchanan and his brothers - later to become the property of the 
Blantyre and East Africa (B&EA) Conpany - and 55,000 to the Moir 
brothers for the African Lakes Company (ALC).
The proclamation of the Protectorate was followed by a marked
i 2
increase in European settlers, from 57 in 1891 to 237 in 1894,
and by what Johnston called:
wholesale grabbing of land or, where it is 
not fair to describe the acquisition of 
land as "grabbing", at any rate huge tracts 
had been bought for disproportionate 
amounts from the natives.
The settlers knew that Johnston would have to enquire into and settle
their claims and that he was unlikely to sanction some of them either
wholly or in part.
The position of the ALC's large areas of land was well
illustrated in a memorandum written by F. L. Moir, General Manager,
scarcely a month after the declaration of the extended Protectorate:
The [Company] claims certain lands... on 
account of Agreements made with the 
Chiefs... Treaties whereby for assistance
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promised in protecting them from aggression 
they handed over to the Company their 
supreme power as Chiefs... On the refusal of 
Government to grant protection then, the 
Company spent several thousand pounds [and] 
much time and trouble in attending to the 
interests of the Chiefs [and] undertook 
heavy and grave responsibilities, which 
resulted in securing for the Chiefs British 
protection.
On receiving this memorandum the Foreign Office instructed Johnston 
to report on all land claims and made clear that the sovereign rights 
ceded by the Treaties were now vested in the Crown as a result of the 
declaration of a protectorate. On 18 July 1891, Johnston asked every 
European in the country to submit land claims to him and said that
whilst claims were being settled, no further purchases could be made
1 fiwithout his sanction.
In September 1892 Johnston began an enquiry into land alienation
and gradually he, or Sharpe, his Deputy - who did the major part of
the work - or Sclater, his Engineer, visited and examined every
estate. Evidence of long occupation and improvement in the way of
cultivation or buildings - which were rare - sufficed even in the
absence of a properly authenticated document, but in other cases
confirmation of the grant depended upon there being no valid
counter-claim, the chief admitting sale, the deed being authentic,
proper provision being made for non-disturbance of existing African
villages and gardens, the boundaries described in the deed according
with the area of land claimed and fair value having been paid. Where
fair value had not been paid, an additional payment or a reduction in
1 7acreage was required before Johnston confirmed the grant.
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He dealt with the claims pragmatically, using a variety of
reasonings and solutions to achieve, as he saw it, the most just,
reasonable and economically advantageous outcome available in each
case. In some cases he granted land where there was no real claim to
it and in others he secured the withdrawal of spurious claims. In a
number of cases, especially where those who had purported to sell the
18land had no right to do so, he completely rejected the claim. °
IQ
Only in the most outrageously unfair cases did he deprive the
claimant of all the land claimed: "Even where flagrant deception had
been attempted... he always provided land somewhere on easy terms for
90a man who meant to develop it." In a large number of cases, he 
was able to ratify the claims in full.
The Rev. Alexander Hetherwick, for many years Head of the Church
of Scotland Mission, Blantyre, who took a deep and active interest in
land matters, especially from the African point of view, expressed
the position well:
Previous to the advent of the 
Administration, certain chiefs had appended 
their hand to documents, by which, in 
return for a certain stated sum paid in 
cloth or other trade goods, they made over 
to the European purchasers a slice of their 
territories, extending from a few hundred 
acres in some cases to a good many 
thousands in others. Apart from the 
question as to whether the chief was 
entitled to dispose in this way with any 
part of his territory, which he undoubtedly 
held only on behalf of his people, there is 
no doubt that the consignor did not realise 
or understand what he was doing - in many 
cases believing that he was granting only 
leave to plant, not making over a freehold 
of the estate in perpetuity ... These 
questions involved many intricacies which 
the Commissioner wisely avoided. He 
determined, where there was evidence of a
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bona fide transaction, not to go back on 
these agreements, but to grant to those who 
held such title deeds, "Certificates of 
Claim" which would have the value and force 
of a copy hold.
Johnston, aware that the chiefs by custom had no right to 
alienate the land, 22 considered that they had assumed that right 
and that it was tacitly accepted by their people although "it may 
well have been that some peasant rights or claims were disposed of in 
the process. "2  ^ In order to secure the people from their chiefs' 
"heedlessness" and to avoid them becoming "serfs" of the new European 
owners, 2  ^Johnston made it clear that their villages and 
plantations were not alienated when the surrounding land was 
alienated:
Except on very small estates the existing 
native villages and plantations were 
exempted from all these purchases, and the 
natives were informed that the sale of the 
surrounding land did not include the 
alienation of their homes and 
plantations.
One of the results of the land settlement, 
therefore, was to completely free the 
natives from any dependency on the white 
settlers, by restoring to them the 
inalienable occupancy of their villages and 
plantations.
He purported to do this by including in most of the deeds, which he
styled "Certificates of Claim" when he confirmed the alienation, a
non-disturbance clause:
That no native village or plantation 
existing at the date of this Certificate on 
the said Estate shall be disturbed or 
removed without the consent in writing of 
Her Majesty's Commissioner and 
Consul-General, but when such consent shall 
have been given the sites of such villages 
or plantations shall revert to the
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Proprietor of the said estate. No natives 
can make other and new villages or 
plantations on the said Estate without the 
prior consent of the Proprietor.
This clause was the only restriction on what in English law is a fee
simple absolute, and was to be resented, or rather ignored, by the
owners of private estates.
Johnston said that his objects in settling the land claims were 
firstly to protect the rights of the Africans, to see that their 
villages and plantations were not disturbed and that sufficient space 
was left for their expansion, that is, presumably, their natural 
increase and traditional shifting cultivation; secondly to discourage 
land speculation; and thirdly to secure the rights of the Crown. He 
added that:
[Where] land... is thickly populated 
and... bought "over the heads" of the people 
by a bargain between the Chief and the 
purchaser... I have (usually) insisted that 
the native occupants should remain in 
undisturbed possession of their land and 
villages, and have only allowed the 
purchaser to make use of the waste 
land.
The difficulties associated with alienated, closely populated, land 
were, therefore, understood at a very early date.
A later commentator said that "Johnston ... made sense of a very 
difficult situation and tried very hard to be fair", although another 
believed that the Commissioner had "kept the options open whilst 
giving the edge to the European planters." Johnston himself was 
pleased with his settlement, which registered 66 Certificates of 
Claim covering 3, 705, 255 acres, saying that it was well accepted
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by the Europeans/ gave distinct satisfaction to the Africans and was 
agreed without modification by the British Government. Having dealt 
with the Certificates of Claim, he secured Crown control over the 
remaining land which then became inalienable without his 
sanction. ^  It was accepted that Government thus became owners in
fee simple and Sharpe later claimed that the chiefs clearly
32recognised this.
The essential intentions of Johnston's intervention were 
three-fold. Firstly, in the interests of the Europeans and of 
economic development, he confirmed the alienation of land not heavily 
populated, genuinely agreed by the chiefs, for which fair value had 
been paid; and he made it clear that the opening of new villages and 
gardens on these alienated areas required the prior consent of the 
landowners and was no longer at the disposed of the chiefs.
Secondly, in the interests of the Africans, such alienations excluded 
the areas then devoted to village settlements and gardens and space 
for their expansion; he confirmed the non-alienated status of these 
areas and their inalienability save with his written consent. In 
heavily populated areas he endorsed the alienation only of waste 
land, that is undeveloped land, a concept later of great importance. 
Thirdly, in the interests of both Europeans and Africans, he reserved 
to himself the exclusive right of further alienation thereby nipping 
a dangerous development as much in the bud as was then possible.
Even so, there was already the fear of further alienation in the 
minds of the Africans: "They are going to take away our land and give 
it to the Europeans.
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CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM OF AFRICANS ON PRIVATE ESTATES 
AND ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE IT, 1900 - 1945
r
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Johnston's steps were adequate for the late nineteenth century: 
further uncontrolled alienation of land was prevented, the rights of 
non-disturbance of residence on estates were secured and there was 
plenty of space for both Africans and Europeans.
In practice, the non-disturbance clause was enforced by neither 
side and little hindrance was placed on Africans moving within an 
estate every few years with shifting cultivation, and when this 
happened the estate owner took over the abandoned sites - quite 
unlawfully it would appear. Until about 1902 there was no 
opposition to this movement: either the owners consented - expressly 
or implicitly - to "other or new villages or plantations" in 
accordance with the clause, * or more likely they believed, 
genuinely or otherwise, that when the original occupants moved from 
their original site they forfeited its protection.
The turn of the century saw a change in the Protectorate's 
economy, as the pioneer collecting stage based on ivory and rubber, 
gave way to cultivation. From planting coffee in the 1890s, the 
Shire Highlands estate owners began in the very early 1900s to plant 
considerable acreages of cotton and a little later tobacco which 
required far more labour than formerly, much of it residential, 
because tobacco, an annual crop, needs more continuous attention than 
does coffee, a tree crop. In response to this demand for labour 
large numbers of Anguru migrated from Mocamhique into southern 
Nyasaland where many of them settled. There had been a trickle of 
Anguru immigration for a number of years but now "this movement 
became a mass flight when the Portuguese colonial government ...
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introduced a new Labour Code for Mocambique"; all males between the 
ages of 14 and 60 were legally obliged to work to grow foodstuffs, 
cotton or sugar, and "Africans in their thousands crossed the border 
into British Central Africa." Whether they settled on Crown Land or 
on private estates they were a captive labour force because if they 
refused to work they lost their right to settle in British Central 
Africa. ^
The relationship between European landowners and African 
residents now changed from being one simply concerning residence, to 
one additionally concerning labour. Since many of the Africans were 
newcomers whose residence relationships were not covered by the 
Certificates of Claim, and since the labour relationships of the 
original occupants were also not covered by the Certificates, some 
land owners tried to place these new relationships on a contractual 
footing by written agreements with headmen on their estates. The 
B&EA Company, which held 167, 829 acres in the Shire Highlands under 
Certificates of Claim, took a lead and seems genuinely to have 
been trying to achieve a relationship which was satisfactory to all 
parties, which spelled out the residence conditions in more detail 
than had the Certificates and which also dealt with the labour 
conditions. *
The B&EA Company agreements were signed by the Company's manager 
and marked by eleven headmen on behalf of their people on 26 
September 1902. Presumably for simplicity and clarity, and 
realising the practical difficulties in differentiating between 
original occupants and newcomers, the Company sought the renunciation
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of the non-disturbance clause protection. In exchange for having 
been allowed to change their village and garden sites and "to enjoy 
various privileges as tenants", the headmen agreed to give up all 
non-disturbance clause rights and to occupy their villages and 
gardens as tenants of the Company. They agreed also to cut timber 
only in demarcated areas; to build new houses, open new gardens and 
admit newcomers only with the estate owner1 s permission; and to move 
gardens and houses if asked, with adequate notice given, on the 
assurance that "the new sites will be ample as regards garden room, 
water etc and suitable in all respects for their occupation." The 
Company guaranteed "the peaceful and undisturbed possession of 
[tenants' ] houses and villages and gardens." In respect of African 
residence conditions the agreements were at least as favourable as 
were the non-disturbance clauses save for the crucial point that the 
agreements could be terminated, on five months notice, whereas the 
Certificate of Claim rights were in perpetuity.
In regard to labour conditions, the headmen agreed "on behalf of 
their people and with the full consent of their people" to give two 
months' work during the rainy season, if asked, in lieu of six 
shillings rent a year. In return the Company agreed to pay the 
taxes of their tenants for the first month worked and to pay normal 
wages for the second. Breaches of the agreement by the tenants 
entitled the Company to issue a notice to quit. In respect of 
labour conditions the agreement seemed to be fair: residence, tax
and a month's wages in exchange for two months' work and agreement 
not to work for other employers.
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The practice embodied in these agreements became known as 
■hhanaata. the traditional labour service rendered to chiefs.
Although to have voiced objection might have jeopardised their 
chances of being given work and consequently their ability to pay tax 
and might have run the risk of them being returned to Mocambique, the 
Africans did not appear to be aggrieved by this arrangement. The 
work did not seem more onerous or unreasonable than that which the 
newcomers had performed for the local chief when they first 
arrived, ^  and none relied on the non-disturbance clauses.
Nonetheless, worried by the removal of the clause protection, the 
Supervisor for Native Affairs petitioned the High Court to set the 
agreements aside.
In giving his judgment on 28 April 1903, Judge Nunan said;
The present agreement ... appears to me to
be exceedingly unfair and one-sided. The
natives ... surrender a freehold or claim
of freehold, and receive a tenancy at will 
with the super-added condition that if they 
do not work for the land owner ... they are 
bound to pay six shillings annual rent for 
their holdings ... As these conditions are 
neither fair nor reasonable the Court has 
no hesitation in setting them aside.
Having disposed quite quickly of the labour aspects of the agreement,
Nunan turned to what was for him the more interesting and "far wider
question of the right of natives under the old Certificates of Claim
[which] must be decided once and for all". Indeed, his decision on
the labour aspects must have related to the original occupants
entitled to protection under the Certificates because the agreement
could not reasonably be said to be "exceedingly unfair and one-sided"
in the case of newcomers with no rights of residence. He was, he
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felt, required to determine three questions.
First he asked "To whom were the [non-disturbance] rights 
secured by the Certificates of Claim? To the tribe, to the village 
community, or to the individual native?" Johnston had not expressed 
a view on this question, presumably because he considered the areas 
in question to have the same status as other African-held, 
unalienated, land. Nunan ruled that the rights were conferred on 
the village communities.
His second question was "What was the nature and extent of the 
rights so secured?", and here he was in no doubt that Johnston had 
confirmed to the land holder an estate in fee simple. "There was, on 
the other hand, no idea of conferring upon the village communities an 
estate in fee simple over the villages and plantations expressly 
reserved." He was, however, highly ambiguous for he immediately 
went on to say, "But the intention of the Crown was to reserve to 
the villagers a freehold right as a community to the said villages 
and plantations." He did not explain the difference between "an 
estate in fee sinple", "a freehold right" and, later, the rights of 
"native freeholders". As to the extent of the right, he ruled that 
at least eight acres per hut would allow "a sufficiency of land to 
obviate the necessity of migration and to allow of a proper rotation 
of gardens and a proper fallow period": like Johnston, he accepted
that the lands reserved to African original occupants were larger 
than those currently used for villages and gardens.
Nunan's third question was " How are the persons or bodies in
whom the rights inhere to be ascertained, and upon whom [is it that] 
the onus of proof lies?" He first noted Ma most serious difficulty" 
because many villages had moved or greatly expanded, many new 
villages had sprung up and "in these last three years have come the 
great Anguru immigrations wiping out old landmarks and producing a 
situation of the greatest complexity." He then ruled that firstly 
if the "native freeholders" - the judge's expression - were 
permitted to move from their original sites without objection, they 
could not be treated as tenants; secondly, settlers other than 
Anguru could not be treated as tenants unless the estate owner 
satisfied the Commissioner that they were not original occupants; 
and thirdly, proof that original sites were voluntarily abandoned 
would be required before they reverted to the proprietor. In 
respect of this last point, he confused disturbance or removal with 
the opening of new villages or gardens; only in the former case was 
reversion to the estate owner mentioned in the Certificates of 
Claim.
At the very end of his judgment Nunan returned to the labour 
question and suggested "a new arrangement" whereby from the 
Africans' point of view, without distinguishing between original 
occupants and newcomers, they paid a "moderate rent" of perhaps 
three shillings which should be commutable if they worked for a 
month during the rainy season "in return for a fixity of tenure and 
for the grant of an allowance of land sufficient to prevent frequent 
migration of the village community." From the Europeans' point of 
view, it would "probably be in the interests of the proprietor not 
to attempt to make a sharp division between old occupiers and new
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tenants." For the Africans, however, the unfair distinction was not 
between old occupants and new tenants but between those on estates
c.
and those on Crown Land.
Nunan's decisions may be summarised as in effect saying, 
firstly, that the B&EA Company agreements were unfair and 
unreasonable because they removed the non-disturbance clause 
security from the original occupants. Secondly, he re-affirmed 
that the non-disturbance clause rights were vested in the village 
communities, were freehold rights and extended to eight acres per 
family, and the proof that a resident was not an original occupant 
rested on the land owners. Thirdly, he suggested that the 
Africans, whether original occupants or newcomers, might find it in 
their interests to agree to pay a rent, or work, in exchange for "a 
fixity of tenure" and that the Europeans might also find it in their 
interests not to distinguish between original and new occupants.
Save for a difference over the amount of work to be performed and 
its equivalent in rent, and the question of long term security of 
tenure for original occupants, Nunan does not seem to have 
accomplished any more than the B&EA Company agreements would have 
accomplished.
Whilst this case was being heard, the Commissioner appointed a 
Land Commission under Nunan's chairmanship to consider how best to 
give effect to it and particularly to deal with the two differences 
between Nunan's judgment and the estate owners' agreements with 
Africans on their estates. Nunan recognised that his ruling on the 
law - that the original occupants were protected and that the onus
L
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of establishing an African's status rested with the landowner - 
conflicted with practicalities - that the owners could not 
reasonably be expected to prove this. He therefore made the point - 
significantly more in his Vice-Consular role than in his judicial 
role - that if the owners did not enter into discussions "in a 
spirit of compromise", the Government might well impose a "drastic 
land tax [and resume] large tracts of land... for public purposes" 
which would "help to loosen the mortmain of the great proprietors." 
He was threatening them with penal taxation and expropriation in 
order to secure their cooperation.
As a result of Nunan's recommendations, ^  the Lands (Native
Q
Locations) Ordinance of 1904 was enacted and empowered the 
Commissioner to direct landowners to set aside for Africans, 
locations of up to ten per cent of undeveloped land, and to allot 
this land to estate residents on the basis of eight acres per
Q
family. The land was to be vested in the male tax paying heads
of families as joint tenants upon a lease forever without power to
1 nmortgage, sell or pledge their interest in, the land. In this 
way the long-term security of tenure of original occupants, which 
the Company agreements would have removed, was reaffirmed, albeit 
not in respect of the original sites and not without payment of 
rent. Every tenant was required to pay an annual rent of four 
shillings to the landlord or be liable to have his crops, goods and 
chattels distrained. Where rent remained unpaid for a year the 
defaulter's interest in the land corid, at the Governor's 
discretion, be forfeited and the defaulter could be evicted; ^  
presumably, if the Governor declined to exercise this discretion the
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long term security of original occupants was as sound as under the 
Certificates of Claim. The effect of this Ordinance was to extend 
to all Africans on private estates some of the non-disturbance 
clause benefits and the liability to pay rent or be evicted: the 
original occupants suffered a duty - to pay rent - whilst the new 
tenants gained a right - to occupy eight acres of land. Thancrata. 
labour rent, which Nunan had ruled invalid in the B&EA Company 
agreements, was not mentioned in the 1904 Ordinance.
For reasons later not entirely clear, the Ordinance was never 
brought into effect. Perhaps the assimilation of the two types of 
Africans on private estates was recognised to be unfair on the 
original occupants. The large landowners later claimed that the 
reason was that the Africans did not like being confined to a small 
area of land, the locations, and Sir George Smith's opinion in 
1917 was that it would operate with undue harshness on the smaller 
estate owners and "would certainly carry in its wake many of the 
inconsistencies and undesirable consequences of a system of native 
compounds or locations." In any case, save for giving long-term 
security of residence - which the B&EA Company agreements did not 
give - it did little but provide for giving legal effect to a well 
established practice: the owners wanted labour and the practice 
provided it because, notwithstanding the Ordinance's silence on 
labour rent, in order to pay the rent the Africans had to work and 
they did not publicly object principally, presumably, because they 
wanted to work in order additionally to pay their tax and purchase 
trade goods. The Ordinance was capable of giving the 
non-disturbance rights, or something very like them - a perpetual
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lease - statutory force because it would have been open to the 
Commissioner to allot locations only to original occupants, who 
then, as a community - notwithstanding the individual requirement to 
pay rent - would have security of tenure. It would also have been 
open to the Commissioner not to exercise his discretion to order 
eviction for rent default in the case of the original occupants.
This statutory force could have clarified the position of the 
original occupants, but for Africans it was not then a pressing 
matter and for Europeans it was a restriction they would resist. In 
not bringing the Ordinance into effect, Sharpe missed the 
opportunity to resolve a dangerous problem which was to worry his 
successors for the next half century. In 1904 3, 618, 000 of the 
Protectorate's 26, 000,000 acres were alienated: 2, 700, 000 in North 
Nyasa, 387, 000 in Zomba, 364, 000 in Blantyre, 94, 000 in Ruo, and 
73, 000 in Upper Shire. Only 32, 809 acres of private land were 
under cultivation and 156, 727 acres were occupied by Africans. ^  
Sharrer had developed only 5,000 of his 367, 000 acres, the B&EA 
Company only 3,000 of its 160,000 acres and the Bruce Estates only 
500 of their 160,000 acres. *5 If the full powers of the 1904 
Ordinance had been used, the BCA Company would have had to give up 
36, 200 acres to become African locations, the B&EA Company 15, 700 
acres and the Bruce Estates 15,950 acres.
In the early twentieth century, then, the problem of Africans on 
private estates emerged: under what conditions were estate owners to 
secure labour from resident Africans without infringing the 
non-disturbance rights of original occupants ? Allied to this 
central problem were other problems which grew in severity over the
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years: difficulties in identifying original occupants, of giving 
tenants no choice to pay money rather than labour rent, of 
conserving natural resources against the damage caused by 
traditional African forms of cultivation, of increasing population 
pressure, and of withholding from development large areas of land in 
the hands of absentee landlords, large companies based in Great 
Britain.
A very large extension of alienated land was agreed by the
Government in its 1902 and 1908 contracts with the Shire Highlands
1 fiRailway (SHR) Company. In exchange for constructing a railway 
the Government agreed to grant lands in fee simple by way of a 
subsidy to the Company at the rate of 3, 200 acres - the Company had 
originally asked for 6,400 acres - for each completed mile of 
rail. 243, 634 of the 361, 600 acres to be granted in this way*® 
were held in reserve in the Chiradzulu, Blantyre and MLanje 
Districts where "the land is in fact so thickly populated and so 
denuded of timber that it can be of no use to any private owner
1 Qexcept for the control of the labour supply."
OA
The Associated Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce now 
became deeply concerned about the shortage of Crown Land available 
for lease or purchase, since "the greater part of the Shire 
Highlands [was already] taken up by private companies" and they 
resented the large grants being made to the SHR Company. 2* They 
seized upon the fact that the Company had not completed its contract 
on time to press the Government to withdraw its grants of subsidy 
lands. The cause was taken up not only by the planters but by
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Hetherwick who in 1908 pointed to the very large holdings held, and
shortly to be held, by the BCA Company, the company formed to
succeed the SHR Company, and added:
What was to be done to get these large 
tracts ... now in private hands, developed, 
or if not developed brought into the 
market?... The planting companies can only 
develop certain portions of their lands; 
why do they hold up their land when 
planters are crying out for new ground to 
settle on?22
Although his arguments were directed at acquiring land for 
Europeans rather than for Africans, the basic point was one later to 
become important from an African point of view: it was unwise to 
allow large alienated areas to be unused rather than open them up for 
development. In 1908, only 86 Europeans were engaged in agriculture 
and consequently their ability to develop the land speedily was
oo
extremely limited.
The BCA Company responded that it was wrong to assume their 
lands would lie idle for they were ready to "sell or lease land at a 
reasonable figure" or to develop it themselves. When the General 
Manager produced a map showing the BCA Company's Shire Highlands 
estates in red or pink, the Chairman of the meeting exclaimed "The 
map seems to be all red and pink!"2^
Pressure continued, however, and Hetherwick raised the issue at
oc
the November 1909 meeting of Legislative Council, basing his 
arguments still on the failure of the SHR Company to complete its 
contract on time. He pointed out that on the subsidy lands "were 
settled a large native population. Their position and their rights
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were very important features of the whole case", and he asked 
Government to "secure some re-arrangement of the terms as regards the 
disposal of land. The question of the native living on this tract of
land was becoming more and more serious."
The Governor recognised that the subsidy lands were an
"important question" and although the contract with the SHR Company
preserved the rights of Africans living on the subsidy land, he 
feared the Company might refuse to recognise the rights of the many 
newcomers since the contract was signed.
The Deputy Governor admitted that shifting cultivation was now 
damaging the estates' natural resources and the owners were reluctant 
to allow it to continue, especially since the population was 
increasing at a fast rate: in the Shire Highlands between 1901 and 
1908, by 121% from 95,000 to 210,000, and it was becoming extremely 
difficult to distinguish the original occupants from newcomers.
The Governor said that he knew of "no question more difficult 
which an Administrator of an African State had to confront than this 
matter of land where there were both black and white populations"; 
what the country needed "more than anything else" was to deal with 
the question of land in a " comprehensive and suitable manner." 
Hetherwick took these remarks as an indication that the matter was 
under active consideration by the Government and "would be dealt with 
at an early date", so he did not then press his points further.
At this same meeting of Legislative Council in November 1909, an
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Employment of Natives Bill was discussed and agreed to. Although it 
provided that "the wages of every employee shall be paid to him in 
cash", which almost certainly meant that payment in the form of 
residence rights was illegal, this particular aspect was not raised 
in the legislature nor by the Chamber of Commerce which made 
representations to it. 2® The estate owners circumvented the 
difficulty by continuing the B&EA Company practice of paying their 
tenant-1 abourers' tax directly to Government. Had Government 
insisted on enforcing the 1909 Ordinance, they would have lost the 
considerable financial and administrative benefits of having the tax 
collected for them. 2  ^ Later, owners overcame the legal difficulty 
by paying wages for the work which they continued to insist on.
Hetherwick kept the land question in the public eye and at the
O O  r
May 1910 meeting of Legislative Council he initiated a debate on 
"Native Land Tenure" in which he claimed that the Lands (Native 
Locations) Ordinance was a "dead letter" and attributed its failure, 
on the European side to it not being in their interests to encourage 
dis-alienation of their land, and on the African side to ignorance of 
the existence, let alone the content, of the law. He argued that 
African agriculture would expand, benefiting the economy, only if 
Africans had secure tenure and thus not only should the Ordinance be 
used to create secure locations but Crown Land should also be used to 
create reserves. He also argued that Government should re-acquire 
land in districts where "Government land was scarce, by purchase or 
by treaty with private ... owners to lease it out to ... natives." 
There had been many changes of private land ownership recently and 
questions of the rights of Africans living on the estates arose, and
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he concluded that:
the only policy Government could adopt was 
to find some means by which some of the 
lands which the native disposed of years 
ago were returned to him.
In this way he went further than had Nunan who recommended that
Government should require estate owners to set aside locations, and
he now recommended that Government should itself purchase private
land and set aside part of its own land for African settlement.
A month after this Legislative Council meeting, the Governor 
asked the Chamber of Commerce for its views on a tax on undeveloped 
private land. The idea, originally mooted in 1897 had been repeated 
by the Land Commission in 1903 when the Government had decided to 
take no action, but they now wished to consider it again. The 
Chamber advised against it, but Government became influenced by the 
sharp increase in the number of Europeans settling in the country, 
mainly in the Shire Highlands. The support of the Secretary of State 
was secured and at the November 1911 meeting of Legislative Council a 
Land Tax Bill was introduced.
It was a short Bill but the officials introducing it argued
their case at unusual length and with unusual strength, pleading for
the three unofficial members to support it since
A unanimous vote ... would ... indicate to 
the Home Government that the Nyasaland 
European was ... willing to take a 
responsible interest in the country. It 
meant that future representations for works 
of development ... would be considerably 
strengthened ... and it would tend 
eventually to financial independence.
Conversely, dissent would weaken the country's position " and it would
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be the planting community who would eventually suffer." In every 
previous year Britain had met Nyasaland's budget deficit: some 
£750, 000 in twenty years, and it was felt it was high time that 
Nyasaland stood on its own financial feet. Yet the unofficial 
representatives in Legislative Council all had a deep personal 
interest in land and were unlikely to agree readily to a land tax 
particularly one which was aimed primarily at large estates such as 
their own. Metcalfe was General Manager of the BCA Company; Bruce 
owned the Magomero estates, and Kidney was General Manager of the 
ALC.
The Government's argument was that since the Africans already 
contributed 70% of the revenue and were about to have their hut tax 
increased, the Europeans should pay more so as to maintain the 30% 
which they currently contributed to public revenue. At half a penny 
an acre the land tax, which would fall almost exclusively upon 
Europeans, would raise £8, 000 a year and since half of this would 
fall upon the British South Africa Company's North Nyas a holdings, 
and another £2, 000 would derive from land north of Fort Johnston, 
only £2, 000 would be taken from Shire Highlands owners, in exchange 
for which the Governor gave the assurance that £8,000 would be 
devoted exclusively to "the benefit of the planting and commercial 
community in the Shire Highlands" by macadamising roads and 
constructing feeder roads from the plantation areas to the railway. 
There was to be no attempt to distinguish between the values or 
cultivahility of land; although this was put forward on grounds of 
simplicity and cheapness, Government was well aware that if they 
taxed the poorer and undeveloped land equally with other land, the
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large owners might be induced to part with the poorer land and
develop the better areas. Of the unofficial members, Kidney and Bruce
saw no necessity for additional revenue but were won over by the
promise that the £8,000 would be devoted to the Shire Highlands.
Bruce believed that the European planters should make the "sacrifice"
in order to assist and hasten on the 
bettering of existing lines of 
communication and genuine development.
This belief was related to the fact that the Bruce estates were
located across one of the two routes which the northward extension of
the railway system was most likely to take and Bruce, consequently,
had a deep personal interest in the matter. Metcalfe, however, was
not won over, notwithstanding the fact that his Company owned land
astride the other probable route. He also saw no necessity to
raise additional revenue, nor could he see the economic necessity:
if the large landowners... were holding up 
their lands there would perhaps be some 
excuse for this tax, but this was not the 
case; on the other hand, they were doing 
their utmost to develop them as opportunity 
occurred by selling and leasing, and by 
opportunity occurring he meant by 
cultivation as far as the supply of labour 
went.
He distinguished between land capable of development and land not 
capable of development either because it was "naturally uncultivable" 
or because - revealingly at this early stage - it was "occupied by 
thousands of natives", for whom he could see no reason why the owner 
should pay land tax.
After final pleas for unanimity in which the Governor attempted, 
with no great hope of success, to win him over, Metcalfe voted 
against and all others voted for the Bill which became law and took
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effect on 1 April 1912.
Hetherwick returned yet again to the land question in
Legislative Council in November 19123  ^and argued for African
reserves in every District because "there might be natives living on
European lands who... might feel themselves occupying a situation
which they desired to be relieved of." The only satisfactory
solution, he felt, was to reserve "sufficient for the needs of the
natives" of each District. In replying, the Deputy Governor said
that especially in the Shire Highlands "suitable Crown lands for the
natives were scarce and scattered" and it would be difficult to set
land aside for reserves. Indeed,
Government was... compelled to inform 
District Residents where Anguru immigration 
was taking place that no further immigrants 
would be allowed to come and settle on 
Crown lands in the Shire Highlands, but 
could be directed to the Estates of private 
land holders who still desired them as 
settlers. 3
This encouragement of immigration onto private land was to exacerbate 
a problem later to become very difficult to solve but it is clear 
that Government was aware of the general dangers and was taking steps 
to control immigration at least onto Crown Land. The occasion for 
this debate was the introduction of the Crown Land Bill which 
included a requirement that a fixed proportion of the land leased 
should be developed within a stated period or that a certain sum 
should be invested in its development. Had Government been able and 
minded to apply similar conditions to freehold land this would
33significantly have stimulated the development of private estates.
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In 1913 the Government negotiated with the BCA Company to redeem 
the railway subsidy lands as a result of pressures by the Chamber of 
Commerce and by other Europeans, especially the smaller landowners, 
to secure more land for themselves; by Hetherwick to secure land for 
the Africans; and by the fast growth of population in the Shire 
Highlands which made it extremely difficult to claim that the 
Africans did not need the land: in the Shire Highlands the African 
population increased by 64% from 168, 584 to 275, 738 between 1905 and
1913. The Government redeemed the subsidy lands for £180, 800 -
35ten shillings an acre - with a loan from the inperial treasury.
In this way the BCA Company Shire Highlands holdings became 361, 600 
acres less than otherwise they would have been: to that extent a 
problem later to become one of very serious dimensions and grave 
concern was lessened.
In March 1914 Legislative Council debated a Bill to make 
"general a practice which has obtained in the past on several 
important estates." The Bill was designed to require landlords 
to enter into written agreements with tenants on their land, 
stipulating the payment of a money rent but permitting, in lieu, 
labour for a specified period and at a stated wage. Tenants 
collectively or individually would be required to declare and adhere 
to their preference for payment of rent in money or labour. These 
agreements, which original occupants protected by the non-disturbance 
clauses could, but need not, enter into, would be terminable on six 
months' notice but only if and when accommodation elsewhere had been 
provided. In his opening remarks the Attorney General said that 
Government wished to arrive at an "arrangement in regard to the
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conditions upon which the native population, and especially the 
[large] immigrant native population, should be allowed to settle and 
remain upon landed estates" and he referred to the different 
attitudes of Africans from those of Europeans towards "land as a 
species of private property." On the one hand "the native mind has 
no conception of individual tenure" whilst on the other were the 
"Europeans with this highly developed sense of value of individual 
tenure." He then spoke of the great increase in population and 
asked:
How are we to deal with this growing 
population, which we do not wish to 
discourage?... was it seriously proposed 
that the only condition on which we would 
admit them is that they are bound to work 
for the particular landlord on whose land 
they happened to settle? ... The only 
alternative then was to provide some fixity 
of tenure and give them the opportunity to 
pay their rent either in money or by 
service in lieu of money rent.
He hoped the large landowners "on whose land these increases chiefly
occurred" would agree, because it was largely owing to their "holding
up" practically the whole of their land that the situation had
arisen: the owners were developing only a minute percentage of their
holdings. If immigration was not to be discouraged and the
usefulness of the Africans on the estates was to be increased, it was
important to have fair conditions of employment, a choice of employer
and "fixity of tenure which should not be removed at the caprice of
an individual owner."
Bruce first replied that the Bill had been sprung upon them with 
insufficient time to give it adequate examination, and then described 
the system which had worked for many years on his estates: all
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tenants, by oral agreement, worked for one month for the owner who,
in exchange, paid their hut tax, and in addition they worked for one
month for wages, and
the thousands of natives who had settled, 
and were settling, on the land with full 
knowledge of these conditions bore witness 
to the fact that there was no hardship in 
such an agreement.
He was convinced that the option to pay rent, rather than to
work, would upset the labour supply and damage development because
the extension of cultivation "largely depended on the number of new
tenants who annually settled on the land." Because high yields of
cotton could be maintained only by cultivating freshly cleared
fields, the demand for labour for clearing bush land was continuous
and expanding; "More labour was used to clear more bush each year to
37maintain productivity. " ' Principally because of complaints about 
the lack of time given to examine the Bill, further consideration was 
postponed until the next meeting although, in the event, it was not 
then proceeded with.
Even so, the 1914 debate was important. On the Government side 
there was recognition of the fundamentally different views of land 
holding in the European and the African minds: private ownership 
versus communal use; there was also acknowledgement of the large 
immigration and of Government's wish not to discourage it; and the 
belief in some security of tenure for Africans and the choice of 
working or paying money rent in exchange for security. The 
Government was also clear that it was the large landowners who 
accepted most immigrants and who were retarding development by
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" holding up practically the whole of their land. " On the estate 
owners' side there was the argument that work in exchange for 
residential rights was so widely acquiesced in that it must logically 
involve no hardship. Additionally Bruce claimed that the fuller 
development depended on the work - not rent - of new African settlers 
to open up further areas of land: a point hinted at by Metcalfe 
earlier.
The Report on the 1915 Chilembwe Rising at Magomero - on Bruce's
land in fact - disapproved of the agreements to provide labour in
return for residential rights, 33 and recommended that work in lieu
of money rent be abolished except at the tenant's choice, that fair
rents be established, that reasonable notice to quit be given and
that eviction be only by the order of a court. As a consequence, the
Governor discussed the 1904 Ordinance, and the need to modify it, and
the 1914 draft Bill in Executive Council in the middle of 1916. 3^
He concluded that the 1914 proposals for written contracts were
"unworkable" and should be replaced by an ordinance regulating the
accommodation and obligations of estate Africans. A new draft Bill
omitted written agreements and provided for, firstly, banning
compulsory labour in lieu of rent; secondly a monetary payment in all
cases, to be determined by the landlord within Government-set maxima;
and thirdly the landlord's power to evict tenants within safeguards.
Governor Smith, ignoring Nunan's 1903 ruling on the onus nrobandi.
inserted a section in the draft Bill to abrogate the rights on the
grounds that:
With the many changes in the population 
which have occurred... and the practice of 
breaking new ground for native gardens at
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short intervals, it would be practically 
impossible for a claim to be now sustained 
on behalf of any individual or group of 
natives.
In giving these proposals to the Secretary of State, Smith 
acknowledged that the question of Africans on private estates was 
"one of no little difficulty and complexity" but he was optimistic 
that his proposals would "do much to regularise the position". The 
Colonial Office accepted his proposals but required him to remove the 
section which purported to abrogate the non-disturbance rights of 
original occupants.
The Bill, published on 30 September 1916, was discussed, 
inter alia, by the Blantyre Scottish missionaries and by the Chamber 
of Commerce. The missionaries were particularly worried by the 
shortage of African land in the Shire Highlands and concluded, in 
their journal Life and Work in Nvasaland: "We see no way out of the 
present impasse than that the Government should buy over some of the 
undeveloped land in European hands. The Chamber emphasised that 
the only reason for owners having Africans on their land was as a 
supply of labour and that the rent charged was but a minor 
consideration. The Government replied that the 1909 Employment 
of Natives Ordinance forbade payment for work in anything other than 
cash and that rent-free residence in exchange for labour was probably 
illegal. The Chamber objected that the Bill took away the right of 
free contract with estate Africans and in effect cancelled existing 
contracts. They believed that the destructive nature of traditional 
African cultivation rendered any rent "quite inadequate" to cover the 
damage to the soil and woodland; consequently labour - thanoata - was
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the only real return to the estate owner and was not an onerous 
requirement. They were deeply concerned that the provision that 
tenants could not be removed until the District Resident was 
satisfied that accommodation elsewhere had been provided or was 
available/ would amount to expropriation if the removal was to a new 
area on the estate, since there was hardly any Crown Land available 
in the Shire Highlands to which they could be moved.
The Chamber summarised their objections: freedom to contract to
pay rent in labour should be maintained; the level of rents should be
fixed locally/ to reflect varying land values; the extent of land to
which a resident African was entitled should not be precisely
specified but stated simply as sufficient for a dwelling and
subsistence; the Resident should be obliged/ without discretion/ to
eject Africans who failed to fulfil their obligations and to whom due
notice had been given; and
it [was] inopportune to raise questions 
affecting relations between proprietors and 
natives at the present time when a number 
of men whose interests [were] affected 
[were] absent on active service.
These objections were raised again when the Governor discussed 
the proposals with the Chamber early in 1917. He secured agreement 
on several points but two cardinal points remained: the method of 
fixing rents and the necessity for accommodation to be provided or be 
available before eviction was permitted. During the Bill's passage 
through Legislative Council he stood firm on the former and conceded 
the latter objection.
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In reporting this progress to the Colonial Office in April 
1917, 4  ^the Governor dealt with hardships which might fall upon the 
Africans resident on private estates, first distinguishing between 
the large landowners, the bulk of whose land was undeveloped, and the 
270 smaller owners with less than 5,000 acres each, 197 of whom owned 
less than 1, 000 acres each. Unrestricted squatting on the larger 
estates had not so far interfered with their economic exploitation, 
but on the smaller estates it was likely to "become a burden and 
result in considerable interference with the interests of the 
proprietor". Since smaller estate owners needed the labour it was 
unlikely that they would be harsh or unreasonable with their tenants.
Next, Smith wrote of the hardship resulting from Africans being 
" turned off the estate at a moment's notice" and felt that this was 
now to be covered by requiring fair and reasonable notice to quit. 
Unlike the Chamber, the Governor believed that there was still 
sufficient Crown Land in the Shire Highlands and adjacent areas for 
Africans to settle. If there was "undue expulsion" from estates, the 
1904 Ordinance could still be used to create locations on them.
The Governor, anxious to set matters as aright as possible,
"reserved" the Bill for the Colonial Office's view after it had been 
approved by Legislative Council and before it finally became 
law. 44 The Colonial Office were worried that "in deference to 
local opinion" the stipulation that six months' notice of eviction 
was to start only when the Resident was satisfied that accommodation 
was provided or available elsewhere, had been removed, but were
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reassured by the retention of the non-disturbance clause, by the 
Governor7 s view that Crown Land was available and by the 1904 powers 
to create locations. A further change was to remove the Resident's 
discretion in evicting defaulting tenants following due notice. ^
Although the Colonial Office accepted the Bill, they were clear
that it had "been modified very considerably in favour of the
landlord" and Sir George Fiddes felt that " agitators might, with some
shew of reason maintain that the result is worse than the thanaata
4fisystem so far as the freedom of the native is concerned." The 
Ordinance became law in September 1917 and in essence forbade the 
exaction of labour in lieu of money rent - in effect made thanaata 
illegal - separating the concept of landlord and tenant from that of 
employer and employee, but authorised the landlord to charge money 
rent in exchange for residence, a site and materials for a. hut, and 
sufficient cultivable land for the tenant and his family7 s 
sustenance. It provided for six months' notice to quit and summary 
eviction by the Resident thereafter. It did not alter the 
Certificate of Claim rights of the original occupants. In practice, 
by 1917 it had become even more difficult, although not yet 
impossible, to identify the original occupants, and the onus of 
proving original occupancy in reality fell upon the occupant himself.
It was soon recognised that the 1917 Ordinance, designed to 
achieve a system of tenancy based merely on payment of rent, would 
not work successfully. The Governor realised that the policy that 
every African "should be free to offer his labour where he pleases" 
was being ignored and "certain landlords [had] been endeavouring by
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indirect means to evade the. .. Ordinance. Pressure [was ] put on
natives residing on private estates designed to compel [them] to work
for the landlord and prevent them working for other employers." ^
Nor were all the means of evasion indirect:
a deputation of planters led by Major Bruce 
... threatened to evict all their tenants 
unless they were given a free hand in 
enforcing thanaata . .. Horrified by visions 
that they would have to settle thousands of 
Africans on Crown Land at six months' 
notice, the Administration capitulated ... 
and no tenant was offered the alternative 
of paying his rent in cash.
Smith, deeply worried, was pressed in mid 1919 by the Chamber of 
Commerce and Legislative Council to appoint a special commissioner to 
enquire into "the position of Africans residing on private 
estates. " He readily agreed but felt that with so many officers 
taking post-war leave and with everyone else very heavily pressed
4Q
with work, he could not do so for a while. A year later, 
however, on 19 July 1920, he did set up a Commission of Enquiry to 
look into the whole question again and on the same day promoted the 
Attorney General, E. St. J. Jackson, to be Judge of the High Court and
cn
made him Chairman of the Commission. The Commission accepted
that, whilst tenancy based simply on rent was "very desirable", the
1917 Ordinance was not working:
labour is the only return for which . . . 
estates will accept native tenants. No 
landlord can be compelled to accept 
them.. . Our problem accordingly is to define 
terms which are fair to the native 
and. .. such that the European landlord will 
be prepared to accept and retain native 
tenants on those terms.
This last point was important because already Crown Land in the
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Blantyre and Zomba Districts was insufficient to support the African 
population. Between 1904 and 1920 the population of Blantyre 
District had risen from 87, 000 to 156, 000 whilst the density rose 
from 53. 35 per square mile to 95. 53, and of Zomba District from 
46,000 to 102,000 and its density from 24. 53 to 51. 93. In Zomba a 
quarter of the Africans were living on private estates, and in
cp
Blantyre half. During the war the estate population increased 
considerably because it was easier to avoid military carrier service
CO
there than on Crown Land. Furthermore much Crown Land was leased 
to Europeans immediately after the War: in March 1919 13, 757 acres 
had been leased and by March 1921 this had risen to 118, 506 acres and 
the number of Europeans engaged in agriculture rose over the same 
period from 124 to 372. ^  By this time, too, the children of those 
many African immigrant families from Mocambique at the turn of the
r
century were setting up their own families and placing additional 
pressure on the land.
Jackson was impressed by the modem extension of a traditional 
relationship, thanaata. persisting despite legislative attempts to 
abolish it, which he believed showed that it "has practical 
convenience for both sides." He warned that since the only legal 
control on the relationship was six months' notice of eviction, "the 
absence of stricter regulation leaves numerous dangers". ^
The Commission, again ignoring Nunan's nnns p-mhand-i ruling, 
said that those who could establish non-disturbance clause rights 
could not be evicted under the 1917 Ordinance. There can be 
little doubt that if the question had been brought before him in his
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judicial capacity Jackson would have reached the same decision in 
favour of the original occupants.
What particularly worried Jackson was that although evictions 
were currently rare, conditions existed which could make them 
frequent - as Bruce and his deputation had threatened in 1917 - and 
the disturbance of large numbers of tenants "would obviously produce 
great hardship, discontent and numerous dangers". The conditions 
to which he referred were the recent influx of European settlers 
which split up the larger estates, introducing many more landlords 
than formerly, weakening the security which existed through long 
relationships with well known estate owners. The hardship referred 
to was the tenure insecurity of Africans who settled on private land; 
the possible removal from their homes was "a source of real anxiety 
to many". The discontent and numerous dangers referred to were 
political threats to which the Chilembwe Rising had given heightened 
appreciation. Even if the problem of Africans on private estates had 
not been clearly viewed in this light before, it was now seen as 
having marked and worrying political security ramifications.
The Commission recommended that security be enhanced by 
providing four years as the minimum period of tenure of Africans on 
private estates, subject to the performance of the terms of the 
tenancy agreement. To avoid mass eviction for non-performance, which 
would "cause serious disturbances", they recommended that eviction 
should not exceed ten per thousand acres of individual estates a year 
and should be subject to six months' notice failing which a further 
four years would run. To avoid or reduce exploitation of the
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tenants, the maximum period of work to which the owner could be
CO
entitled was recommended to be two months a year. Jackson also
recommended that Government should regain areas of private estates in
59 ,the Zomba and Blantyre Districts by exchange or purchase; in 
this, he went a step further than Nunan had in 1903: the latter 
recommended that Government be empowered to direct estate owners to 
create African locations; the former - following but not 
acknowledging Hetherwick's 1910 suggestion, repeated in Life and Work 
in 1916 - now recommended that Government acquire private land, in 
the two districts containing most European estates and most African 
tenants, by exchange or purchase.
The Government did not act on the Commission's Report, probably 
because the fears created by the Chilembwe Rising subsided and 
because the current economic depression removed the need to 
pressurise tenants to work on estates. Also, the greater political 
strength of the European owners enabled them to resist legislative 
changes which favoured the less powerful African tenants. The 
Protectorate Annual Reports for the next five years said that the 
proposals were still being considered, no decision had yet been 
reached, and consequently there was no change in land policy although 
they recognised that European settlement, land tenure and African 
reservations were "important and pressing problems". From 1926 
onwards the Reports made no reference to the Commission's proposals.
Governor Sir Charles Bowring, appointed in 1924, believed that 
the Protectorate's future depended on developing agriculture by a few 
European planters but principally by the Africans with European
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instructors; that blocks of Crown Land for further European
occupation should not be large or numerous and that the amount of
land suitable for that purpose and not required for African use was
very limited. Bowring said this notwithstanding the view of the
Jackson Commission, basing its calculation on the requirements of
double the existing African population, that 6, 000, 000 acres, twice
the existing amount of alienated land, could be opened up to European
agriculture. . He expressed these views to the Ormsby-Gore East
Africa Commission and, taking Nunan, Hetherwick, Life and Work, and
Jackson7 s point about acquisition a stage further, said that in the
Shire Highlands:
the only method of dealing with the problem 
is to re-acquire from the landowners 
convenient blocks of sufficient area to 
accommodate the natives at present resident 
on the estates for whom accommodation 
acceptable to them and to Government cannot 
be provided elsewhere on Crown Land.
In privately congratulating Ormsby-Gore on his 1924 General Election
majority (although "as a colonial civil servant [he had] no concern
with party politics") Bowring wrote:
the settlement of that important matter 
will cost money but there is no point in 
playing with the problem and ... it is up 
to us to pay for the evils of our 
fathers.
He mooted a graduated land tax - which would hit the larger estates 
most heavily - to pay for the re-acquired land, and, using arguments 
similar to those used by Nunan in threatening "a drastic land tax" in 
1903, added that such estates would "doubtless under pressure of this 
form of taxation be either partly released to Government ... sold, or 
leased to new settlers or prosperous natives ... But if the estates 
are to be freed from the rights of resident natives, they must be
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prepared to pay an equivalent for these rights in one form or 
another. " ^
When the Ormsby-Gore Report published and supported Bowring7 s 
views there was an outburst of criticism from the large landowners, 
and the ALC, A. L. Bruce Estates, B&EA Company and BCA Conpany produced 
a memorandum dated 24 May 1925 to voice their protest. ^  They felt 
particularly offended that the Commission had spent only three days 
in Nyasaland and had no formal meeting with the large landowners who 
had no idea the subject of Africans on private estates was being 
considered nor that "drastic" recommendations would be made; and that 
Qrmsby-Gore seemed unaware of the Jackson Report. They believed that 
the graduated tax would amount to "confiscation" and "a predatory 
measure" and that such "expropriation" was unnecessary, since there 
was in fact no shortage of land in the Protectorate: "In our view it 
is simply a case of confiscation under the guise of purchase. " They 
hoped that the matter would soon be settled " once and for all."
The Report and the European landowners7 sharp reaction led to 
the whole question of Africans on private estates being reopened. 
During 1925 and 1926 the Government had discussions with the 
landowners and the results were incorporated in resolutions agreed to
at a public meeting in Blantyreand embodied in a skeleton
67Bill. 0/ When he was on leave in the second half of 1926 Bowring 
had meetings at the Colonial Office and it was "a very great 
disappointment" to him not to settle the land problem. He explained 
to Legislative Council:
the position of natives on freehold estates
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... is one of extreme intricacy and ... 
negotiations are still proceeding in 
England between the Secretary of State and 
the representatives of the landowners.
The Secretary of State directed that a number of modifications should
be made to the skeleton Bill and that it should then be introduced
into Legislative Council, discussed and referred again to the
Colonial Office. ^
In 1927 the Government became deeply concerned about the number
of evictions, and Bowring brought the modified Bill before
Legislative Council as soon as he could "in order that an attempt to
solve one of the outstanding problems of vital importance to the
70Protectorate may be advanced with the minimum of delay." In the
course of being drafted, the Bill changed its title from "An
Ordinance to secure to natives the use and enjoyment of certain land
and of the revenue arising therefrom" to the "Native lands Bill" and
71finally the "Native Tenants on Private Estates Bill" In 
introducing it, the Acting Chief Secretary, E. F. Colville explained 
that:
Difficulties have repeatedly arisen as the 
development or break up of estates was 
interfered with by the presence of native
settlements, or as the need for labour
forced the landowners to try and make work 
on the estate a condition of remaining. On 
the other hand, the native found his 
liberty to choose his own employment 
limited, and many of his customs ... 
seriously interfered with. The difficulty 
was further accentuated by the absence of 
suitable Crown Land in the neighbourhood on 
which the ejected natives could settle.
This last point emphasised a worrying change from the position ten
years earlier when the Governor said "it is rarely the case that
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there is not Crown Land in the vicinity on which [evictees] could
7~
settle". Colville partly quantified the problem by saying that 
there were 115,703 Africans then living on private estates, 63% of 
them on the land of only five landowners, each having a minimum of 
4, 000 tenants, and the remaining 37% being distributed among about 50 
other landlords. All agreed that a great deal of discussion, 
resulting in compromise, had taken place: Smith believed the outcome 
"fair to the land holders and just to the.. .tenants"; the unofficial 
members acknowledged that the Bill presented "a fairly satisfactory 
solution" which "had been arrived at after a great deal of trouble" 
taken by Government and landowners; ^  a large landowner later said 
that "the 1928 Ordinance was the result of a great many years of 
consideration and giving way on the part of the landlord on one side 
and Government and natives on the other." ^  The Bill was enacted 
as the Natives on Private Estates Ordinance of 1928 which repealed 
the Native Locations and the Native Rents Ordinances and replaced 
them with what a later Governor described as "an elaborate series of 
provisions to regulate the position of natives residing on private 
estates". ^
Under the 1928 Ordinance^ resident Africans were liable to 
pay rent the equivalent of between two and three months' average 
agricultural worker's pay. In return they were entitled to a site 
and materials for a hut, cultivable land sufficient to maintain their 
families, and compensation for disturbance. They could ask for work 
or facilities for growing economic crops, the wages or price of which 
were to be used in remission of rent. If the owner refused labour or 
facilities for growing economic crops, his rent claim disappeared.
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Eviction was permitted summarily for rent default or misconduct, and
upon six months' notice without cause in the case of not more than
ten per cent of the resident population of each estate on the
expiration of a quinquennial period. In every other case, resident
Africans who complied with the Ordinance's provisions had security of
tenure for a further five years. This quinquennial eviction
provision was included at the request of landowners. The Ordinance
78also obliged the Government to find land for evicted Africans, 
but within a few years District Commissioners experienced great 
difficulty in enforcing legitimate eviction notices because they 
could not find sufficient land in the vicinity for settling
7 0
evictees. The Governor was empowered to acquire by compulsion up 
to 10% of the area of any estate over 10, 000 acres, for African 
settlement by exchanging Crown Land of equal value - not equal area.
f
This last provision was another step along the Nunan-Hetherwick-Life 
and Work-Jackson-Bowring road towards acquisition and dis-alienation 
of land for permanent African settlement, and although it might be 
seen as a sideways step in dealing with exchange rather than 
purchase, it was the first legislative step: earlier steps were 
merely the expression of views or recommendations.
The Government had allowed itself to be entrapped by the 
quinquennial eviction provisions. Landlords had a statutory right 
to evict 10% of resident Africans each five years. The Government 
had a duty to find land for the evictees. Crown Land nearby was not 
available and in order to acquire land nearby, exchanged land had to 
be of equal value and it was extremely unlikely that such land - 
except by alienating very large areas indeed in remote parts of the
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country - could be found of value equal to that in the Shire 
Highlands.
After 1928 the failure in practice to distinguish between
Africans protected by non-disturbance clauses and others continued:
indeed a later Governor described this as the distribution of "the
vaguely defined but undoubtedly existing rights of a few natives over
80a large number who could not claim to have any title to them".
Five years later - against a background in which very large areas of
private land were undeveloped and in which economic depression slowed
down development on all estates - Governor Young summarised the
resulting position:
The conditions, once universal, under which 
landowners were more anxious to obtain a 
supply of labour than to receive rent, do 
not now prevail ... The result is that a 
large number of natives who have no claim 
to special rights under the certificates of 
claim are enabled to live rent-free upon 
privately owned land, while the inheritors 
of the original native rights are in fact 
being treated in what can only be described 
as contravention of those rights.
The Blantyre District Commissioner's Annual Report for 1932 
criticised the level and different rates of rent being charged and 
added that there was insufficient firewood and building material 
available, that large areas of some private estates were still 
uncultivated and that the rent and labour sections of the 1928 
Ordinance needed changing. At about the time the Governor was 
reading this report, he received a copy of a letter to the Colonial 
Office by one of the large landowners bitterly complaining that, in 
effect, tenants lived rent-free on the estate. Young quickly
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concluded, as had most of his predecessors, that
the time had arrived for an attempt to be 
made to place the whole question of the 
position of natives on alienated land on a 
final and satisfactory footing.
In his 16 months in Nyasaland, Young introduced the Native
Authority Ordinance and, as he saw it, "finally disposed" of the
question of unalienated land and he now looked for similar action in
respect of alienated land. He saw the new Native Authorities as
"the re-creation of the same kind of Native Authorities as originally
parted with the land. These Authorities have replaced the village
communities as... holders of land." He awaited the end of the
quinquennium, 1933, with apprehension since the eviction of 10% of
resident Africans could result in removing to already congested Crown
Land at least 12, 000 people - a formidable and dangerous task. Most
large owners refrained from exercising their statutory right to evict
because it "might have proved an embarrassment to Government." In
exchange for this forebearance they hoped that Young would favourably
86consider representations which they proposed to make shortly. A 
major reason for not exercising their right of eviction was the 
current economic depression which lessened their demand for labour
07
and crops. Even so, 781 notices to quit, covering 3,124 people, 
were served in 1933: 299 in Cholo, of which 150 were enforced, 208 in 
Zomba, 207 in Chiradzulu, 42 in Mlanje and 25 in Blantyre. In Cholo 
only two of the larger estates - probably both belonging to the BCA 
Company - insisted on issuing notices to the full 10% of the number 
of tenants. At this time there were 35,328 families, or 141,312
Q Q
people, resident on estates in the Shire Highlands.
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In 1934 a Select Committee of the legislature considered what
legislation was required to reach a final solution to the problem.
The deliberations were carefully guided by Young whose own view
regarding the protection of the Certificates of Claim was:
every land owner was under an obligation 
merely to allow... the extent of land 
occupied by resident natives at the date of 
the grant with provision for normal 
increase, to be permanently at the disposal 
of the community concerned. This extent of 
land could shift from place to place within 
the boundaries of the estate according to 
the needs of the community and with their 
consent and that of the land owner but 
could not be shifted within these 
boundaries against the wishes of the 
community or removal outside them without 
the written consent of the 
Commissioner. *
Since the rights of the village communities had passed to the new
Native Authorities, Young wanted to be able to answer questions which
they might put to him.
Government should now take the opportunity 
of the creation of the Native Authorities 
to ... reply that the very first 
opportunity had been taken as soon as there 
was some organisation ... to represent the 
claims of the original holders of rights 
under the non-disturbance clauses, to 
regularise the position by coming to some 
arrangement agreed to by the landowners and 
the Native Authorities alike by which all 
such claims would be finally 
extinguished.
The Select Committee recommended that a local Commissioner should be 
appointed to try and identify the original occupants and their direct 
descendants or, if this was not possible, to take those on the 
estates at the 1911 census as the original occupants plus one 
generation7 s natural increase. The Commissioner was then to determine
the amount of land which it might be possible for owners to hand over
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to satisfy the needs of those with original rights. He was to
attempt an agreement between owners and Native Authorities to
discharge the landlord7 s obligation by handing over either the
determined amount of land or a portion of the rents collected and
giving rent-free tenure for life or until the original occupants and
their direct descendants moved off the estate. The 1928 Ordinance
was to be amended to abolish the quinquennial periods of eviction, to
provide for eviction only if a tenant either failed to pay rent or,
having offered to work or grow economic crops, had not been given the
opportunity to do so unless economic conditions prevented it and the
92tenant was able to earn money to pay rent in some other way. The 
proposal to hand over to the Government a portion of the landowners7 
estates - to which most land-owning witnesses strongly objected - was 
a further step along the Nunan-Hetherwick-Life and Work-Jackson- 
Bowring-1928 Ordinance road to acquisition of land for the permanent 
settlement of Africans from private estates.
Young sent these 1934 proposals to the Secretary of State who 
consulted the large land-holding companies and disagreed that the 
land question should be re-opened. He argued that the 1928 Ordinance 
was reached only after exhaustive enquiries and prolonged 
negotiations, and although the outcome was a compromise it was 
regarded at the time as the "final and best possible solution to a 
long standing difficulty": the present proposal "revive[d] a very
QO
difficult problem". Perhaps he realised that the only pressure 
to revive it came from Young himself and a very few of his District 
Commissioners and certainly not from the landowners nor, probably, 
the Native Authorities since they had but very recently been
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appointed and, at this stage, they voiced no particular concern to 
re-open the matter.
In reply, Sir Harold Kittermaster, Young7 s successor, in 
December 1934 claimed that the doubts of the unofficial members of 
Legislative Council about re-opening the question had been removed 
and that he was not worried about the effects on the Native 
Authorities, since they stood to receive funds from the proposals.
He suggested that African and European opinion should be gauged by 
publishing the Select Committee Report, and by appointing the local 
Commissioner. 9^
The Secretary of State was not moved by Kittermaster7 s 
arguments, saying that many landlords - presumably the London head 
offices of the companies holding land in Nyasaland - were still 
averse to re-opening the question and that others had agreed only 
because Young had suggested that the 1928 settlement might be 
challenged in the courts. Because of "public opinion in England" - 
again presumably the head offices - he preferred, if the matter were 
to be re-opened, an independent - not local - Land Commissioner. 
Furthermore, he was much opposed to publishing the Select Committee7 s 
Report. 95
Kittermaster7s District Commissioners now advised that "the 
position was not unsatisfactory and that the 1928 Ordinance was not 
the cause of any serious complaints." They felt, however, that this 
was because the landlords had not exercised their right of 
quinquennial evictions but that if they did so in 1938 "a serious 
situation might result" because it would be extremely difficult to
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find land on which to resettle the evicted Africans. Kittermaster 
did not know what to advise: "abstract justice" required that the 
original occupants and their direct descendants should have rights of 
rent-free residence, which could be bought out by the landlord, and 
that others should pay rent, but this distinction would not be 
appreciated by those not entitled to non-disturbance under the 
Certificates of Claim. He felt that a Special Commissioner would 
give greater publicity to the whole question which would run the
Q£
greater risk of "upsetting native opinion".
Although relationships were generally good, there was frequent
ill-feeling on the larger estates where supervision was poor,
97especially on the Bruce Magomero Estate:
tenants are unable to lay their complaints 
and troubles before the manager without 
much difficulty. In consequence, there is 
bred up a feeling that the landlord cares 
little for the tenants and, as a corollary, 
the tenants neglect their obligations.
There were problems too in heavily congested areas: " the shortage of
garden land is also responsible ... for a strong feeling of
resentment that unoccupied estates should be allowed to lie fallow
and undeveloped, while across the boundary the Trust Land native
cannot find room to plant his crops."99 The general difficulty was
summed up by the Southern Provincial Commissioner in 1936 when he
said of the tenants:
Economically they are not badly off but 
socially they are not so happily placed.
The majority live under "controlled" 
conditions, opposed to their way of life 
and irksome to them. They have no real 
fixity of tenure and their "resident" 
status conveys few privileges ... and they 
are not their own masters in any
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respect. 100
During 1936 a major reduction was made in the amount of
alienated land although this had little effect on land shortage and
population pressure. When the Certificates of Claim were issued, the
British South Africa Company - who took over the interests of the ALC
- were granted 2, 731, 700 acres covering practically the whole of the
North Nyasa District. An Order-in-Council of 24 July 1936 confirmed
the Company7 s renunciation of its freehold claims in return for its
101retention of mineral rights. The population of this very large
107area was only 46, 999 with a density of 10. 8 to the square mile.
Land congestion and the political security dangers in such congestion 
were absent, the area was distant from the European settlements of 
the Shire Highlands and in practice the renunciation had little 
effect on the problem of Africans on private estates.
In 1937 Kittermaster discussed Africans on private estates at 
the Colonial Office, repeated that he frankly was unable to put 
forward any constructive suggestions but followed the view of his 
advisers and suggested waiting to see what the landlords would do at 
the end of the quinquennium the following year. The Secretary
of State in the meantime proposed to await the report of Sir Robert 
Bell on the finances of the Protectorate in the hope, presumably, 
that Bell could make constructive suggestions. During this
year, 1937, the Southern Provincial Commissioner reported that 
" relationships between landlord and tenant [on the Bruce Magomero 
Estate had] not been good," and that the BCA Company applied to evict 
1,200 tenants for rent default but settled for the eviction of 150 of
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the ringleaders whilst the Government decided to "observe the effect 
upon the remainder."
If the Secretary of State had hoped for positive guidance from
Bell, he was disappointed. In his report, published in July 1938, he
concluded that there were two possible courses of action: firstly to
allow the conditions which had become stabilised over ten years to
continue and "if trouble arises in the future it can be dealt with in
the light of the actual circumstances of the time"; or, secondly, to
try and distinguish - he did not suggest how - between original
occupants and later tenants and make an equitable distinction between
them so as to give the former free rights of occupancy and oblige the
latter to enter into individual agreements with the landowner. He
concluded, however, as had Kittermaster, that there was "no certainty
that such a result, however fair it might be to all the parties,
would be accepted by them as satisfactory." The choice was a matter
of policy and Bell7 s advice - obvious, unhelpful, pragmatic and very
short term - was that
the only practical course at the moment is 
to ascertain the extent to which landowners 
exercise their right of issuing notices to 
quit and observe the effects. 06
Whilst 984 notices to quit were issued (359 from BCA Company 
land, 289 from B&EA Company land and 123 from Bruce Estates land), 
many tenants reached agreement with their landlords that they should 
stay on the land under special agreements. In the event, no 
large number of evictions took place in 1938, and consequently no 
early action was taken especially since the war intervened and 
occupied the energies and attention of most people in Nyasaland.
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Although there were a few evictions for rent default or misconduct,
there were no serious problems and the evicted families were
accommodated on Trust Land. Even so, Lord Hailey who visited the
country at this time reported:
the situation has provided in the past and 
may again provide incidents which prejudice 
the generally equable relations existing 
between Europeans and Africans... The 
measures which have been taken towards a 
solution... create a relationship which 
still contains many possibilities of 
friction... If a solution is to be found, it 
is probable that it must be sought on 
bolder lines than those hitherto followed, 
and may even involve the acquisition of 
certain areas in the private estates in 
order to provide secured holdings for part 
of the native population now resident on 
them.
Other signs of concern existed: the Native Welfare Committee in
January 1939 said that "in some of the very crowded regions of the
Southern Province there is a very general and justified complaint by
natives that there are large undeveloped areas of land in the hands
of owners of freehold estates... The purchase of freehold land by
Government may, in some cases, be necessary to relieve 
10Qcongestion."
1940 was a worrying year. In January there was talk of "a 
second rising" on the Chilembwe pattern and the Governor was 
sufficiently disturbed to remove the Bruce Magomero Estate manager 
from the Protectorate. * 2 , 0 0 0  eviction notices for rent default 
were served in the Blantyre District although few were enforced 
because most tenants agreed to undertake work in lieu of rent. 
Rumours also circulated that the Government intended to buy out 
landlords and abolish thanaata. ^  Governor warned Legislative
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Council at the end of 1940 that "native land occupation" would have
to be tackled as soon as time and staff permitted:
We cannot settle an inconvenient problem of 
the first magnitude and importance by 
simply continuing to ignore it... we must 
grasp this nettle, and a very rank and 
luxuriant weed it is.
Acute anxiety returned as the end of the next quinquennium, in
1943, approached. In 1942 and 1943 several hundreds of tenants in
the Blantyre District were served with orders to quit and they
refused to leave, creating "serious incidents". Hie Administration
found that although much of the difficulty stemmed from
misunderstanding, there were genuine grievances against the estate
owners. Even more disturbingly, agitation among tenants had increased
and was now political: "This appears to have been the first time that
agitators had fished in these troubled waters". **4 Senior
Administrative Officers and leading unofficials now believed that
serious trouble would arise if a solution was not soon found and the
Governor asked the Colonial Office to appoint "an independent
commission which could make an exhaustive examination of land 
115questions."
In 1943 Government took an important, but little publicised, 
step by purchasing a private estate of 3, 200 acres in the Shire 
Highlands, south of Blantyre, to resettle Africans "under a 
controlled settlement scheme ... to demonstrate the best use of land 
in congested circumstances."**^ Although the Africans resettled 
on this estate over the next few years were from Trust Land rather 
than from private estates, it was felt that the experience would be
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117of value later when more private land was acquired.
Early in 1945, two estate owners in Cholo tried to evict 1, 250 
rent-defaulting tenants and Government was faced with the daunting 
prospect of resettling this large number - totalling with their 
families over 5, 000 people - on already congested land. One of these 
estates was the Mpezo estate from which the owners, the BCA Company, 
applied for the eviction of over 2000 people. The District 
Commissioner, H. V. McDonald, through "political and tactful handling" 
succeeded in reducing the evictions to about 120 families and found a 
number of grievances held strongly by the tenants: the apparent 
inequity of charging rent on estates but not on Trust Land, reduction 
in the size of gardens by owners - which the 1917 and 1928 Ordinances 
had, by implication, permitted - and refusal of owners to permit 
tenants7 children to build huts and open gardens.
As a result principally of these worrying portends and of the 
Governor7 s representations, the Secretary of State7 s 1935 suggestion 
that a Special Commissioner be appointed was revived and Sir Sidney 
Abrahams was appointed on 22 July 1946. **9
Thus, during the period 1900-1945, three general and three 
specific elements characterised the evolution of the problem of 
Africans on private estates in Nyasaland and the attempts to solve 
it. Generally, there was an increasing demand for labour, about 
which the Government was pleased for economic reasons; increasing 
population pressure, about which the Government could do little; and 
increasing African discontent, about which the Government was worried
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but about which they felt they need do nothing other than "wait and 
see" and marginally improve the Africans7 lot. The specific elements 
were the position of the original occupants, thanaata - labour tenure 
- and tenants7 rights particularly security of tenure.
The non-disturbance clause protection of the original occupants 
was maintained in law throughout the period but in practice was 
ignored and no distinction was made between them and newcomers. Save 
that after 1903 this displayed a weakness, a lack of determination, 
on the part of Government to impose its will and ensure protection, 
no one other than Governor Young and a few of his District 
Commissioners in the early 1930s seemed to be worried by this 
neglect.
Thanaata. the right to demand labour of tenants, very soon 
became the only reason for owners voluntarily allowing settlers to 
enter and remain on their land. The B&EA Company7 s attempts to have 
this committed to written contracts failed because Nunan ruled it 
illegal in the case of the original occupants and placed upon owners 
the extremely difficult task of proving that settlers were not 
original occupants. Since the 1904 Ordinance did not mention 
thanaata. the 1903 status quo remained the legal position. The 1909 
Ordinance precluded direct thanaata but owners achieved it indirectly 
by paying wages or tax for compulsory labour. The 1917 Ordinance 
expressly made thanaata illegal but the owners openly defied it. The 
Jackson Commission in 1920, without saying whether thanaata was or 
was not legal, recommended that it be recognised and confined to two 
months7 labour a year. The 1928 Ordinance made the undertaking of
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thancrata voluntary: the tenant could choose to pay money rent or 
offer to grow crops or to work for the owner. The 1934 Select 
Committee recommended that it continue to be voluntary but if 
undertaken it should be the subject of separate written contracts.
With regard to the rights of tenants, throughout the period 
there was a general acceptance that they were entitled to a site and 
materials for a hut and sufficient cultivable land to sustain their 
families although stipulating an acreage was abandoned in 1917. In 
respect of security of tenure, subject to the payment of rent if 
required, the B&EA Company contracts required five months' notice to 
quit, whilst the 1904 Ordinance provided for perpetual security on 
locations excised from the estates. The 1914 Bill and the 1917 
Ordinance required six months' notice to quit but the Ordinance, 
unlike the Bill, did not make it conditional upon alternative 
accommodation being provided. In 1920 Jackson introduced the notions 
of security over a four year period and of evictions limited to ten 
per 1, 000 acres. The 1928 Ordinance extended the detail of these 
notions in favour of the tenants by granting security over a five 
year period and by limiting evictions to 10% of the resident 
population. Since this Ordinance also placed a duty on Government to 
accommodate evictees on Crown Land, and since there was a severe 
shortage of such land in the Shire Highlands, Government in .practice 
found it extremely difficult - and in some cases impossible - to 
enforce any significant number of eviction notices.
During the period up to 1945 the problem evolved of how to 
balance the rights of freeholders to do as they liked with their
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land, the need to use as much of the country's land as possible to 
accommodate a fast increasing population and to grow economic crops, 
the need to facilitate the supply of labour to estates which were the 
main wealth-creating agencies, and the duty to protect the African 
people and ensure that they were not exploited.
Whilst doing little to remove the basic problem, Government did 
take steps, albeit limited, to inprove the lot of African tenants on 
estates. It is true that nothing de facto was done to protect those 
who should have benefited from the non-disturbance clauses but this 
seemed to worry very few. Labour tenure was made an alternative to 
money rent at the choice of the tenant, and security was improved by 
restricting evictions without cause to quinquennial periods and to 
10% of the residents.
r
Why, then, did the Government not do more? There were 
demographic, economic and political factors concerning land which 
provide an answer to this question. Basically, there was only a 
given amount of land to support the country7 s population and from a 
narrow point of view Government did not mind whether the Africans 
lived on Trust Land or on private estates: they were gratified that
many lived on estates and were consequently reluctant to take any 
steps which would make owners less willing to accept and retain 
Africans on their estates. Secondly, as an agricultural country, 
Nyasaland's economy depended on its land and the use of its land. So 
long as estate agriculture contributed so massively to the nation's 
economic wealth through employment and exports, the Government was 
deeply reluctant to do anything which would decrease the supply of
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labour upon which that wealth depended. The Government wanted 
Africans to work on private estates. On the political side, two 
factors combined to reduce the Government's incentive to do more to 
improve the lot of the Africans on private estates: the considerable 
political strength of the Europeans, especially the large landowning 
companies, and the failure of the Africans to highlight and exploit 
their grievances - in effect their failure to cause sufficient 
anxiety to the owners and to the Government to persuade them to take 
more positive action. In this latter respect, the existence and 
predominance of corporate absentee landlords, controlling very large 
areas of land, is significant since it was very much more difficult 
to take effective action locally to influence, persuade, embarrass, 
even frighten, such landlords than to take similar action against 
small resident owners. On the whole, relationships with the smaller 
owners were good and it was the larger, company, estates which 
presented the greatest difficulties.
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CHAPTER III
THE ABRAHAMS COMMISSION, 1946 AND 
THE LAND PLANNING COMMITTEE, 1947
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Abrahams spent from 25 July to 4 October collecting evidence, 
and submitted his Report on 31 October 1946; it was published early 
in 1947. He took evidence from 80 individuals including estate 
owners, Government officers, Africans and missionaries; and from 37 
associations including 16 of chiefs, 10 of the Nyasaland African 
Congress and three of missions. He visited every District in the 
Protectorate except Kota Kota from where he nonetheless met, at 
Lilongwe, the District Commissioner, the chiefs and a delegation from 
the African Congress. *
In his Report he summarised the problems as seen by Africans as: 
the landlords' concept of land rights being contrary to African 
ideas; the failure of the law to cater for customary practices; some 
landlords' infringement of the law and in other cases the harsh 
exercise of their legal rights; the Africans' inability to understand 
their rights and obligations under a very complex law. The 
landlords' complaints were: quinquennial evictions were not 
politically practicable where large numbers were involved; the 1928 
Ordinance did not give what was most wanted - labour; and the
inability in many cases to offer work or facilities for growing
2crops.
Abrahams found in every District in which there were estate 
Africans that a number of occurrences had "excited resentment" or that 
there was apprehension that it was easy for landlords to "do 
something at any time to disturb seriously [the] traditional mode of 
life".^ Additionally,
There was not a single district ... with
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the exception of Fort Johnston, where this 
grievance ["the possession of large unused 
areas of land by non-natives" ] was not 
presented ... by deputations of chiefs, by 
the local branch of the African Congress 
and by other natives, first in a memorandum 
and afterwards orally.
Abrahams saw the problem as essentially a conflict between 
European concepts of freehold land and African concepts of communally 
held land and the true difficulty as a failure to appreciate this.
The Attorney General had, of course, stated the conflict of ideas 
very clearly in 1914 although Abrahams did not acknowledge this.
The European estate owner wanted, and believed that he should have 
the right, to demand rent or, preferably, labour; to select his own 
tenants and to eject them if they neglected their obligations or 
became a nuisance; and not to cater for burdensome African customary 
practices despite a general willingness to tolerate those not 
burdensome. The African tenants wanted, and believed that they 
should have the right, to live precisely as their fellows on Trust 
Land, free of rent and obligations in lieu of rent, with security to 
live in accordance with African law and custom, and able to select
c
their own employer or person to whom they sold their crops.
Abrahams concluded that reconciliation between the conflicting ideas
could not be achieved and - making Bell's point about the choice
being a matter of policy - compromise was "out of the question":
the only solution is the clear-cut one of 
getting rid of the status of resident 
native and leaving him free to quit the 
estate or stay there on terms satisfactory 
both to himself and the landlord, 
substituting contractual for statutory 
rights. 7
He referred to this process - which barely differed from the 1917
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Ordinance's aims - as " emancipation" and emphasised that it would be 
possible only if Trust Land were available to accommodate Africans
o
wishing to leave private land. The word " emancipation" had
connotations of slavery or serfdom and this, coupled with his
reference to leaving the resident African free to quit the estate -
which gave the false impression that Africans were not free to quit
estates - was an unfortunate word to use. Abrahams expressed his
solution in disarmingly simple terms:
There are three problems to be solved, 
namely the economic problem of the relief 
of congestion on Native Trust Land, the 
political problem of satisfying the sense 
of grievance that Europeans are holding 
large tracts of undeveloped land while the 
natives are suffering the acute pangs of 
land hunger, and the problem of 
emancipating the resident natives. If the 
first two problems are settled by the 
practical method of acquisition of these 
undeveloped lands, it follows automatically 
that the ... third problem will be solved 
since the resident natives are living 
there. If, on the other hand, the 
resident natives on undeveloped lands are 
emancipated by acquisition of the lands, 
and that is the only practical way in which 
it can be done, then automatically the 
other two problems are entirely solved. 9
In either case, he claimed, acquiring undeveloped private land would
solve all three problems. In both cases he relied on sufficient
undeveloped land being available to absorb the excess population on
Trust Land.
Following, although not acknowledging, the train of thought 
which had run from Nunan, through Hetherwick, Life and Work, Jackson, 
Bowring, Ormsby-Gore, the 1928 Ordinance, Young, the 1939 Native 
Welfare Committee and Hailey, he recommended that private land which
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was both unoccupied and uncultivated - what Johnston had described as
"waste land" in heavily populated areas half a century earlier -
should be acquired to relieve congestion on neighbouring Trust Land
or provide space for emancipated families from nearby estates. Land
occupied and cultivated by Resident Africans should also be acquired
"for the purpose of emancipation if it is situated in congested
areas." With the "comparative few", as he saw them, resident
Africans living not on undeveloped land but in areas scattered on
developed estates, Abrahams advised that the owners should be invited
to place all resident Africans on contracts which gave residence
rights on condition that they worked for an agreed period - which
would have institutionalised thanaata - and, if the owners agreed,
the Africans On Private Estates Ordinance should cease to apply to
them, whilst the resident Africans should be invited to opt between
entering into the contract or leaving the estate and living on Trust
Land (to be enlarged by acquisitions) and being compensated by
Government. ^  This was an inportant recommendation because, by
having the tenants leave the unacquired areas, the owners would be
left with unoccupied land which they could develop, knowing that the
Ordinance no longer applied to them and encroachment could be
controlled. The words "invited to opt" are also important because
they do not suggest any Government pressure to leave. Where
unoccupied and uncultivated land, and land occupied and cultivated by
resident Africans, existed on the same estate as land worked by wage
labour or visiting cultivators, Abrahams recommended that if the
1 1former lands were excisable they should be purchased. He also 
recommended that estate owners of land which Government wished 
otherwise to acquire should be allowed to retain "a reasonable
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portion of land" for development within a reasonable period of 
time. ^
Abrahams was most anxious to test his recommendations on, and 
secure the support of, both Europeans and Africans. In the case of 
Europeans he consulted Government officers, estate managers, 
individual owners including missionaries, the Convention of 
Associations and the Cholo Settlers' Association. In the case of 
Africans he consulted the African Provincial Councils, the African 
Congress, Councils of Chiefs and a number of leading African 
personalities. Only in Port Herald and MLanje Districts, which he 
visited first before he had arrived at his solution, was he unable to 
sound African opinion, but "in view... of the unqualified, and I might 
say almost enthusiastic, approval with which the suggested scheme was
r
met in all the other districts, I find it hard to believe that the 
reception would have been any different in these two 
districts." Abrahams visited Port Herald and MLanje only a 
fortnight after his arrival in Nyasaland, so it appears that within 
two weeks of arriving he had reached a solution and then, possibly, 
spent the next two months securing support for, or acquiescence in, 
it.
Abrahams was much gratified by the warmth which his proposals 
received:
The results of these consultations both 
with Europeans and natives were most 
encouraging. There was no criticism of the 
scheme from any quarter.
The reception with which the scheme was met 
by the natives was even more gratifying.
;
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Except in one [quickly corrected] instance 
it was immediately acclaimed with 
unqualified approval, and in some cases 
with great enthusiasm.
I think that I am entitled to say that in 
view of this volume of opinion, European 
and native, that the scheme has no obvious 
defect and if there is a latent fault which 
would seriously affect the success of its 
operation. I have sinned in good 
company.
He emphasised the dangers of failing quickly "to satisfy the
political grievances aggravated by land hunger" which were now
"receiving form, direction and force from organised bodies composed
17of the more intelligent members of [the African] community", and
made frequent reference to this:
It is obvious that a state of affairs 
which has poisoned the relations between 
the estate owners and those who work for 
them, to say nothing of the relations 
between European and African in general, 
must contain the seeds of many forms of 
trouble.
He added that many civil servants, especially Administrative 
Officers, and non-officials including many estate owners, 
particularly those of long standing and considerable experience 
"expressed their view that trouble will arise if a solution is not 
found."
He went on to point out that "if the Government does decide to 
acquire areas ... on which there is still room for further 
settlement, it is necessary that these lands should be jealously 
protected against indiscriminate settlement ... and unsupervised 
cultivation." He advocated closely controlled settlement of families 
from private estates using Settlement Officers in "a strong team of
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Executives". He thought also that the Government should appoint a 
Principal Settlement Officer, "an experienced administrative officer 
with knowledge of the problem, influence with the natives, keenness 
for the work and proven tact in dealing with Europeans and 
natives." He did not think it would be difficult to find such a 
person: he almost certainly had McDonald in mind. Abrahams also 
recommended a Planning Committee of very senior civil servants and 
disinterested unofficials to consider which land should be acquired, 
in what order, the method of settlement, the staff required, the cost 
involved and the compensation to be paid. Acquisition of private 
land should be negotiated, including arbitration and umpiring if 
needed, but if that failed, or if negotiations were refused - "an 
extremely improbable event" in Abrahams' view - then compulsory 
acquisition would be necessary. He could not suggest a means of 
financing the acquisitions by contributions from either landowners or 
tenants which would be "both equitable and practical" but he 
suggested the Native Development and Welfare Fund - "designed to 
promote the welfare or the social or economic development" of the 
African people. He also recommended that private land might be 
acquired by exchanging it for a right of occupancy of Trust Land 
without rent which "might be good business for [the estate owners]
Oft
and of considerable assistance to Government". This was not a
new idea since Executive Council during the 1920s agreed to many such
21applications especially from the large land companies.
The Government published the Abrahams Report on 15 February 
221947 and a few days later it was discussed very briefly in 
Legislative Council. The Governor, Richards, at the time warmly
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welcomed it with optimism, regarding it as a
most clear sighted and helpful survey of 
the land question in this country and as 
the most valuable contribution yet made to 
the final solution of this serious 
problem.
Six weeks later, after Richards had left the country on 
retirement, Brown the Chief Secretary, as Acting Governor, appointed 
a Land Planning Committee to obtain the information required to reach 
decisions on the Report's recommendations. As Abrahams suggested, 
the membership of the Committee included the Acting Chief Secretary, 
Talbot Edwards, who had been in Nyasaland less than six months having 
previously served in Nigeria, as Chairman; the Financial Secretary,
C. W. F. Footman; the Attorney General, W. J. Lockhart Smith; the Lands 
Officer , W. G. Alcock; the Cholo District Commissioner, McDonald; and 
the Acting Director of Agriculture, E. Lawrence. The other members 
were the Development Secretary, R. H. Keppel Compton and an Unofficial 
Member of Legislative and Executive Councils, M. P. Barrow. Forestry 
and Veterinary department representatives, advised by Abrahams, were 
not appointed.
The Committee co-opted a dozen European unofficials: Sir William 
Tait Bowie, Manager of the B&EA Company; Kaye Nicol, Manager of the 
BCA Company; Sibbald, manager of the A. L. Bruce Estates; Harris, 
Manager of the Cholo and Michiru Tea and Tobacco Estates; Ferguson of 
the Zambezi Mission; Fathers Dissard and Hardman of the Montfort
Marist Fathers Mission; Raynes of the ALC; Rev. W. H. Watson of the
*
Livingstonia Mission; Rodgers and Borrowman of the Blantyre Mission; 
and J. Tennett, a Cholo estate owner. They also received evidence
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from eight African Chiefs, all from the Shire Highlands: Nchema of
Chiradzulu; Chimombo and Chimalira of Cholo; Mabuka of MLanje; Mlumbe
25and Chikowi of Zomba; and Somba and Machinjiri of Blantyre. In 
their published report the Committee did not mention the co-opted 
members or the African Chiefs. 2^
The members, observing that 200,000 Africans were resident on 
private estates which totalled 1,207,000 acres (5. 1% of the 
Protectorate's land area) were deeply conscious of the magnitude and 
complexity of their task, the amount of detailed planning required, 
the likely expenditure - probably over a million pounds - and the 
length of time the operation would take to gather, collate and study 
information, agree on the action to be taken on each individual 
estate, to excise areas and eirploy surveyors. Yet time was not on 
their side. Abrahams had foreseen that much time would be required 
but felt that alleviating African discontent provided a pressing 
reason for an early announcement of Government's intentions. Largely 
as a result of Abrahams' visit, African interest in solving the land 
problems had intensified, and this, together with the approach of the 
quinquennial eviction period in August 1948, persuaded the Committee 
that more immediate steps than originally contemplated were 
demanded. Consequently, at the same time as requesting from 
District Commissioners information on the size and degree of 
development of the estates and the number of tenants in their 
Districts, they also sought recommendations as to which of those 
estates that were not cultivated under direct supervision should be 
immediately acquired by Government. 2^
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The Committee concluded that in the Shire Highlands Districts
where the difficulties were most acute, much of the trouble resulted
from industrialisation, in which term they included intensive
agricultural development, and here the heavy concentration of
population was on both private and Trust land, making necessary an
adjustment from shifting to more settled agriculture. The adjustment
was slowly taking place and inevitably involved some friction, to
which part of the political problem could be attributed. More
clearly evident was the resentment of Africans in the less intensely
developed areas when viewing large tracts of unused land held by
Europeans. Although there was generally a welcome acceptance of
Europeans actively working and developing the estates,
The growth of racial self-consciousness may 
perhaps be a contributory cause of the 
resentment felt by Africans against the 
holding of tracts of land held by Europeans 
and at present undeveloped by them.
In turning to which areas the Government should acquire, the 
Committee was guided by the principle that all land should be put to 
the best use possible in the interests of the Protectorate as a 
whole. These were significantly more economic than political, for 
they recommended that there should be no wholesale acquisition of 
undeveloped land suitable for European cultivation when an assurance 
of development within a reasonable period was given and that estates 
acquired primarily for African settlement more suitably developable 
by intensive methods should be granted on long lease to Europeans; 
that no actively worked estate should be acquired; that when part of 
an estate was acquired sufficient land should be left to permit 
development within a reasonable period; that all estates suitable for
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African settlement offered to Government should be acquired;' and that 
all fully settled undeveloped estates in congested areas should be
2Q
acquired.
In considering Abrahams' recommendation that the Government
should acquire all estates fully occupied by resident Africans
together with those unoccupied and uncultivated if acquisition would
relieve congestion on neighbouring Trust Land and provide settlement
areas for Africans wishing to leave estates, the Committee
encountered little difficulty although they pointed out that in the
areas where congestion was most severe, most estates were either
already developed or earmarked for early development so that the
amount of unoccupied land available for acquisition was negligible.
They met considerable difficulty, however, in respect of his
recommendation that on estates partially developed and partially
occupied by resident Africans, the latter areas should be excised
wherever the estate was divisible without being unfair to the 
30owner.
The problem now encountered, and one unforeseen or
insufficiently considered by Abrahams and apparently by members of
the Committee itself, was that in the intensely developed areas,
where the difficulties were greatest, nearly all the estates were
indivisible, and the Committee was faced with reaching a solution
without acquiring all the land which the resident Africans then
31occupied, as Abrahams had recommended.
Although Abrahams had not foreseen this difficulty he had been
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aware of his lack of detailed information, and in his letter to the 
Governor covering his report he was careful to include reference to 
this:
I have been unable to reach completely 
accurate conclusions on such subjects as 
congestion of population, cultivability of 
the soil and European development owing to 
the absence of a scientific survey of the 
country and the lack of persons who could 
give specific evidence of a fully reliable 
nature in respect to a particular case.
In such cases I have had to rely upon 
general impressions enabling me to reach 
approximate conclusions, or upon the rule 
of thumb. 32
It is puzzling that Abrahams felt that he had to rely so much on 
general impressions and rule of thumb because although no scientific 
survey of the country had been made there were many administrative 
and agricultural officers with considerable field experience in the 
important areas, and there were many estate owners and their 
employees also with considerable experience who, whilst not perhaps 
being able to give evidence of a fully reliable nature, should have 
been able to place Abrahams' understanding well beyond the level of 
general impressions and rule of thumb. Indeed, in his report he made 
reference to "administrative officers, agricultural officers, estate 
owners, chiefs and headmen intimately acquainted with local 
conditions" m  the congested area of the Shire Highlands, and 
members of the Land Planning Committee adduced more detailed evidence 
which cast grave doubts on Abrahams' recommendations within a few 
months of his report being published. Nonetheless, having expressed 
himself as being aware of his lack of detailed information, he 
dismissed its significance by saying, "I do not think .. .that my 
recommendations need be unduly qualified on this account." 3^
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Consequently, he recommended that in the case of indivisible estates 
- which he assumed to be few in number and limited in extent - the 
Africans should be invited to opt between entering into a contract or 
leaving the estate. But, as has been mentioned, there was in fact 
very little undeveloped land sufficiently nearby for the resident 
Africans to be agreeable to move to it and it was unlikely that the 
Africans would readily agree to move to distant areas away from their 
relatives.
In short, the recommendations in the report 
for these partially developed and partially 
occupied estates were founded on two 
hypotheses, the first being that a large 
number of such estates would be found to be 
readily divisible, and the second being 
that large scale acquisition of suitable 
undeveloped land in the same neighbourhood 
would be practicable. . It was the 
unquestioning acceptance of these 
hypotheses that secured for Sidney Abrahams 
the strong support he obtained for his 
proposals. But after close and detailed 
examination of the estates involved this 
committee has been forced to come to the 
conclusion that the true position is not as 
it was generally accepted to be, and that 
it does not lend itself to action on the 
lines proposed in the Abrahams Report. The 
problem of the emancipation of natives 
living on estates under active European 
development therefore still remains.
The Committee consequently dealt first with the divisible 
estates, that is those which though partially developed contained 
compact - not scattered - areas occupied by Africans, and made 
specific recommendations. In the highly congested Cholo District 
they planned for the concentration of the African population in 
compact villages in areas to be acquired adjacent to the tea and tung 
estates so that the Africans, who were in any case fairly recent 
immigrants, could choose between living in the villages, with small
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gardens, and working on the estates; or remaining on the estates as
contract tenants; or moving some distance elsewhere where larger
gardens might be available. Their proposals would continue the
supply of labour for the estates whilst not allowing that labour to
take up too much cultivable land, and at the same time encourage
African commercial foodstuffs production albeit at some distance from
the estate areas. It was:
no longer possible for a man to work for a 
few hours as a labourer on an estate and 
for the remainder of his time to attempt to 
cultivate his own farm. Apart from the 
fact that there is not enough land 
available in the neighbourhood, the ... 
disappearance of the part-time peasant 
agriculturalist would not only make much 
more land available for the genuine fanner 
but it would provide the latter with an 
assured and lucrative market in supplying 
the rest of the urban and rural 
wage-earners... there can be no ordered 
development of this part of Nyasaland 
unless such differentiation is begun 
immediately. 37
O Q
They were anxious to emphasise, in their draft report but not m  
the published version, that they were not encouraging large numbers 
to become landless wage earning labourers - and thus at the mercy of 
their employers or the vagaries of the economy - since the amount of 
land used by European estates would continue to be relatively 
insignificant compared to that available for African agriculture.
The Committee foresaw that those who worked on estates with small or 
no gardens, if they wished, could return from time to time to their
O Q
more distant and larger village gardens.
In the published Report, the Committee simply said "The land 
which we have recommended for acquisition in the Cholo District
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consists of four separate blocks", but in a draft they went into 
quite specific details of the areas involved. ^  The north-eastern 
block of 12,000 acres and the north-western block of 6, 000 acres 
belonged to the BCA Company and the General Manager personally 
thought that the Company would be prepared to sell this land to the 
Government "in view of the serious nature of the political problem", 
despite the fact that such sale would seriously interfere with the 
Company's ten year development plan to grow soya, sisal, tung and 
tobacco, items "all urgently needed" by Britain - a point which would 
not be lost on the British Government when mentioned to them by the 
London directors. Kaye Nicol believed that "it would be in the best 
long-term interests of the Protectorate to hand over the land to 
Government for use by Africans"; . this was a view which, even if 
genuinely held personally by the General Manager, was not necessarily 
also held by his London directors, and the focus on the long term 
enabled the Company, as things turned out, to avoid taking much early 
action in handing over land to the Government. Tait Bowie said that 
he believed the B&EA Company would probably be prepared to sell the 
Ruo Estate of 12, 500 acres to Government to form the west-central 
block. In the east-central block Harris believed that his company, 
the Cholo and Michiru Tea and Tobacco Estates, would be prepared to 
sell the Tuchila Estate of 3, 038 acres, and recommended that 
Government should also buy part of the ALC's Gotha estate which 
Raynes thought his company would be prepared to sell. ^
In all, 33, 538 acres in the Cholo District were to be purchased: 
54% of this belonged to the BCA Conpany. ^  There appears at this 
time to have been a considerable willingness on the part of the local
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managers, representing some of the very largest landowners in the 
country, to be prepared to sell land to the Government. None of 
these details and none of this willingness was referred to in the 
published Report.
In the published Report no mention was made of the Magomero 
Estate but the draft report made it clear that the owners, A. L. Bruce 
Estates, had already offered to sell it to Government, and they 
recommended that all but 10,000 acres round the factory preparing 
tobacco for the West Africa trade, should be acquired for possible 
future European development, for settling present resident Africans, 
for resettling Africans from elsewhere and for Government large scale 
"collectivised" farming.
In the Blantyre District, the Committee recognised a problem 
different from that found elsewhere. There, in the peri-urban area 
surrounding the Blantyre and Limbe townships which were expected to 
expand considerably, they recommended that areas be set aside as 
accommodation areas for the urban workers. These peri-urban areas 
would contain only small garden plots and those who wished to farm 
larger areas would have to move elsewhere. ^
In all, the Committee recommended the purchase of 545, 857 acres 
of the Protectorate's 1, 200, 000 acres of private land. Of the land 
recommended for purchase, 80% was in the Shire Highlands Districts: 
235, 502 in the Zomba District, 103,592 in the Blantyre District, 
35,212 in the Mlanje District, 33, 538 in the Cholo District; the 
remainder was scattered throughout other districts. They advised
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that 453, 641 acres, or 83%, of the total should be acquired 
45immediately.
The Committee felt it necessary to make a statement about
further acquisition, and in both their draft report and the published
version they said that if their recommendations were adopted,
Government should make it "perfectly" or "very" clear that "no
further large scale acquisition of freehold land [would] be
practicable without seriously prejudicing the European development
46upon which the prosperity of the [country] so largely depends."
In the draft report, but not in the published version, these words
were followed by:
We emphasise that our recommendations 
provide a palliative for, not a permanent 
solution of, an urgent political problem, 
but it is a palliative which cannot in any 
circumstances be repeated.
The words which appeared in the published version and which preceded
rather than followed the passage quoted were:
We recognise that much of the land acquired 
by Europeans in the early days has either 
not been developed or fallen out of use and 
does not now ... lend itself to European 
development. To meet an urgent political 
situation ... such land should now be 
acquired. Indeed ... the acquisition of 
land is essential, not only for the 
solution of the political problem... but 
also to prepare for the orderly settlement 
of Africans working in or near the main 
industrial areas.
The "palliative" had become a "solution": perhaps the Committee
reasoned that solutions do not have to "be repeated" whereas
palliatives might have to be repeated; and they were laying down the
limits of acquisition, that is land which did not "lend itself to
European development", but not land capable of "European development
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upon which the prosperity of the [country] so largely depends."
Having dealt with the acquisition of private estate land, 
members turned their attention to settlement on that land. ^  They 
expressed the view that the very heavy expenditure involved would be 
largely wasted unless from the very beginning they ensured controlled 
settlement. Abrahams had expressed the same point when he said that 
the acquired land "should be jealously protected against 
indiscriminate settlement and unorganised cultivation." The 
Committee recognised that the control would also be expensive. They 
thought that whilst the broad outline of policy should be laid down 
by the Government at the centre, the settlement of all acquired 
estates should be the responsibility of the District Commissioner in 
whose District the estates were located.
The Committee was at pains to emphasise its proposals for
collective farming:
The acquisition of large new tracts of land 
will present Government with an unique 
opportunity to embark on collective fsunning 
schemes on a large scale; indeed it is our 
considered view that it is only by the 
introduction of some such methods that the 
best use can be made of much of this newly 
acquired land ... By collective fanning we 
mean the fanning of small holdings in a 
single kigck by large scale fanning 
methods.
Although the Committee did not make it clear, these proposals could 
be applied only to those areas of private land which had relatively 
few African residents on them, and which were largely undeveloped - 
such areas as the Bruce Magomero and BCA Company Chingale estates - 
and could not be applied to the heavily populated Cholo areas.
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They did, however, deal with the view of a number of estate
owners: that there were large areas of Trust Land in other parts of
Nyasaland which Government should develop and to which Government
49should compel Africans to move from congested areas. This view 
was connected with a proposal made by the Convention of Associations 
shortly before Abrahams7 visit, advocating a Government scheme to 
settle European ex-soldier farmers. ^  The Committee rejected 
these ideas on the grounds that such areas were usually far distant 
from the settled parts, and that compulsory settlement schemes would 
not be successful and would defeat the object of the Land Commission 
Report which was to remove discontent: it could not provide an 
"immediate solution to the present political problem."
On the other hand, the Committee believed that where land was 
sufficient for the immediate and future African needs or where land 
was available, unoccupied and unsuitable for African cultivation, 
alienation should be considered provided, firstly, that it was in the 
general interest of the community, secondly that the proposed tenant 
- presumably European - was "of a type who will be an asset to the 
country", thirdly that intensive agricultural development would be 
used and the natural resources conserved. The Committee advocated 
that Government should make an early policy statement on this 
proposal although they did not indicate where such land was to be 
found: possibly they had in mind some of the Trust Land in the
Central Province which was suitable for -flue-cured tobacco
CM
cultivation.
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The Committee members were aware of a number of facts and
considerations which they felt the Government might, for political
reasons, not wish to publish, and which were recorded in a
confidential appendix to the draft report. ^  They recalled that
Abrahams had formed the very firm impression that the Africans
expected their grievances to be remedied and their claims satisfied
as a result of his report, and that if this did not happen there
might be very serious consequences. The Committee had no doubt that
this impression was correct. In his Annual Reports for 1946 and
1947, the Provincial Commissioner of the Southern Province had said
that the " report of Government7 s policy regarding the acquisition of
alienated land for resettlement is eagerly awaited by the chiefs and
people" and that his ability to settle individual cases under the
Natives on Private Estates Ordinance had "been maintained [only] in
53expectation of the radical solution to be found" by Government.
They directed their attention to how far the acquisitions recommended
in their Report would go to satisfy African expectations and
concluded that they could be satisfied only if extensive areas of
freehold land in the Cholo and Blantyre Districts which were not in
their report, were acquired by Government. Whereas all the areas
recommended in their published report would, they believed, be
offered voluntarily for sale - indeed the General Managers of the
large estates had led them to believe this - these additional lands
could be acquired only compulsorily unless the owners could be
persuaded to change their minds. However, they advised against
compulsory acquisition on the grounds that:
Nyas aland has been fortunate hitherto in 
being comparatively free from racial 
troubles. To resort to compulsory
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acquisition at a time when European capital 
is seeking opportunity in the country and 
when estate owners are planning to make up 
for the time lost during the war in long 
term development of their estates might so 
alienate European opinion and sympathy as 
to endanger the happy relations which have 
so far existed between the majority of 
European estate owners and their African 
labour. It might also prevent the further 
investment of European capital, without 
which the prospects of future prosperity 
would be but slight.
In addition, even if compulsory acquisition were resorted to it would
be likely to result only in a temporary solution to the problem of
congestion and it might provide "an example of the remedy proving
worse than the disease."
The land which the Committee here had in mind was land owned by 
the BCA Company, "the largest owner of land and the largest owner of 
undeveloped land in the Protectorate" and the "target of considerable 
criticism on general grounds by African opinion" which was 
particularly sensitive on land issues in the Southern Province. The 
Company owned large undeveloped estates in Blantyre and Cholo 
Districts in the most heavily congested areas of the Shire 
Highlands. That these areas were not a great deal more extensive was 
the result of the Government having redeemed the railway subsidy 
lands in 1913. As on adjacent Trust Land, where the population 
density was over 400 to the square mile, these lands were entirely 
cultivated by tenants on a subsistence basis. In recent years large 
numbers of tenants had refused to pay rent and the Committee feared, 
at the least, embarrassment and political discontent at the end of 
the quinquennium in 1948 if the Company again applied for mass 
evictions. Whilst they believed that the other two major landowners
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- the B&EA Conpany and the A. L. Bruce Estates - at least under their 
current management, would not be the source of serious tenant 
trouble, the same could not be said of the BCA Company because in 
addition to the general grievance against large areas of undeveloped 
land, the BCA Conpany was the source of other grievances: conpulsory 
movement of gardens and huts, refusal to permit cash crops in rebate 
of rent, poor personal relationships and a lack of active interest in 
tenant welfare, the unfortunate personality of the European estate 
superintendents and their attitude towards Africans, and the 
perpetual fear among tenants of the arbitrary eviction of 10% of 
their number at the end of each quinquennium. The Provincial 
Commissioner of the Southern Province believed that it was not 
possible to exaggerate the inherent dangers and the Committee 
agreed. 55
The BCA Company was not prepared to sell these additional
undeveloped lands, notwithstandi ng the political dangers which the
General Manager had acknowledged, and notwithstanding the advice of
Nunan, which Abrahams had recently repeated, to
the landholders to face the matter as 
businessmen ... They will find that their 
interests are so bound up with the natives 
of this country that they will be best 
served by a pronpt, a fair and a reasonable 
settlement.
The Company claimed that under a fifteen year development plan the 
estates would be extensively cultivated and would additionally 
provide four acres per tenant family, the tenants to be placed on 
special agreements and restricted to areas near the development areas 
to provide labour for the expansion of cultivation. The Committee
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dismissed these plans as "patently impracticable" and they
demonstrated that this was so. 57 They gravely doubted whether the
manager's " emancipation" proposals would improve relationships
between the Company and its tenants, and graver doubts as to whether
he really did appreciate the political significance of past troubles
and the danger of future troubles:
He gave the impression that he considered 
that any unrest among the tenants was 
entirely the responsibility of Government 
and that he was unaware of the extent to 
which the Company7 s policy in the past was 
the cause of unrest or how such unrest 
might involve the whole of the Shire 
Highlands.
The Committee could conceive of only one way to arrest the
growing discontent among the BCA Company tenants: by acquiring those
thickly populated blocks of their land which it was clearly
inpossible for them to develop without wholesale disturbance of
tenants. Yet, drawing back from compulsory acquisition, they said it
was "infinitely preferable" that
the Company should be brought to realise 
that it was in their own interests and in 
the interests of the protectorate as a 
whole, that such land should be offered to 
the Government for voluntary sale.
They suggested that, because the matter was so important, this should
be done by Government with the London directors, and they felt that
if the Board could be made to understand the situation and its
implications, they would co-operate. Clearly they had little
confidence in the local General Manager - who had prevaricated over
the political dangers involved - and were determined to by-pass
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In summary, then, the Land Planning Committee7 s enquiries and 
deliberations led to the recommendations that the shortage of land in 
the Shire Highlands and the indivisibility of many partly developed 
estates there, prevented a solution along Abrahams7 lines; that four 
blocks should be acquired in the Cholo District on which Africans who 
opted to leave retained land could be accommodated; that suburban 
residential areas in the Blantyre District should be similarly 
acquired; that further large scale acquisition was impracticable and 
Government should say so; that collective farming should be embarked 
upon; that acquisition and other plans should include some European 
development; that compulsory acquisition was undesirable; and that 
the large blocks of BCA Company land in the Cholo and Blantyre 
Districts should be acquired by persuading the London directors of 
the political need to sell them to Government. In respect of 
relieving congestion on Trust Land they felt there were no permanent 
solutions but only palliatives such as acquiring freehold land, 
developing new areas of African Trust Land and improving agricultural 
practices. They felt their recommendations would go a long way to 
solve the political problem of satisfying the African grievance that 
Europeans held large tracts of undeveloped land whilst they 
themselves suffered acute pangs of land hunger. As for the social 
problem of emancipating Africans resident on estates under active 
development, however, they felt their recommendations would not 
contribute much
These were the recommendations which awaited Sir Geoffrey Colby 
when he arrived in Nyasaland as Governor late in March 1948.
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CHAPTER IV
SIR GEOFFREY COLBY7 S EARLY REACTIONS, 
1948 - 1953
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Since Colby was to play a major part in settling the problem of 
Africans on private estates, it is important briefly to give an 
account of his career before becoming Governor and to show what his
i
priorities in Nyas aland were.
Colby was bom in 1901, the eldest son of three, and was brought 
up in Surrey, in a middle class, professional, Church of England, 
conservative family. On his father7 s side were three generations of 
medical practitioners and his mother came from a business family. At 
the age of seven he went to preparatory school at Bexhill and stayed 
there until he was thirteen, in an environment emphasising “strict 
principles and manly games", with a strong cricketing tradition, with 
Christian influences and association with the children of parents in 
"the armed or administrative services of the Crown" overseas. In 1914 
he went to Charterhouse where he stayed until he was eighteen. This 
was an important period when significant influences were brought to 
bear on him. The Carthusian life stressed qualities of leadership, 
hierarchy, empire, public service and unruffled reaction to 
emergencies. He excelled at cricket and played both cricket and 
football for the School; games were important at Charterhouse, 
emphasising competition, leadership and status. From 1919 to 1922 
Colby was a scholar at Clare College, Cambridge; here the 
Charterhouse influences were extended and to them were added the 
encouragement to make his own decisions as to how he was to arrange 
his life and life style. After a year back at his old preparatory 
school as an assistant master, principally so that he could play 
cricket for the Cryptics, and a sobering year at Galashiels working 
in a fell mongers' factory, he successfully applied for an appointment
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in the Colonial Administrative Service and in 1925 was posted to 
Nigeria.
His career in Nigeria took him from the Northern Provinces as a 
District Officer, into the Kaduna Secretariat Lands and Mines 
Department, back into the districts and in 1939 he was posted to the 
Lagos Secretariat, first as Assistant Secretary in the Finance Branch 
and then as Deputy Director and subsequently Director of the Supply 
Branch. In 1945 he was promoted to be Administrative Secretary - 
superseding sixty officers - and acted as Chief Secretary and 
Governor7 s Deputy. From this position he was promoted to be Governor 
of Nyas aland.
From the outset in Nyasaland, rapid and substantial economic 
development was his major, virtually all-consuming, concern. He was 
an outstanding development Governor. The country was, in his own 
words,"overdue for a little development" and Lucas Phillips has 
written:
Until after the Second World War no 
development whatever took place in the 
country, and it had no legs to stand on in 
the money markets of the world. Sir 
Geoffrey Colby then came on the scene as 
Governor and by his drive infused new blood 
into the torpid body.
The early importance to Colby of solving the problem of Africans 
on private estates was its effect on his economic development 
strategy. The European-owned estates contributed significant wealth 
to the economy particularly through growing tea and tobacco but also 
through commercial activity. Yet potentially African agriculture was
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even more important and he was determined to increase production by
African fanners. He recognised the political dangers of not solving
the problem and feared that unrest would divert resources, attention
and energy from the prime task of economic development. He clearly
saw the inevitability of increasing African political interest and
power; in July 1948, only three months after his arrival, he said,
in words to which MacMillan7 s "wind of change" speeches, drafted by
Sir David Hunt, a dozen years later bore a remarkable similarity:
It is inevitable ... that the very 
considerable [political] development and 
awakening that has taken place in ... West
Africa will take place here. We ... must
be ready to receive the impact that is
sweeping Africa ... It must come and we
cannot expect conditions to remain 
unchanged.
He was a man in a hurry; initially he was appointed for only five 
years although this was subsequently increased to eight; there were 
many years of neglect to be remedied. He knew, as few others knew so 
clearly, that the rising tide of nationalism was fast and that much
needed to be accomplished before it reached full flood so that his
successors could build on secure economic foundations. He died only 
two years after leaving Nyas aland.
On arrival in Nyas aland he quickly turned his attention to the 
question of Africans on private estates.
The essence of the problem, which made it intractable in the 
hands of Colby7 s predecessors - although it had been recognised as 
early as 1914 - was the conflict of land-holding concepts between 
Europeans and Africans which focused on the one hand on the demands
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of European landholders to run their estates in accordance with 
Western ideas of freehold tenure as they wished, unencumbered by 
resident Africans save those of their own choosing who were prepared 
to work for them, and on the other hand the desire of the resident 
Africans to live on estate land in the manner in which their fellows 
lived on Trust Land in accordance with customary tenure, virtually as 
of right and without the obligation to work for, or pay rent to, the 
estate owners.
The ultimate solution to the problem - Government acquisition of 
private land on which to resettle families - had been developed over 
a long period, successively by Nunan, Hetherwick, Life and Work, 
Jackson, Bowring, the 1928 Ordinance, Young, the 1939 Native Welfare 
Committee and Hailey. Their message had become increasingly clear
r
as the years passed, and now Abrahams had repeated it and adopted it 
enthusiastically as his own, expressing the solution as one of great 
simplicity. Indeed, so simply was it expressed that it was deeply 
misleading, as the Chairman of the Land Planning Committee shortly 
discovered:
as a newcomer ... it seemed surprising to 
me that no one had thought of such a simple 
answer before.
As the work of the Committee progressed 
it very soon became clear that the problem 
was so complex that it would not admit of 
such a simple solution. Many of the 
people mentioned [as supporting the 
proposals] admitted that they had expressed 
agreement with the proposals without 
considering their practicability.
He claimed that the landowners believed the scheme to be admirable
because it would relieve them of their responsibilities to their
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tenants, whilst the estate Africans believed that there were to be
large areas of land made available to them nearby to which they could
move if they wished. The Senior Unofficial Member of Legislative
Council added:
Sir Sidney, having made his proposal, 
sailed away, or flew - I do not remember 
which - if the latter then I trust that he 
has now come down to earth. In any case 
he left this Government "to carry the 
baby", a baby which he had fed with 
something which it very much coveted but it 
will not be possible to give it all it 
would like. There is therefore danger 
that this baby will become fractious and it 
is with this that this Government has to 
deal. 6
These views of Abrahams' work, expressed by Edwards and Barrow, were 
made known to Colby soon after his arrival.
With these factors in mind, Colby moved quickly towards 
beginning to solve the problem. Although the balance of power was 
shifting, Government still very much held the scales and Colby was 
not reluctant to hold them firmly and, if necessary, to tilt them. 
Bell and Abrahams had both said that the resolution of the difficulty 
was a policy question for the Government to decide one way or the 
other: it was a nettle to be grasped, a nettle which, as Colby saw 
it, was held mainly by Europeans but increasingly by Africans, a 
nettle with a sting in it which would become much more severe and 
disabling - possibly even fatal - the longer it was left ungrasped. 
None of his predecessors - except Johnston (1891-1897) and Thomas 
(who was not long enough in Nyas aland (1929-1932) to effect any major
I
change) - had been the significant type of nettle-grasper which Colby 
now began to show himself to be. Hie time for dithering was passed.
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One of his earliest taste was to study the files on the problem, and 
a month after his arrival, on 28 April, he addressed a long 
demi-official letter to Andrew Cohen at the Colonial Office, setting 
out his views. ^  He felt that since the question was new to him, he 
could regard it objectively. It was an important letter which shows 
his very early reactions to the problem.
His first point was that since Abraham's investigations were of
a general character without detailed examination of individual areas,
his recommendations similarly were of a general nature and more
detailed investigations would be needed to discover the circumstances
on individual, estates: hence his recommendation that a Land Planning
ftCommittee be set up. Colby fully accepted the principle of 
Abrahams' recommendations about acquisition but he and his officials 
were faced with the difficulty of determining the extent to which 
they could be implemented and how far they would relieve congestion: 
both were fundamental points. He accepted the Committee's view that 
"the true position is not as it was generally accepted to be and that 
it does not lend itself to action on the lines proposed in the 
Abrahams' Report", because it was the "only authoritative statement 
of fact available" and one made only after detailed examination of 
evidence not available to Abrahams. Consequently, they should act on 
the basis that the statement was correct and if later it proved to be 
wrong, corrective measures could be taken.
Colby believed that parts of the Report over-simplified the 
problem: he referred to Abrahams' conclusion that there were 
comparatively few resident Africans on developed estates whereas the
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Committee's more detailed investigations - quite quickly carried out, 
or perhaps they already knew the details - showed that there were a 
very substantial number and this significantly reduced the 
practicability of Abrahams' solution. He also referred to Abrahams' 
proposal that parts of estates should be excised and formed into 
enclaves whereas the Committee believed that in most estates where 
the problem was most acute, excision would lead to "a large number of 
enclaves dotted about over a number of individual estates" and this 
was not a practicable solution; even if it were, it would not be a 
permanent solution since population increase in the enclaves would 
lead to further demands on the surrounding areas. Hie Committee, and 
Colby, preferred the acquisition and setting aside of blocks - like 
those which they recommended in the Cholo District - rather than 
enclaves.
He pointed out that Abrahams' suggestion that land which was 
unoccupied and uncultivated but which would be developed within a 
reasonable period should not be acquired, would seriously reduce the 
amount of land available for African settlement. Even at this very 
early stage Colby seems to have been contemplating the possibility 
that African interests with their political implications - unrest and 
security dangers - might become more important than European 
interests with their economic implications - export crop production. 
Furthermore, Abrahams assumed that substituting contractual for 
statutory rights would be a clear-cut solution, but many experienced 
Administrative Officers were convinced that to the Africans there 
would be little difference between contractual and statutory 
obligations to pay rent; moreover, difficulties arising from natural
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increase in the family and on the death of the original tenant would 
crop up under both the contractual and the statutory system.
Like Barrow who was shortly to express himself so bluntly to 
Legislative Council, but rather more restrained, the Governor was 
worried that Abrahams' fulsomeness in expressing what he saw as 
wholehearted enthusiasm for his recommendations, would raise 
expectations too high on the part of the Europeans and Africans in 
Nyas aland and of the Colonial Office in London. He thought Abrahams 
had significantly overdone it: "To be quite candid, I can only regret 
that Abrahams wrote [these particular] paragraphs... which do little 
to advance a solution of the problem."
Colby was convinced that there could never be any clear-cut 
final solution to the problem: it could only be partially solved and 
would remain with them indefinitely. He mentioned this because it 
could be inferred from Abrahams' report that a clear-cut and final 
solution could be found. Colby saw the problem as twofold: the 
political problem of large areas of land in the Southern Province 
being held by Europeans, and the economic problem of population 
congestion also in the Southern Province.
He pointed out that the political problem could be disposed of 
finally only if the Europeans were completely dispossessed of their 
land: a "quite inpossible" solution and one not to be contemplated.
It was the large areas of undeveloped land and the payment of rents 
which were the main causes of discontent. He referred to the 
generally welcome acceptance of Europeans actively developing their
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estates, but added,
How long this happy position will remain it 
is impossible to say, but ... we should not 
rely on it lasting forever.
So long as Europeans hold large areas of 
land ... so long will a potential political 
problem remain.
Clearly, he believed that the amount of land in European hands needed 
to be reduced, and of undeveloped land very considerably reduced, if 
the political problem was to be solved albeit only partially.
As to the economic problem he emphasised that, notwithstanding 
Government's intention to make more land available for African 
settlement, as the population continued to increase and at an 
accelerated pace, so would the problem of congestion remain. There 
was the allied economic problem that the large estates were -simply 
hanging on to large areas and taking few steps to develop them.
Given the major contribution of European agriculture and the great 
potential of African agriculture, Colby's development strategy 
demanded that fuller economic use should be made of all the 
Protectorate's land, including private estates.
Bearing in mind his conviction that only a partial solution was 
possible, and concentrating on the extent to which such a partial 
solution could be reached, he felt that the Committee's 
recommendations to acquire 550,000 acres out of a total of 1, 200, 000 
acres of European estate land would be taking them a considerable way 
especially since 53, 000 of the 74, 400 resident African families on 
estates in the Shire Highlands would be automatically "emancipated" - 
a term which Colby considered to be "unhappy and possibly
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misleading". Although the owners of the remaining 650, 000 acres not 
recommended for acquisition had given an assurance that they intended 
to develop them as soon as machinery and materials were available, 
Colby was uncertain how much credence could be placed on these 
assurances but pointed out that in the course of implementing the 
recommendations, Government would find out the true position on each 
estate: he was not simply going to accept their word for it.
Colby referred to the fact that they did not know how much land 
currently not scheduled for acquisition was developed, and then 
turned to how he proposed to implement the Land Planning Committee 
recommendations. Even at this early stage he was displaying a 
determination to get on and do something positive about the problem 
in a way which distinguished him from his predecessors. He 
emphasised that implementation would necessitate a strong team in 
charge of acquisition and resettlement and he believed they had not 
truly realised what a very big job, requiring a substantial staff, 
the implementation was going to be. He was particularly careful 
about the need to negotiate with estate owners in a pre-arranged 
order:
We should aim at first acquiring areas from 
estate owners who are really ready to meet 
us, and it seems reasonable to hope that 
such estate owners will release their land 
to us at reasonable prices. By approaching 
the most reasonable owners first we shall 
thereby have created some precedents in 
regard to prices to be paid. These 
precedents should subsequently be of the 
greatest use to us when we have to 
negotiate with owners who are not so well 
disposed and ... if it comes to a question 
of compulsory acquisition.
In the event even the "reasonable owners" were reluctant to move
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until the BCA Company had been tackled and the "going rate" had been 
fixed. Even at this relatively early stage the new Governor was not 
as averse to compulsory acquisition as had been the Land Planning 
Committee and possibly Abrahams.
Colby was keen that the implementation of the Land Planning 
Committee's recommendations should be based on as much detailed 
information as possible. On each estate with which negotiations were 
to be commenced he proposed that his team should establish with the 
owner the acreage undeveloped and the acreage required for future 
development, with a view to acquiring any substantial difference 
between the two. In examining individual estates they would be able 
to determine the number and location of resident Africans, be 
preparing areas for resettlement, conducting an agricultural survey,
r
and finding out how many Africans would wish to remain on the estate 
on a contractual basis. At this point he dealt with an inference in 
Abrahams' report: that all tenants on private estates were 
discontented, and he refuted this. Whilst the charging of rent 
rankled with some, this was not so in the many cases where economic 
crop growing was permitted, where sufficient land for tenant needs 
was available and where relations between landlord and tenant were 
good. Since these conditions obtained on "a considerable number of 
estates" the rent obligation was "discharged without demur and the 
tenants are generally content with or acquiesce in their lot."
He made a particular point of supporting the Land Planning 
Committee's remarks about the fundamental change needed in securing 
the disappearance of part-time agriculturalists:
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I am convinced that the objectives to which 
we should work are, on the one hand, a 
definite non-farming permanent labour force 
living either in the residential blocks 
recommended by the Committee or on European 
estates in full-time employment by those 
estates, and, on the other hand, a farming 
community established on Native Trust Land 
which will supply not only their own needs 
but the needs of the labourers on the 
estates.
In essence, his argument was that if the large and increasing African 
population was to be accommodated on already congested land, then 
that population would have to depend upon others, more distant, to 
produce their foodstuffs. He was mindful also that it would be an 
uneconomic use of fertile Shire Highlands land to devote it to 
producing subsistence food crops rather than economic crops.
Allied to this, Colby realised that there was a potential 
conflict of policies. On the one hand from a political point of view 
there were powerful arguments for acquiring as much private land as 
possible to hand back to the Africans, but on the other hand this 
would conflict with the British Government's economic policy and his 
own wish to secure the maximum outputs of such estate crops as tung, 
tea, sisal, soya and flue-cured tobacco. Colby showed that such a 
reconciliation was possible by pointing out that in paying the estate 
owners considerable sums for their land - on which Africans would be 
settled - he would be providing them with capital with which to 
develop their remaining estates and increase production.
He then turned to the Committee's strong advice that Government 
should publicly state that no further large-scale acquisition of
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freehold land would be practicable, and - rejecting this advice - he 
made it clear that he could not rule out further acquisitions and 
that no matter how unpalatable it might be to the European community, 
Government would investigate land requirements on individual estates 
and if they found that lands not scheduled for acquisition were not 
to be developed he would consider acquiring them. Furthermore, he 
would review the position after a reasonable period when development 
projects had had time to mature and again consider acquisition of 
areas not developed in the meantime. Once more he was not inclined 
simply to accept the estate owners' word for it. In effect he was 
dividing private land into two categories: that which was to be
developed in a reasonable time, and that which was to be acquired for 
African settlement. He declined to specify a definite period for 
development because any such specification might be taken by Africans 
as an undertaking to acquire European land on a certain date which in 
practice the Government might not wish to implement for a variety of 
reasons including financial costs. He refused to be drawn into 
estimating how many Africans currently residing on private estates 
could be accommodated on the half million acres scheduled for early 
acquisition because this would require a detailed agricultural 
survey. He did, however, say that by acquiring 46% of the freehold 
land in the Shire Highlands they would be emancipating 71% of the 
population resident on it.
He expressed his own views on compulsory acquisition - a 
question which was to crop up repeatedly in later years - and said 
that it would be resorted to only if there was no alternative. He 
was aware from his own experience in the Lands Office in Northern
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Nigeria and in the Lagos Secretariat, and from the experience of his 
senior Nyas aland colleagues in Jamaica and Hong Kong, that High 
Courts often awarded compulsory acquisition compensation "vastly in 
excess of the worth of the land." He thought it advisable to acquire 
as much as possible by "voluntary negotiations before [he] 
proceed [ed] to compulsory acquisition in cases where the landowners 
[were] not amenable." The whole tone of this part of his letter was 
one of a preparedness to be tough and to force acquisition if needs 
be, and he did not conceal this general attitude of his to the 
problem with which he was confronted. The difference between Colby 
and the Colonial Office was that although both felt that compulsory 
acquisition should be used as a last resort, Colby believed that it 
might well come to that, whilst the Colonial Office thought or 
pretended that it would not have to be used.
The Governor next dealt with finances. Whilst provisionally
accepting that the £300, 000 required to purchase lands to be
immediately or early acquired, should be from local sources, he
pointed out that this would be a severe drain on Protectorate
resources and "may prove to be beyond them if any further acquisition
beyond that recommended by the Committee is undertaken." He was, of
course, fully aware that acquisitions beyond those formally
recommended by the Land Planning Committee were essential if the
political problem was to be seriously tackled, and he did not want
this additional burden to fall upon the Protectorate's limited
finances. He then said:
As expenditure... might be considered both 
of a development and a welfare character, I 
am wondering whether there would be any
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chance of seeking your support for 
obtaining assistance from the general 
reserve of £12,000,000 under the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act.
Colby's view was: "we are likely to have to spend a very 
substantial sum of money on unremunerative expenditure in purchasing 
land from the large land owners." Frankly, he said, he could not 
see how they could contemplate spending more than a fraction of that 
recommended by the Committee since this would, in his view, "be 
totally unjustified." Initially he had assumed that any money spent 
in purchasing land from companies, such as the BCA Company, would be 
used in the development of the country, but on reflection he believed 
that this was a vain hope and saw very little prospect of the monies 
being invested in Nyas aland, and this was another reason why he could 
not contemplate heavy expenditure on buying land.
Colby was anxious to get on with the job; he set aside £100,000, 
a third of the sum required for acquisition, in the 1948 Estimates, 
his first budget, thereby incurring a deficit, and a further £150, 000 
in the 1949 Estimates; ^  and he asked Cohen to submit the Planning 
Committee's Report to the Secretary of State and seek his approval 
for action on the lines which Colby indicated "as early as 
possible". He proposed then to publish the Report and a statement 
of Government policy along the same lines. He was not, however, 
going to let events overtake him, and concluded his letter to Cohen 
by saying that it would be necessary to defer action under the next 
quinquennial eviction period beyond September 1948: the Southern 
Provincial Commissioner was warning that the approaching end of 
quinquennium was bringing "the problems which exist on many estates
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into the foreground and a certain disquiet exists among the African 
tenants."
It is quite clear from the drafts of this letter to Cohen that 
Colby personally worked very hard and carefully on it, altering 
numerous pieces, writing extensive new paragraphs, adding new 
sections and rewording several passages so that the final version, 
whilst containing most of the original points - drafted by. - 
Secretariat officers - bore very little resemblance in structure and 
tone to the original. He took enormous pains over it - even for a 
newly promoted Governor anxious to make an impressive start - and his 
redrafting is one of the very few documents on which he worked in 
black pencil rather than in red ink, possibly because the work was 
extensive, important, demanded much thought and great care and 
because he was drafting for himself rather than minuting to. 
others. ^  These considerations and the very early date of the 
work indicate that he quickly saw the immediate and great importance 
of the Africans on private estates question.
In various ways Colby communicated his concern and the 
importance of the question to the public. Only two months after his 
arrival he sent a letter to the Tea Association urging them to 
grow sufficient maize for their labour force because the shortage of 
Trust Land made it increasingly difficult for the tea estates to buy 
enough maize from that land and their purchases simply reduced the 
foodstuffs available to the growing urban African population. He 
reminded them that three years previously the Government had asked 
the industry to produce its own maize and had suggested two suitable
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blocks of unsettled land for this purpose.
Since then there has been considerable 
encroachment of native cultivation on both 
and unless a decision is made quickly it 
may not be possible to find suitable areas 
of land.
In this letter Colby deliberately did a number of things. Firstly, 
he specifically directed his remarks about land shortage and 
foodstuffs supplies to the tea industry which was located in the 
Cholo and Mlanje areas of severe congestion. Secondly, he urged the 
industry to develop its lands by growing foodstuffs for its labour 
force as well as commercial crops. Thirdly, he told them that time 
had already been lost and urgent action was now vital. Whilst he 
could be reasonably sure of such tea planters as Barrow and Hadlow, 
who were members of Executive Council, and many others, he was far 
from sure that he could get the larger companies, particularly the 
BCA Company, to develop its land and furnish its own food supplies.
He was trying to use the support of many of the Tea Association 
members to influence the others.
A few weeks later, the Governor used a Chamber of Commerce
luncheon to express his views even more publicly and particularly to
deal with land and accommodation problems in and near the townships
from which most of the members came:
The provision of African residential areas 
on modem lines is obviously a matter of 
urgency, and the creation of facilities for 
an African urban population, living in 
reasonable conditions of comfort will ... 
do something to resolve the serious land 
congestion problems ... the present 
situation where the majority of the 
wage-earning African population also 
cultivate small gardens is one which cannot 
continue. I purposely used the word
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"cannot". There is just not sufficient 
land available.
The following week Colby presided over his first meeting of
Legislative Council which debated the Report of the Land Planning
Committee. It was at this meeting that Edwards and Barrow
expressed their reservations about Abrahams' proposals, and Colby
used the occasion to seek the support of estate owners as to the
price of acquired land and to counter recent local press criticism as
to the Government's bona fides in land acquisition matters. He had
already written to Cohen about the severe drain on Nyas aland's
resources which land purchase would mean, and had pleaded for British
financial support, and he now drew the landowners' attention to this
drain and appealed to their public spirit:
It is the earnest hope of the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies and of t^ iis 
Government that land owners will be willing 
to meet the Government in this matter in 
the interests of the Protectorate.
... any funds that are devoted to 
purchasing undeveloped land from private 
ownership will be from the resources of 
this Protectorate which are provided by the 
taxpayers of this Protectorate. Thus, 
those resources, all of which would 
otherwise be available for development 
purposes will be depleted by the amount 
which is used for the purchase of 
undeveloped land. In other words it would 
be in the interests of the taxpayers, which 
include the landowners, that such 
undeveloped land should be secured at a 
reasonable price. 6
Edwards took up this price issue in his speech introducing the 
Report, but rather than appeal to the landowners' public spirit he 
first argued on grounds of market value and secondly made a scarcely 
concealed threat. As to the value, he argued that much of the land
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had been so neglected by its owners as regards soil conservation that 
it was as bad as areas of Trust Land in the worst congested areas:
" To ask Government to pay one penny for such land would be ludicrous 
since it would cost Government large sums of money to put it 
right." As to the threat, he made the point that some of the areas 
recommended for acquisition were "not only valueless but ... if the 
provisions of the National Resources Ordinance were applied -to them 
[they] would cost the owners considerable sums to put in proper
17
condition." '
Barrow also dealt with price and said the current time was an 
unfortunate one for buying land because of the ruling high prices, 
and he believed that if the owners demanded their "last pound of
flesh" it would be doubtful whether Government would be justified in
spending the money to comply with the Committee's recommendations.
He begrudged the money and argued that a "definite limit" should be 
placed on the amount to be spent on land acquisition. Clearly,
Colby, Edwards and Barrow were much concerned about the probable cost
of acquiring private land.
The other matter on which Colby dwelt during this July 1948 
Legislative Council meeting was press criticism of Government's 
intentions in amending the Acquisition of Land for Public Purposes 
Ordinance. The press statement was to the effect that "neither a 
man's home nor his land was safe" from compulsory acquisition.
During his period of office Colby was to suffer numerous press 
attacks against any step which could be viewed as state intervention 
in private enterprise and this was the first of such attacks; Colby
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reacted - maybe over-reacted - quickly. He described the statements
as "unworthy" and said that not only could no country operate without
such legal provisions but that Nyas aland had had similar provisions
for the past forty years. He assured Council that the powers to be
given under the Bill would "be exercised with one object, and one
object alone, and that is to benefit the progress and development" of
Nyas aland. The powers were needed in order that greater control and
strict land use principles could be applied to the acquired land;
without them the fertility and carrying capacity of the acquired land
would deteriorate, and Abrahams had warned strongly of the dangers of
1 Qallowing that to happen.
During the following months Colby continued to study the 
implications of the Land Planning Committee7 s report and gave it a 
great deal of careful thought. He was pleased with the progress in 
surveying the Cholo accommodation blocks and determining the number 
of tenants resident on them, but he was unclear - and believed that
others were also unclear - as to the precise purpose of purchasing
20them. He was anxious that his officials should turn their mind 
to the specific practicalities of what had been proposed in general 
terms.
Are we going to stop farming by the 
Africans who are already settled on these 
blocks? Do we propose to lay out these 
blocks to provide housing plots and a small 
garden... in order that we can accommodate 
tenants settled on neighbouring estates, 
the owners of which want to develop them?
It seems to me that we must answer both 
these questions and have clear-cut ideas of 
the developments we envisage. It seems to 
me that it is going to be extremely 
difficult to take away farming land from 
people who are already fanning in the
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residential blocks. If, on the other hand, we 
do not take away such fanning land, we shall 
have some people in these blocks fanning and 
other people precluded from fanning. This is 
likely to cause discontent.
He argued that if the accommodation blocks were capable of absorbing
a fairly large number of Africans from neighbouring estates - which
in turn would imply the absence of anything other than very small
gardens - this absorption would confer a very great benefit on the
estate owners, in exchange for which, Colby thought, they ought to be
prepared "to give a substantial amount of financial assistance to
Government in purchasing" the land. So strong did he believe
Government's bargaining position to be in such a case that if the
owners did not give financial assistance he would threaten to "drop
the whole scheme." Edwards' response to these views was that
the BCA Company would argue that in moving their tenants to released
land they would be losing both valuable land and a resident pool of
labour, under which circumstances they would not see justice in also
being asked to give financial assistance. Colby felt that
Edwards had "rather missed the point" and he held to his view that
the estate owners, under these circumstances, ought to be paid little
if anything for the land released. 24
In studying the documents and especially the confidential 
appendix to the draft report of the Land Planning Committee, Colby 
quickly realised that he was likely to have the greatest difficulty 
with the BCA Company because of the size and location of its land
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holdings, their undeveloped state, the attitude of its management and 
its potential as a source of serious political trouble. In order 
that he should as fully understand the Company as possible and be 
adequately briefed in his dealings with them, he followed a practice 
which he used on major issues, both in Nigeria and in Nyas aland, of 
seconding an officer for a few months thoroughly to research the 
issue for him, and he asked McDonald to prepare a history of, and 
commentary on, the Company and its land holding activities. He also 
asked McDonald to report to him personally every month on
pc
developments in land matters. From what he was told of the 
Company's local management and the impression which he himself 
formed, he was determined to have no dealings at a policy level with 
this management but to have the Colonial Office negotiate with the 
London directors - advice which the Land Planning Committee had also 
given - and he wanted to be as well informed as possible about the 
Company.
McDonald's commentary, sent to the Governor on 12 December 1948, 
was an extremely well written, clearly expressed document, as well 
researched as the material available permitted, and a devastating 
indictment of the BCA Company.
He showed firstly how E. C. A. Sharrer, a forceful and shrewd 
German businessman, between the 1880s and 1902 built up successful 
interests in trade, transport and agriculture and then turned his 
attention to railway development. At this stage he formed the BCA 
Company which consolidated the interests of the SHR Company, his own
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estates and his Zambezi Traffic Company. Having formed this Company, 
he returned to Europe never to revisit Nyasaland, and McDonald 
concluded that Sharrer had seen the difficult times ahead and had 
formed the BCA Company as a means of realising the assets already 
gained and of distributing among shareholders risks which he knew 
would be inherent in further development.
The BCA Company started life with an authorised capital of
£1, 500, 000 almost fully subscribed.
Its history for the next 22 years can only 
be described as extremely unfortunate; it 
never declared a dividend; its financial 
resources dwindled steadily until in 1921 
it had to raise £200,000 on first mortgage 
debentures at the high rate of interest of 
8% in order to carry on; and finally in 
1924 it went into liquidation and had to be 
reconstituted.
There were a number of elements in this decline between 1902 and 
1924. Initially the Company concentrated on communications - ocean, 
river and lake by steamers, houseboats and barges; road by ox wagons 
and a monorail tramway; and rest houses - but these activities were 
overtaken by the introduction of the railway and the motor vehicle so 
that the transport activities were closed down after 1922.
Similarly, its subsidiary trading company, Kabula Stores, failed to 
compete with other, more dynamic, trading companies, and after the 
parent company went into liquidation, Kabula Stores survived for only 
a short time. Concerning land, the Company started life with 372,500 
acres mainly in the Shire Highlands Districts. The principal exports 
when the Company started were coffee and cotton and although they 
spent relatively little on the former they spent lavishly on the
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latter and lost a good deal of money through extravagance and poor 
management.
All those who persisted in the cultivation 
of coffee and cotton eventually failed, and 
the British Central Africa Company were 
perhaps the biggest losers of all.
They also started growing flue-cured tobacco but although this was a
highly profitable crop especially between 1910 and 1920, they opened
up relatively little land and failed to exploit the crop to anything
like its full potential but rather continued to concentrate on
cotton. Similarly their attempts to grow sisal were on a very
limited scale. They made two attempts to attract immigrant European
planters, in the early 1900s and again in 1919, but both failed and
27very few who did come stayed long enough to take up land.
In summarising the Company's history to 1924, McDonald quoted
from a recent view expressed by Barrow:
The truth is that the Company's holding of 
land always was, and still is, too large 
for them to control. They have always 
proved incapable of developing any 
appreciable proportion of their holdings, 
denied the opportunity to others to develop 
the land by demanding high prices in the 
current market, and were quite incapable of 
looking after the vast area they owned and 
of preventing its being ravaged by 
indiscriminate African settlement.
McDonald's own assessment was equally damning: in consequence of the
Company's inability to control their land, much of it got into a
condition which rendered it useless for future development. One
particular aspect he felt would "always remain unforgivable": they
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knew from the experience of others that tea was the most stable
industry in the country; they knew also that the amount of land
suitable for tea growing was strictly limited but that they
themselves owned many thousands of acres of that suitable land.
Yet incredible as it may seem, from 1920 to 
1924 they started to allow onto this land 
uncontrolled immigration of natives from 
Portuguese East Africa. By doing this they 
permanently inpaired the resources of the 
Protectorate and at the same time saddled 
the Government with a grave political 
problem.
The years mentioned, 1920-1924, were years in which Jackson,
Ormsby-Gore and Bowring were publicly discussing the problem of 
Africans on private estates: it was not a period in which the matter 
was unimportant and forgotten.
McDonald then turned to deal with the BCA Company from 1924 to
1947, the period of the reconstituted company which started with a
reduction of its authorised capital, "but although ... reconstructed
it was not regenerated".
Under a joint management with an unenviable 
reputation for inefficiency it continued to 
pursue a policy of extravagance, but not in 
the direction of useful development. And 
no check whatever was put onto the 
continued immigration of natives from 
Portuguese East Africa onto the Company's 
natural tea lands. In fact the period 
between the years 1924 and 1930 was as dark 
as any in the Company's history.
During this period, just as they had earlier concentrated on cotton
which was declining, instead of on tobacco which was expanding, so
now they concentrated on sisal which was declining, instead of on
tobacco which was continuing to expand. Of their third of a million
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acres they never cultivated more than 1, 499 in any one year.
By 1930 the Company was once more in serious financial
difficulties, the shares were further written down and a large
overdraft was incurred. The management was changed and Kaye Nicol
was appointed Manager. He put an end to extravagance but did nothing
to halt the immigration onto the Company's tea lands despite the fact
that they had begun to plant tea albeit on a very limited scale. The
Company's financial position did not improve and in 1936 there was a
further reduction in capital issue:
Thus in the course of 34 years their 
original £1 shares had fallen to two 
shillings and their issued capital of 
£1, 468, 000 to £216, 000, while the value of 
their African estates, once standing in 
their books at £852, 000, had been reduced 
to £107,000.
McDonald then studied in greater detail the last ten years, 1937 
to 1947, which he saw as the most interesting part of the Company's 
history because the management was the same as at the time he was 
writing, it had adequate capital, it had a planned development 
programme, ahead of it stretched the most prosperous agricultural 
years the Protectorate had ever known, and it had considerably more 
land available for development than it had later "owing to the manner 
in which continued depredations were made by African immigrants in 
the years immediately before and during the war". In April 1937 the 
Company's Chairman wrote to the Colonial Office saying that the 
Company was now in a strong financial position and was prepared both
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to strengthen its old activities and to undertake new; specified, 
developments. McDonald examined the developments which were in fact 
then made during the following decade and found that the tonnage of 
sisal produced fell from 680 to 192; the production of tobacco 
increased only from 221,160 pounds to 306, 918 pounds; tea increased 
from 414, 496 pounds of green leaf - everyone else measured output in 
terms of manufactured tea - to 3, 738, 721 pounds but they failed to 
plant iip the full acreage allowed under the international tea 
restriction scheme even although they owned land far superior to much 
of that which they actually planted; despite plans to do so they grew 
no groundnuts; tung nut acreage increased from 35 to 1, 310 which 
produced 110,216 pounds of nuts compared with 312,004 pounds on a 
neighbouring estate of almost exactly the same acreage under tung and 
at the same stage of development; soya bean acreage decreased from 
3, 000 to 1, 505 and output remained static at about 600 tons.
World market prices during the period 1937 to 1947 enabled the 
Company to make a profit, and for the first time, in 1941, they 
declared a dividend. Yet despite this, their assets continued to 
depreciate steadily and in 1947 only 6, 430 of their 329, 354 acres 
were under cultivation whilst 11,000 acres were leased to other 
planters. About 300, 000 acres were not being worked and all the best 
of this land was in the Blantyre and Cholo Districts and was in the 
hands of African tenants. Their late attempts to stem the flow of 
immigration were ineffective and the existing tenants extended their 
occupation further through the estate lands. McDonald was convinced 
that:
- 129 -
extensive development of these areas is now 
beyond the range of possibility ... the 
incalculable disservice the Company has 
done to the Protectorate in the neglect of 
its lands is beyond all dispute.
He attributed much of this deplorable state of affairs to the
Company's parsimony especially in regard to European staff: the
General Manager was a generalist in direct charge of all the
Company's activities and no specialists were employed; the quality of
the subordinate supervisory staff was appalling and the personal
behaviour of many left much to be desired: "It almost appears as if
an unsympathetic and aggressive attitude towards the African is
regarded with favour, perhaps because the Company considers such
persons are less likely to be imposed upon by their labour."
No other employer of labour in the country 
engages and retains the services of 
Europeans who are known to have a 
provocative and demoralising influence on 
their labour. The conduct of these men 
gives rise to numerous incidents, any one 
of which might provide the occasion for 
serious political trouble. But the Company 
is not concerned with such dangers which 
are regarded as the responsibility of 
Government; it is only concerned with 
attempting to develop on cheaper terms than 
anyone else, and to secure these terms it 
will continue to sacrifice its own aims and 
to jeopardise the political safety of the 
country.
McDonald ended his report by saying that the Company's directors 
in England had confidence in the current management and did not seem 
to realise how their affairs were actually conducted in Nyasaland, 
the golden opportunities that had been lost and the damage that had
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been caused to their land.
There seems no hope for improvement until 
they are brought to realise these things, 
and to change their entire staff in Africa.
When Colby received what McDonald had written he was reinforced 
in his view that the really big nut he had to crack was the BCA 
Company, and that he should be as ruthless with them as needs be 
since they had not been, nor did they show any signs of being, 
reasonable in their use of land, in their attitudes towards the 
country's economy and towards the political dangers of land tensions 
and race relations. They were wasting and destroying the nation's 
major asset, land, and allowing it to stand idle instead of 
contributing to its wealth, and in doing so were indifferent to the 
political and security dangers they were causing. Colby would have 
found the Company's failure to develop the land and their 
indifference to the political dangers particularly galling, 
determined as he was to engender substantial economic development 
based on increased agricultural production taking place in a peaceful 
political environment.
He found himself very much in sympathy with McDonald's report
especially the point that there was no hope of improvement until the
London directors realised the true position and its dangers. He
quickly decided that he should now discuss with the Colonial Office,
buying the BCA Company blocks . He again made it clear that he was
" not prepared to negotiate... with Mr. Nicol" locally and he did not
28want to open up discussions publicly on price at this stage.
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So far as price generally, and the price for BCA Company land
particularly, was concerned he pursued his novel but perfectly
serious argument that the Government was likely to be asked a high
price whilst doing the estates a great service in clearing part of
their land of tenants and thereby making substantial areas available
for further development. "In other words, the whole operation should
be of great financial benefit to the estates who will be relieved of
tenants ... the estates will be getting it both ways." He .believed
that in view of this argument,
we have a very strong bargaining card in 
our hand, and I should have thought that 
the estates would be prepared to give a 
substantial amount of financial assistance 
to Government in purchasing this land in 
order to obtain relief from their tenants.
We might, for example, reach the point 
where we said that if the estates are not 
prepared to give financial assistance, then 
we will drop the whole scheme.
Clearly, even at this early stage he was prepared to be tough 
with the BCA Company over price but he was also ready to consider 
softer ways with other landowners: "Has anyone ever considered the 
possibility of proceeding on the following lines? Take each estate 
individually, the owner to provide an area with or without farm land 
onto which his tenants would be settled, the area to become Native 
Trust Land and rent to be waived." On the surface this seems to be 
a strange question for a well-informed Governor to ask because 
Abrahams had clearly recommended the acquisition of land upon which 
Africans from congested Trust Land and from retained private land
on
could be settled. His question may have been based on a number
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of ideas. He might have had in mind the piecemeal, individual, 
approach to landowners and the settlement, at least initially, only 
of a particular estate's African tenants (and not Africans from Trust 
Land or other estates) on that estate's released land. His question 
also implies transfer without payment price, and he might also have 
had in mind only the smaller owners and the hope of being able to 
deal with them without waiting for discussions, including price, with 
the larger owners. More important is the probability that he was 
asking the question as a means of solving the crucial difference 
between Abrahams' recommendation on those indivisible developed 
estates which contained numerous, scattered, African settlements, and 
the Land Planning Committee's conclusion that the recommended 
solution was impracticable. Abrahams believed there were 
comparatively few such areas and that the tenants on them should 
either enter into a contract to work in exchange for residing on the 
estate, or move to nearby Trust Land and be compensated by Government 
for the disturbance. The Committee found that the estates with 
scattered settlements were numerous and formed the majority 
especially in the worst congested areas and that there was scarcely 
any Trust Land nearby to which tenants could move. It is possible 
that they were conscious of the cost of compensation and for this 
reason preferred to avoid Abrahams' solution. As an alternative they 
had recommended the Cholo accommodation blocks. Colby might have 
been drawing guidance from the 1904 Ordinance "locations" idea and 
have had in mind adapting Abrahams' solution and placing the onus on 
individual owners to select sufficient land to accommodate their 
tenants, settling the tenants on that land and then turning it into
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Trust Land. Which areas were selected would be up to the owner, and 
Government would not be put to the trouble and expense of buying the 
land nor of controlling it as it would have to do if the land became 
Public Land.
Colby discussed his proposals with the Secretary of State 
during his visit to Nyasaland in April 1949 and Creech Jones agreed 
that if private land were not properly used or developed, the 
Government would be justified in "exerting considerable pressure on 
landlords to part with it at reasonable prices" and he also agreed 
that the best plan was to negotiate with the London Boards of the 
major landowning companies.
Early in June 1949 Colby set up a committee comprised of 
McDonald, Barrow and Hadlow, to advise on the action to be taken in
r
the discussion to be held in London with the BCA Company, the B&EA 
Company and the A. L. Bruce Estates, specifying the land which 
Government should acquire and detailing the limits to which Colby 
should go with the Boards of Directors: Executive Council felt that 
since the money for purchase would have to come from Protectorate 
funds "even a figure of ten shillings per acre would result in a 
comparatively heavy outlay which the Protectorate could with 
difficulty afford." Ten shillings an acre was the price at which 
the Government had redeemed the BCA Company's railway subsidy land 31 
years earlier and was rather higher than the level to which the 
Company had written down the value of its estates in its books in 
1936. . In July, Executive Council received this committee's
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report and recommendations. ^  In respect of the BCA Company, their 
recommendations were based on the Land Planning Committee's 
understanding given by Kaye Nicol that he would be prepared to 
recommend his Board to surrender land, notwithstanding the fact that 
he subsequently told the Chairman that he was unable to agree with 
many of the Committee's findings. Council advised that McDonald 
should contact each of the three companies individually, emphasising 
the serious consequences which would inevitably follow upon 
ill-considered action by them and particularly stressing the strong 
political grounds which made a speedy and reasonable settlement 
essential. When this had been done, McDonald should report to Colby 
and a joint meeting should be held with the three companies, the 
Governor, McDonald and a Colonial Office, representative. In respect 
of finance, Council advised that since the precise acreage of the 
estates was not yet known negotiations should be on the basis of 
price per acre so that a final adjustment could be made after the 
estate had been surveyed; the Financial Secretary was asked .to 
examine the payment especially in respect of whether it could be 
spread over a period without interest accruing. Colby accepted 
Executive Council's advice.
In order to exert pressure on the companies, from November 1948 
the Governor actively considered imposing a tax on undeveloped land 
to replace the 1912 land tax which had fallen into abeyance; ^
Creech Jones noted his proposals but did not pass an opinion on them, 
and now Colby planned to use them in trying to persuade the companies 
to sell their land at a reasonable price. Whilst Barrow "viewed with
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dislike and misgivings" the idea of this tax he told Colby that, 
because of the importance of buying considerable areas of land and 
the danger of failing to do so, if a price could not be negotiated 
reasonably within Government's resources he would support the 
imposition. ^  Colby persisted, again consulted Executive Council 
on 13 April and 8 June 1949 and was advised not to circulate a 
memorandum on the tax to the Convention of Associations and the 
Chamber of Commerce as he had suggested but rather during his 
forthcoming London visit he should try to persuade the Boards of the 
large companies to part with undeveloped land at a reasonable price 
because the proposed tax was directed primarily against large 
landowners who were neglecting to develop their land.
In July and August 1949, Colby and McDonald began discussions in
London with the large companies and the preliminary arrangements were
made by December of that year for purchasing some 200, 000 acres of
land over half of which was in the Zomba District and the remainder
in the Blantyre, Cholo and Lower River Districts. ^  The
discussions were fairly quickly agreed and these significant areas of
land were conveyed to the Government at a flat rate of twelve
shillings and six pence an acre notwithstanding Executive Council's
opinion that Nyasaland could afford ten shillings "only with
difficulty". At this early stage the companies were fairly
co-operative at least over the particular areas in question.
Abrahams had expressed
the hope and belief that estate owners, and 
in particular the great land holders, will 
not endeavour to drive a hard bargain with
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Government in respect of the price, nor 
will endeavour to retain unreasonably large 
areas of land for future development.
Following another of Abrahams' recommendations, 21, 500 acres in
the Kasungu District in the Central Province were offered to private
planters and syndicates in exchange for land in the Southern
Province. ^  During 1950, over half the Africans on the acquired
estates were resettled by concentrating them into selected sites so
as to provide for the orderly reception of new entrants from
congested areas and so as to mate good use of the best agricultural
land. Government was able to claim that
the response has been excellent and the 
general rate of progress reflects great 
credit on the officers responsible.
By the end of 1951, 300, 000 acres had been acquired in the Southern
Province for resettlement, including 130,000 acres at Chingale from
the BCA Company in the Zomba District and 72, 000 acres at Magomero
from the Bruce Estates in the Zomba, Chiradzulu and Mlanje Districts,
and the water supplies and communications had been very considerably
improved. These were areas which were not densely populated,
were of poor quality and were not in close proximity to the heavily
settled areas on or near the Cholo tea estates: given such
improvements a large increase in settlement was possible. The work
continued during 1952 and 1953. 44 At Chingale the road system was
further extended, simple medical, postal and market facilities were
provided, the administrative station and agricultural staff housing
were built and there was a steady and continuing - but not dramatic -
flow of settlers into the area. At Magomero work began on the
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administrative station and reconnaissance work was started in the 
more sparsely populated areas to select residential sites and 
demarcate agricultural holdings. The owners, Bruce Estates, aware 
that Government wished to acquire the largely undeveloped Magomero 
estate, nonetheless offered it for auction in 1947 and large blocks 
were bought by I. Conforzi (40,000 acres) who started to grow coffee 
and tobacco, Barrow (2,250 acres on behalf of Nyasa Tea Estates) who 
used it for cattle ranching, and a combine of estates led by Lujeri 
Tea Estates for growing maize with which to feed their tea estate 
labour. The auctioneer, Kirkaldy, was paid with 1,000 acres on which 
he grew tobacco.
When the Bruce Estates had first put up its Magomero Estate for 
sale in 1945, Governor Richards had recommended purchase and although 
he would have been prepared to pay up to ten shillings an acre for 
the land, the Colonial Office confined him to five shillings which 
the Bruce Estates rejected. Now, by the end of 1949, 92, 794 acres 
had been sold to private individuals or companies and only the 
remainder, and less fertile, "badly drained and sparsely inhabited" 
east and overpopulated west sections - 75,000 acres - were left for 
Government to purchase, and on them they resettled tenants from the 
privately purchased sections. It had also been intended that the 
owners should auction the Chingale estate but few potential bidders 
showed sufficient interest. Between the two world wars the BCA 
Company had leased a number of 1, 000 acre blocks of the Chingale 
estate to tobacco farmers but all failed; there was no resident 
manager and save for two 1, 000 acre blocks sold privately - one to
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the Montfort Marist Mission and the other to an Italian tobacco
fanner - the estate was sold to Government. By the end of 1953
the Chingale and Magomero acquired lands had increased their
population from 65, 500 to 82, 000 but had done little to relieve the
congestion in the Cholo tea estate areas. A year later the
population was 111,000 and in 1955 122,000, most of the new-comers
48leaving congested land in the Zomba and Chiradzulu Districts.
Other, smaller, estates were also purchased during this period 
from a variety of owners - but not the four important accommodation 
blocks in the Cholo District. Some transactions were quickly agreed, 
for example the handing over of the whole of Likoma Island by the 
Universities Mission to Central Africa to Government without charge 
in 1950. Another quickly agreed transaction was the purchase of 
1, 122 acres in Blantyre from the Church of Scotland Mission; this was 
valuable land and the price of almost £90,000 was agreed, payable 
over a ten year period from 1950. More often, however, the 
negotiations took a very long time. The example of the 
Kuntaj a-Kumj owe estate provides an interesting and not untypical case 
study. This 23,040 acre estate, situated on the fringe of a densely 
congested peri-urban area near Chileka in the Blantyre District, 
belonged to the British South Africa Company. Their agents, the ALC 
had last inspected it in 1932 since when they had lost the records 
and consequently had no knowledge of how many tenants there were on 
the estate. No European had visited the estate since 1941 and in the 
meantime large numbers of Africans had taken up residence on it for 
subsistence farming. ^  In October 1947 the Chairman of the .Land
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Planning Committee wrote to the Company's resident director in
Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, told him of Abrahams' recommendation
that undeveloped private land should be acquired by Government for
resettling Africans in congested areas, and asked if the Company
would be prepared to surrender the estate to Government. In
November the resident director replied that he would need to consult
his colleagues in London, and a month later said that before he could
give a definite answer the land would have to be examined by the
Company's technical staff to determine the agricultural and mineral
potentialities. ^  A reminder from the Government in May 1949^4
prompted the Company to reply that they were having difficulty in
releasing a geologist to accompany their agriculturalist but hoped to
examine the property in September. ^  In August 1949 the resident
director advised Government that he had been unable to secure the
services of a geologist and because of the unfavourable weather it
would be unwise to release any of his agriculturalists; he asked that
the inspection be deferred a year. ^  In July 1950 the Government
asked if the Company had yet reached a decision^ and in October
McDonald advised Executive Council that:
The value of this estate for agricultural 
or accommodation purposes can ... be put 
down as nothing or next to nothing. The 
area at stake, however, is considerable and 
if the British South Africa Company offered 
the land to Government there would appear 
to be political justification for acquiring 
it at a price such as a shilling an acre or 
the refund of land tax paid.
The following month the resident director wrote to say that the
Company would be prepared to sell the freehold of the estate at ten
shillings an acre but would wish to retain the mineral rights.
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In December Government wrote that there was little justification for 
purchase "other than that arising from political considerations" and 
that they would be prepared to pay a sum equal to the land tax paid, 
amounting to £1, 872 or 1. 625 shillings an acre, an offer which was 
quickly declined. 66 In January 1953 Government considered offering 
2. 5 shillings an acre but did not believe the Company would accept 
it; nonetheless they went ahead and offered 2. 33 shillings an 
acre61 to which the resident director replied that since his 
Company was " desirous of meeting the Government in the latter* s 
desire to acquire this land" they would be prepared to accept five 
shillings an acre. 6  ^ In the meantime the Provincial Commissioner 
expressed the view that since the land was of no use for settlement 
purposes there was no point in purchasing any of it. By February 
1955, however, he had changed his mind because Chief Ntaja was now 
"very interested in having the land bought as a 'pacifier* ". The 
Chief Secretary then offered 3 shillings an acre for the surface and 
mineral rights66 and the resident director promptly declined this 
and said that the Company now considered itself free to negotiate 
sale elsewhere. 00 A few days lat er the Chief Secretary offered 5 
shillings an acre6  ^which the Company accepted. 66 In June 1956, 
once a clarification had been made over the different names given to
C Q
the estate, the freehold was conveyed to Government. So, after 
nearly nine years Government acquired 23,040 acres of heavily settled 
land, devoted entirely to subsistence cultivation at a price five 
times that which they first offered, half that which the vendor had 
first requested and precisely that requested two years earlier. The 
purpose of acquisition was a political gesture of goodwill to local
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African feelings. Political gestures were, however, of very great 
importance.
Having acquired the 300,000 acres in the Southern Province in 
1948-1950 Colby turned his attention to reconsidering the 1928 
Africans on Private Estates Ordinance. This Ordinance had been 
seriously criticised in the early 1930s by Governor Young but the 
Colonial Office had then decided against amending it. If he was to 
tackle the problem of Africans on private estates effectively, Colby 
needed to ensure that the legislation, enacted over twenty years 
earlier, was still sound and appropriate for the tasks ahead of him. 
To do this he set up a Committee to consider ways, if any, in which 
the Ordinance should be amended. The Committee was chaired by 
McDonald and its other members were four Europeans - L. T. Rumsey,
A. C. W. Dixon, N. W. Raynor and R. W. J. Wallace - and three Africans - 
E. K. Mposa, L. Bandawe and Chief Chimombo. ^
The Committee, reporting in April 1951, ^  pointed to the
significant changes which had taken place since 1928:
At that time there were none of the present 
problems of congestion. There was ample 
agricultural land for all, not only for 
those living on private estates, but also 
for those living on Native Trust Land. The 
Ordinance was drafted so as to require the 
landlord to provide for his tenants all the 
agricultural land they needed for their 
sustenance which in effect meant all the 
land they were able to cultivate, and it 
was also drafted so as to provide for the 
removal of large numbers of tenants from 
estates onto adjoining Native Trust Land.
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In the first years of its life the 
Ordinance worked smoothly; as the tenant 
population grew so was more land made 
available for their use; and those who were 
required to move onto Native Trust Land 
could find there adequate areas of 
agricultural land on which to re-establish 
themselves. But problems of congestion 
have supervened, and the stage has now been 
reached where agricultural land has for all 
practical purposes been taken up to its 
limit while the population continues 
steadily to increase.
Although their view of the position in 1928 and the following years
was somewhat roseate, the Committee were convinced that it was now no
longer possible to provide every tenant on private estates with as
much land as they could cultivate, nor was it possible to remove
large numbers to Trust Land "without difficulty and hardship". They
concluded that since much of the Ordinance could not be complied
with, either by the landlord or by the Government, "substantial"
changes were "imperative". Their recommendation focused on-three
"main lines of action": firstly removing the landlords' obligation to
provide sufficient land for the sustenance of every tenant family;
secondly reducing evictions to the minimum consonant with essential
development needs; and thirdly improving the lot of those necessarily
required to leave the estates.
In respect of the first of these "lines of action", the 
Committee recommended that each resident African should be entitled 
to a site for his hut and to the agricultural land which he had under 
cultivation currently, provided he made efficient use of the land and 
provided the area involved was not greater than he and his family 
could cultivate without outside assistance. In addition, firewood
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and building material should come only from areas allocated by the
estate owner. These recommendations were based on the knowledge that
there was no longer sufficient land available on estates, nor was
there sufficient building material and firewood for the full' tenant
rights to these items under the 1928 Ordinance unless large numbers
of tenants were evicted to enable those remaining to be provided
for. The Committee was also concerned to eliminate a growing and
worrying practice:
Africans who set up as farmers on private 
land, laying claims to excessive acreages 
which they cultivate with paid labour, thus 
adding to the problem of congestion and 
depriving other tenants of a 'fair share of 
such land as is available for them.
They aimed to allow the estate owner to settle on his estate "an
indefinite number" of tenants willing to live there in the knowledge
that the land available to them was strictly limited and being
dependant for their livelihood on working for the estate owner. In
effect, they aimed at securing a large resident labour force which
did not take up too much land. They saw this as beneficial to both
landlord and tenant, as relieving congestion and also as enabling
them to make concessions which would give the daughters of tenants
rights to settle on the estate in accordance with African custom and
thereby remove a source of considerable dissatisfaction in the past.
Secondly, and very importantly, they recommended a reduction in 
evictions by allowing removal only for rent-default, misconduct and 
"developmental or other essential reasons". Voluntary agreement to 
removal should be sought first and if that failed a specially created
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Arbitration Board should be used. Briefly, they proposed to abolish
the quinquennial eviction provisions of the 1928 Ordinance as Young
had proposed 17 years earlier. These provisions, they claimed, were
made to allow for the development of estates by removing all tenants
from them over a period of 50 years, but this did not take into
account increases in population, naturally, by immigration and by
trespass, nor did it take into account the landowners' "neglect or
refusal" to exercise their rights of eviction. Because of the great
increase in population on the estates, the enormous difficulty of
removing tenants to Trust Land - because of congestion there and
political objections - because also of the now better standard of
tenants' houses (making removal unfair) and the scarcity of building
materials, the Committee concluded that clearing all estates of
tenants over a 50 year period should be abandoned and removal from
estates should be confined to rent default, misconduct and "cases
where it is strictly necessary to do so" principally, that is, where
economic development - which they saw as "imperative" - was proposed:
Nyasaland ... is directly dependent on its 
exports and without the tea, tung, tobacco 
and other crops grown on private land ... 
the whole economic structure of the country 
would collapse, with ruinous effects on 
Africans, Asians and Europeans alike.
The Committee's third "line of action" aimed at helping those 
evicted from estates by recommending that adequate notice of eviction 
should be given in every case, whether for rent default, misconduct 
or the need for development, and that summary evictions should be 
abolished. In addition, compensation should be paid to those removed 
for development purposes.
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The Report of the Committee highlights a number of features: the 
great increase in population and the consequent greater difficulty of 
solving the problem of Africans on private estates; the recognition 
of the impossibility of complying with the 1928 Ordinance - on the 
estate owners' side the inabi lity to provide the full rights to 
garden space, firewood and building material, and on Government's 
side the inability to provide alternative sites on Trust Land and the 
potential dangers of enforcing mass evictions; the recognition of the 
need for economic development and the part played in it by private 
estates; the need for a large resident labour force which did not 
make unacceptable demands on space; a desire or willingness to treat 
tenants more humanely by abolishing summary evictions, by providing 
for compensation to those removed for development purposes and by 
granting settlement rights to the daughters of tenants.
The Committee's recommendations on the three " lines of action" 
were incorporated in the Africans on Private Estates Ordinance of 
1952 which replaced the 1928 law. ^
It is probable that the European members of the Committee - all
landowners or managers of land-holding companies - by improving the
1928 Ordinance, and carrying the African members with them, by making
it more humane and more politically possible to implement - hoped to 
divert Colby from his chosen path of acquiring very substantial areas 
of private land, or at least induce him to halt at the 300,000 acres 
of land currently reached without proceeding to the remaining areas,
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especially those in the Cholo District where two of the members, 
Dixon of the BCA Company and Raynor of the B&EA Company, managed 80% 
of the land recommended by the Land Planning Committee for 
acquisition.
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CHAPTER V
THE 1953 DISTURBANCES AND AFRICAN REACTION
r
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The potential for agitation, conflict and civil unrest inherent
in the land problem had been long recognised and not infrequenWy
expressed, and despite the considerable steps which Colby had taken
to reduce the scope of the problem - by purchasing 300,000 acres of
private land and by beginning to settle African families on it - such
agitation, conflict and unrest in fact occurred in 1953, coinciding
with the imposition of Federation. Colby was particularly angered by
what he saw as the insensitive, provocative and extremely dangerous
action of the BCA Company, with the backing of the Convention of
Associations, in issuing eviction notices on their Shire Highlands
estates - where little had yet been done to transfer private land and
relieve congestion - in the first half of 1953. * He said that:
The question of land was one on which the 
African felt most strongly. Indeed it was 
probable that he felt more strongly on this 
question than on federation and it was 
doubly unfortunate that he would inevitably 
link the two in his mind.
The linking of land alienation and federation was remarked on by a
visiting journalist who was told at the time: "Federation is for the
Europeans' good only. They will take all our land." ^ A British
Parliamentary Association delegation in 1957 reported that "the
objections to federation among the Africans [include] first ... a
fear that land will be taken away from them." * Many Nyasalanders
had personal knowledge of racial attitudes and land practices in
Southern Rhodesia as emigrant labourers. The Governor considered
steps to mobilise public opinion against the BCA Company and to
publicly castigate it but the unofficial members of Executive Council
advised against this because it might rally support for the
c
Company. The serious disturbances which occurred then, in August
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and September 1953, were largely confined to the Blantyre, Chiradzulu
and particularly the Cholo Districts in the Shire Highlands.
Although the Federation issue had created a 
tension in the political atmosphere, the 
disturbances were fundamentally the result 
of land grievances, among them a dislike of 
the tenant system at present in force.
Colby, acutely aware of the depth of feeling among African 
tenants, clearly saw the need further to remove or greatly diminish 
at a fast pace this potentially explosive source of unrest. Although 
by prompt, firm and decisive action, he brought the 1953 disturbances 
to a fairly quick end, the underlying causes of the troubles - 
federation and land - had not been tackled. He and Fox Strangways, 
the Secretary for African Affairs, impressed upon Executive Council 
that unless Government and everyone else understood the causes - 
" fundamentally... land grievances" - and took early action to deal 
with them, trouble could result in a form which would be very hard to
7
deal with.
As soon as the disturbances had died down, Colby sharply turned 
his attention to the land grievances and on 2 October 1953 he told 
the Colonial Office that he intended to see "the comparatively small 
number of landowners who own substantial areas of land occupied by 
tenants" individually to try to secure a more reasonable attitude on 
the part of at least some of them and convince them to "divest
o
themselves" of those areas in the interests of future harmony. He 
was not optimistic of success, feeling that the more he had got on 
top of the problem the harder had become the owners7 attitude. He was 
anxious to have a "strong card" up his sleeve without which he felt
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that meeting landowners would serve no useful purpose and indeed that 
a further hardening of their attitude might result together with the 
adoption of a position out of which they might later find it 
difficult to retreat. He was concerned that although the owners had 
been badly frightened during the disturbances they had soon forgotten 
them - as after the 1915 Chilembwe Rising - and by the end their 
attitude was harder than before. He also believed that Federation 
had hardened attitudes because the Europeans thought it greatly 
strengthened their position vis-a-vis the Africans "and possibly even 
solved their problem." Consequently, the "strong card" which he 
proposed was that if he failed to convince them he would tell them 
that he intended to revive his 1949 proposal and impose a penal rate 
of taxation on undeveloped land - perhaps ten shillings an acre - 
believing that the threat would be sufficient to induce the sale of 
land to Government without actually having to impose the tax. He 
sought the Secretary of State7 s views on this proposal by cable and 
asked for an early reply. It was just this sort of somewhat extreme 
proposal and the request for an early reply which Colby knew would 
concentrate the minds of both the estate owners and the Colonial 
Office.
Colonial Office officials gave close attention to Colby7 s
Q
cable and Marnham, Assistant Secretary, quickly turned to the 
first question to be decided: how vital was it that the land in
question should pass into Government7 s possession, and concluded that 
"there is no doubt that this has in one way or another simply got to 
be done." His second question was as to the tactics and here he 
disagreed with Colby:
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It is pretty clear that the Governor has 
given up all hope that anything less than a 
bludgeon attack will succeed, but even if 
he is right it is not certain that he has 
chosen the right bludgeon.
His doubts as to the right bludgeon arose from the view that penal
taxation was not only objectionable in principle but on the basis of
experience it was unlikely to be effective, and it was politically
undesirable because, for example, Dodds Parker, a director of the BCA
Company, and Alport, Chairman of the East and Central Africa Board,
both Conservative back-bench Members of Parliament, were likely to be
very critical and to brand any attempt at a constructive solution, as
Mamham saw it, as " appeasement". Mamham7 s advice was that the
Colonial Office should tell Colby:
We absolutely agree that something has got
to be done to solve this land problem so
far as it is still solvable, and therefore 
that somehow or other considerable areas of 
undeveloped freehold land occupied by 
African squatters have got to be acquired 
by the Nyasaland Government.
He also advised that compulsion should not be resorted to until "all
efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement have been tried and proved
i
fruitless" when, rather than penal taxation, compulsory purchase 
would be preferable "even though it costs money": they should not 
rule out the possibility of some form of assistance probably from 
Colonial Development and Welfare Fund*® sources if Nyasaland could 
not itself afford it, but Gorell Barnes, Assistant Under Secretary, 
aware from experience that Colby rarely missed a chance to press the 
British Government for finance and exploited every opportunity to do
II
so, said that this part should be omitted !
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Gorell Barnes waited for the views of Abrahams who agreed that
the problem had to be solved if there was not to be "perpetual fear
of disturbances" and that penal taxation was undesirable; ** and
Boundillon, Assistant Secretary, who, as always, saw "great
difficulty" in even contemplating funding from CDWF sources partly
because he felt that if pressed Nyas aland could find the money 
1 oitself; and finally the Secretary of State7 s views were sought.
13The Secretary of State accepted Mamham7 s advice and Gorell
Barnes replied to Colby on 24 October:
The Secretary of State agrees that every 
effort should be made to tackle the land 
problem and that one of the first aims 
should be acquisition by Government of 
areas of undeveloped freehold land occupied 
by African squatters... Secretary of State 
does not, however, consider that resort 
should be had to threats or compulsion 
until all efforts to achieve a negotiated 
settlement have been tried and proved 
fruitless... If negotiations fail and some 
form of compulsion has to be threatened and 
if need be applied Secretary of State 
considers that it would be preferable to 
resort to compulsory purchase. He does not 
favour method of penal taxation.
He added that they welcomed Colby7 s proposal to meet estate owners
and said that he hoped Colby would invite members of the BCA Company
Board to Nyas aland "to discuss the position on the spot" although he
reminded the Governor that in 1949 land negotiations had been carried
out successfully in London with Colby7 s help. His reason for
suggesting discussions with Board members in Nyas aland which he did
not now give to Colby although they had semi-officially been
mentioned to him in the past, were that since relations with Dixon,
the new General Manager, were "thoroughly bad" and it was difficult
for the Colonial Office to negotiate in London without local
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knowledge, it would be better for "some plenipotentiary from the
15Company to be asked to go to Nyas aland to discuss the matter."
Colby responded that negotiations would not be much quicker j.n 
Nyas aland because Brook, the Company7 s Chairman, " has little 
appreciation of African political problems and is likely to be 
unyielding": in any case to negotiate with Brook might well upset 
Dixon who - with no great confidence - he hoped to win over to the 
Nyas aland Government7 s way of thinking. By using the threat of 
penal taxation, Colby had succeeded in moving the Colonial Office 
closer to accepting compulsory purchase.
The Colonial Office now turned to how the price of a negotiated
- or indeed a compulsory - settlement was to be met. The Governor
had said that he had no doubt that a negotiated settlement could be
achieved were it not for the cost and that the 300, 000 acres to be
acquired were likely to require £200, 000. In essence, Colby had
persuaded the Colonial Office that "somehow or other considerable
areas ... have got to be acquired" and he now said that, although
he was sure he could negotiate acquisition, the Nyasaland Government
could not afford the acquisition price: "on financial grounds it
1 Qis impossible to contemplate such a payment." Without 
presenting it explicitly, he was repeating his development strategy 
argument: "if you want me to get Nyas aland out of this mess, you must 
pay for it." Basically Gorell Barnes and his colleagues felt that 
"the Secretary of State would not wish to be faced with a position 
where nothing can be done about the land problem (apart from the 
method of imposing penal taxation on undeveloped land which would 
bring a storm of protest from Government back-benchers) because we
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are short of £200, 000. " On the other hand the Colonial Office
Finance Division and the Treasury were adamant that the money could
not come from United Kingdom funds and consequently they pressed
Colby to find the purchase price from Nyas aland resources. Just as
in Colby7 s view the Africans linked the question of land with
federation, so now did the British finance officials link payment for
solving the land problem with federation, and, noting that his own
estimate was that with Federal financial support he should have a
surplus of £266,000 on the 1954-5 budget, they wrote to Colby:
the Secretary of State who is personally 
most anxious to remedy the present 
unsatisfactory position ... favours a 
settlement by negotiation if this is at all 
possible. He is therefore glad to see that 
you are confident that a negotiated 
settlement could be achieved were it not 
for the difficulties of finding the sum of 
£200, 000 likely to be involved. He agrees 
that hitherto there would have been very 
grave difficulties in finding a sum of this 
order, but now that Federation has come we 
need not continue to regard it as being 
completely out of the question, 
particularly since... you expect a budget 
surplus of some £266,000 for 1954-5 which 
you intend to put to reserve. Nyas aland7 s 
reserves are, of course, inadequate and it 
is very desirable that they should be built 
up as quickly as possible; but I should 
have thought that the postponement of this 
building up process for a year was not too 
large a price to pay for the final removal 
of a long standing land grievance and the 
very considerable contribution which that 
would make to racial harmony. The 
Secretary of State hopes therefore that on 
reconsideration you will be able to agree 
that the sum of £200, 000 likely to be 
involved in a negotiated settlement should 
be found from local sources.
Although they did not tell Colby that they agreed among 
themselves at the Colonial Office that if he really could not find
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the money and if he put up a truly convincing case, the British 
Government would find it from somewhere, and although they warned the 
Treasury of this possibility and later that CDWF money might be 
needed for resettlement purposes, 22 Mamham and Williams would have 
been prepared to tell him; Gorell Barnes, Melville and Bourdillon 
would not. 22 Lloyd, the Permanent Secretary, suggested in a minute 
not sent to Colby that maybe CDWF could find half the money required 
and Nyas aland could find the other half. 2  ^ There was therefore 
significant willingness to help; indeed, having "absolutely agreed" 
that somehow or other " considerable areas ... have got to be 
acquired", the Colonial Office could hardly do otherwise.
In the event, Colby, recognising the practical force of an
argument given in the name of the Secretary of State, accepted the
position and on 26 February 1954 wrote to say that he reluctantly
agreed "we" would have to face heavy expenditure although he hoped to
keep the figure below £200,000: "the settlement of this problem is
worth a lot of money",2  ^to which Mamham, relieved, wrote in the
margin "Good" and his colleagues received Colby7s letter as accepting
that Nyas aland would find the money whilst other officers "assumed
this to mean that the Governor now accepts full liability for finding
26the money likely to be needed to effect a negotiated settlement"; 
they had interpreted Colby7 s "we" as meaning Nyas aland. In 
Bowring7 s terms, Nyas aland was having to pay for the evils of its 
fathers!
Whilst these financial aspects were being explored, negotiations 
were continuing with the landowners. Colby had a "long and agreeable
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talk" with Dixon2 ^ but he found it difficult to assess his personal 
attitude and believed that Dixon had been unable to convince his 
Board of the need to divest themselves of undeveloped land. Since 
the problem of large areas of freehold land was restricted, the 
majority of estates in Nyas aland having little or no undeveloped 
land, Colby wished to make this clear in any general dealings with 
landowners in order to counter the "propaganda that Dixon has been 
putting about ... that this is a problem which affects every European 
estate." He was keen " to drive a wedge between the bulk of the 
estate owners and the comparatively few owners of large areas". He 
planned to meet informally with a few landowners within the next ten 
days and try to convince them that the great majority need not be 
affected if the BCA Company made "some gesture" in being prepared to 
dispose of undeveloped land. Presumably, the "gesture" he had in 
mind included both the parting with fairly large areas of land and 
also a low price, in neither of which respects would smaller owners 
necessarily be expected to follow suit. He was unable to convince 
them of this.
Early in December 1953 Gorell Barnes used a social occasion to 
tackle Alport about unused company land in Southern Nyas aland and 
made the point that the Colonial Office were looking to him and his 
Board to be rather more helpful and to encourage estate owners also 
to assist in Government attempts to deal with "a most unsatisfactory 
situation." Alport took this quite well and whilst he did not think 
much progress would be made in discussions between the Governor and 
the managers in Nyas aland he believed that if the Secretary of State 
were ready to discuss the question in a friendly manner with the
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Board some satisfactory solution might easily emerge. Alport added 
that he would shortly seek an interview between the Board and the 
Secretary of State. The Colonial Office told Colby that they were 
pinning their main hopes on negotiations in London using the meeting 
which Alport proposed as exploratory and working out the details when 
he came to Britain at the end of April. 2® Direct negotiations with 
Board members in London - now advocated by Alport - had been the 
procedure recommended by the Land Planning Committee in 1947 and by 
Colby in 1948, and that which had been successfully used in practice 
in 1949.
On 22 December Colby wrote that he was optimistic that he could 
reach a settlement with most landowners although detailed 
inplementation would take some time; he added, however, that there 
were indications of increasing African impatience and that "something 
must clearly be done soon." He was aware, too, that most owners 
would not move until a settlement with the BCA Company indicated the
O Q
level of prices that was to prevail.
When Brook visited Nyas aland in the first few weeks of 1954 
Colby met with him and Dixon and made it very plain that he hoped 
this time there would be a final solution to the problem which was 
" not only serious but vitally urgent" and that unless there was at 
least some indication from the Company of their being ready to do 
something in the next two or three months "there would be every 
possibility that a difficult [security] situation would arise in the 
coming dry season." He said it would be useless for the Company to 
seek to retain considerable areas of undeveloped land since this
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'would only provide a focus for further agitation and he had in any 
case the Secretary of State's support for acquiring undeveloped 
land. The problem, therefore, he said was to determine how much land 
the Company could develop within, say, the next five years: "if the 
BCA Company could reach a position in which they held no undeveloped 
land, there should be no political problem." He told the Colonial 
Office of his view, however, that Brook did not really appreciate the 
dangers involved and he suggested that - whilst awaiting a letter 
from Brook indicating What the Company intended to do - Gorell Barnes
on
might see him in London and reinforce the Governor's arguments.
No letter had been received by mid March and Colby again asked Gorell 
Barnes to see him and "explain that the matter is really extremely 
urgent and time is not on our side. The optimism of an early 
settlement, expressed three months earlier, was now fading fast and 
Colby was worried.
The Governor felt that he was making no progress with most of 
the landowners who were waiting to see and then follow the BCA 
Company's lead, although the ALC had agreed to release a block of 800
acres in the Cholo District: Colby had originally hoped for 4, 400
32acres.
Towards the end of March, the Colonial Office sought Colby's 
views on a proposal that the Secretary of State should announce that 
he intended to visit Nyas aland early in May in order, inter alia, to 
look personally at the Southern Province land problems and that he 
should tell Brook and Alport of this and tell them that, although he 
did not wish to decide on a final solution until he returned from
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Nyas aland, he must do so very soon thereafter. Currently his view, 
he proposed to tell them, was that an essential part must be to 
surrender undeveloped land which would not be developed within the 
very near future. Colby felt it unwise to announce that the 
Secretary of State was going to look into land problems because this 
would intensify African agitation between the time of the 
announcement and the visit. The announcement would probably be 
distorted to make it appear that the visit was to dispossess 
Europeans of their land. He could see no objection to Brook and 
Alport being told of the visit and its purpose in confidence.
Whilst these various steps were being taken in respect of the 
European estate owners, Colby was also dealing with the African 
leaders.
His anxiety to impress upon the BCA Company the extreme urgency 
of making progress, and his view that it would be unwise to announce 
publicly that the Secretary of State's visit was to discuss land 
issues, were accentuated by the intelligence reports he received 
during February 1954 of rising agitation and signs of unrest among 
Africans over the lack of progress in land matters. When these 
reports were also received at the Colonial Office the officials there 
received a "jolt" and they persuaded the Secretary of State to see 
Brook and Alport and say that some public indication that the problem 
was being tackled must be given very soon by announcing either that 
the BCA Company had agreed in principle to part with a certain amount 
of undeveloped land or that since no such agreement had been reached 
the Nyas aland Government proposed to acquire a certain area
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compulsorily. This the Secretary of State did at a meeting on 14 
April and, in effect, paved the way for his visit to Nyas aland in 
May. ^
Even without the grievances, including especially land 
grievances, erupting in August and September 1953 and the 
intelligence reports early in 1954, Colby was aware of the deep and 
growing African resentment over land issues and of the security 
dangers in it, because the deliberations of the African Protectorate 
Council in 1952 and 1953 made the resentment and dangers abundantly 
clear. During the interview which African representatives had in 
London at the Federation Conference in April 1952, the Secretary of 
State had suggested that since the land question was complex it would 
be helpful if they submitted a memorandum giving their 
representations in more detail. Gorell Barnes wrote to Colby in July 
1952 to follow up this suggestion. ^  In August 1952 the 
Protectorate Council appointed a sub-committee of moderate and much 
respected leading Africans to draft a memorandum on land matters to 
the Secretary of State, and in late 1952 and early 1953 they worked 
hard on preparing the memorandum. A draft was discussed in May 1953 
with the Secretary for African Affairs, Fox Stangways, and the 
Secretary for Lands and Mines, Feeny, and a number of amendments were 
suggested. A redraft was later translated into Chinyanja and sent to 
members of the Protectorate Council before being discussed at a 
meeting of Council on 15 December 1953. In October 1953 Colby 
asked Fox- Strangways to tell the Council that he, the Governor, had 
sympathy with the African point of view in respect of freehold land 
covered with tenants and would like to support their submission to
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the Secretary of State. He added:
I could not, however, support the 
memorandum as it now stands and I hope they
will alter it to remove all the utter _OQ
nonsense and political clap trap in it.
Fox Strangways used more diplomatic language in conveying 
Colby7 s wishes and asked Council carefully to " examine the draft to
see that there was nothing in it which was either untrue or
exaggerated. " It was not simply that Colby wished to support 
the Protectorate Council, but equally he was looking to them to 
reinforce his own arguments, and he was aware that inaccuracies and 
exaggerations would render the Council's memorandum open to attack 
and thereby weaken the support which it could lend to the Governor7 s 
case.
At its 15 December 1953 meeting the Council discussed the draft 
at length and decided that it should be looked at again by the 
sub-committee with Fox Strangways7 and Feeny7 s assistance. This took 
place whilst the Council adjourned and after further discussion 
Council endorsed the redrafted memorandum. 4* The effect of the 
redrafting was three-fold. Firstly, it tightened up the wording of, 
and shortened, the introduction by major rewording, and by radically 
reducing the number of introductory paragraphs got more quickly to 
the core of the memorandum. Secondly, it removed many of the more 
"flowery", less meaningful, sections from this introduction.
Thirdly, the redraft left virtually untouched, save for a few 
grammatical inprovements, the remainder of the memorandum and the 
requests - the word substituted for "demands" - made. The redrafted 
memorandum concluded with a statement removed from the introductory
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paragraphs, a reaffirmation of the Nyas aland African people's 
"unwavering loyalty" to the Crown and "absolute confidence" in Her 
Maj esty7 s Government.
In the memorandum the Protectorate Council made a number of
requests. First they asked that " freehold private land... not
actively and directly opened up and not... under direct use or
cultivation by the owner", and "land on which Africans have lived all
their lives", together with land adjacent to congested or fast
becoming congested land, and all land owned by missionaries not being
used for mission buildings or educational centres, should be
purchased by Government at the same price as that for which it was
originally acquired, and handed to the Chief-in-Council for African
settlement and cultivation. They also asked that "all land situated
in and around all townships" should similarly be purchased and that
all forest reserves be examined with a view to opening up some of
them for African settlement and cultivation. They concluded their
memorandum with what was in effect a warning:
We believe that in all inter-racial 
relations in this country, the question of 
land will stand out as the testing standard 
and we accordingly urge the Government in 
the United Kingdom to do the utmost 
possible to find means by which this most 
perplexing question may be solved.
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CHAPTER VI
THE POLICY OF PROGRESSIVE ABOLITION OF THANGAIA, 1954
- 164 -
The Governor forwarded the redrafted memorandum to the Secretary 
of State on 14 January 1954 as part of the proceedings of the 
Protectorate Council meeting and followed it up with his promised 
comments - which he used to state his views on what Government policy 
should be - on 16 March 1954* when he started his telegram despatch 
by briefly outlining the steps taken by Government in recent years 
and added:
Since 1948 considerable progress has been 
made, but despite this the basic problem 
remains and the African's demand for more 
agricultural land and for "emancipation" 
still persists; in fact since twelve months 
ago these feelings have become intensified.
The " considerable progress" included acquiring 300,000 acres of the
546, 000 recommended for purchase by the Land Planning Committee,
agreement on purchasing a further 21, 000 acres and current
negotiations for an additional 4,000 acres. The intensification of
feelings was due in large measure to the imposition of federation and
the African's fear of European domination especially by Southern
Rhodesia.
He next expressed his view that although those subscribing to 
the memorandum were sincere in all that they had written, they had 
allowed their views to get out of perspective and had overstated 
their case, giving the impression that "all tenants on private 
estates are living in a state of near serfdom", and he tried to put 
the position more in perspective. Most estate owners, he said, had 
good relations with their tenants and would deeply resent any 
suggestion that they treated them in a manner approaching serfdom; 
and the grievances were mainly confined to the large estate owners
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especially the BCA Company; of the 170,000 Africans currently 
resident on private estates, he estimated only half were actively 
concerned to secure a change in their status as tenants. He 
acknowledged that the remainder, "notwithstanding the comparative 
smallness of their number", constituted "an important and dangerous 
element."
Colby then turned to consider how far acquisition would relieve 
congestion and pointed out that of the 887,000 acres remaining in 
private hands, 500,000 were already occupied by African tenants; 
purchasing all this land would remove the troubles between landlord 
and tenant but would do nothing to alleviate congestion. Of the 
other 387, 000 acres, 100, 000 were developed by the owners, 200, 000 
were either under indigenous forest or otherwise for conservation 
reasons ought not to be cultivated, so that less than 100, 000 acres 
could be available to relieve congestion. He had made this last 
point - the impossibility of doing much to relieve congestion - to 
Cohen almost six years earlier, and he now said, "It would be idle to 
suppose that acquisition of all of it would give any perceptible or 
permanent relief to the problem of congestion." In dealing with the 
original alienation of land - a matter raised a number of times in 
the memorandum - Colby said that the Southern Province members of the 
Protectorate Council felt most strongly and could not be convinced 
"that the transactions ... leading to the issue of Certificates of 
Claim in the 1890s were recognised at the time and could not now be 
reopened". Colby7 s view was that
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even supposing African claims to land were 
deserving of sympathy on ethical grounds, 
there is no doubt that any claims they 
might make- in a court of law would not 
invalidate the titles now held by estate 
owners. Any reopening of the question of 
freehold titles which were recognised by 
Sir Harry Johnston in his Certificates of 
Claim can only lead to profitless acrimony, 
and cannot be contemplated.
He summarised the early part of his despatch by saying that the 
problem was essentially political, the Africans directly affected 
were a comparatively small proportion living in a relatively compact 
area of the Southern Province, the unoccupied land available for 
acquisition would have little perceptible effect on congestion and 
the present African dissatisfaction contained serious political 
dangers. He was at pains to explain that "it is the political aspect 
of the problem rather than the congestion aspect which is 
important." What he was aiming at, in effect, was the full use of 
the land either for active economic development or for accommodating 
Africans. As for striking a balance between the two, the political 
aspects would take precedence over the congestion aspects.
The Governor proceeded to explain his proposed solution to the
problem and for the first time clearly introduced a social
anthropological dimension to the argument:
the solution of the problem lies in the 
gradual adaptation of the use of land in 
private ownership so as to conform as 
closely as possible to African usufructual 
ideas, which are ... as strong in the mind 
of the African today as they ever were, and 
close examination of the African land 
grievances will reveal that at the base of 
them there is always the same factor, i. e. 
that ownership of land can only go with the 
direct use of it. For this reason they
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have never disputed the ownership of land 
in actual cultivation by estate owners. 
Conversely Africans cannot see that any 
other person should have any rights to the 
land which they themselves are cultivating, 
and it is this belief which is at the 
bottom of their dislike of the tenant 
system. Nor can they see that any estate 
owner has the right to prevent others from 
cultivating land which he does not require 
for his own immediate use, dissatisfaction 
on this last point being particularly 
dangerous in closely-populated areas.
With this social anthropological dimension to the solution 
centrally in mind, Colby categorised private land in four groups. 
First, there was land in direct use by the estate owner including 
land temporarily under fallow; with this he felt there was no 
political difficulty since it would not be in accordance with 
usufructual principles to claim it, but it should be fenced to make 
it clear that it was in use. Secondly, there was private land 
occupied by African tenants; this he believed should be acquired by 
Government for African use, priority being given to the areas where 
dissatisfaction was greatest, thereby removing tenant status and 
preventing sale to Asians which was a growing concern expressed in 
the Protectorate Council memorandum. Thirdly, there was private land 
under indigenous forest, or incapable of economic development or 
which for other conservation reasons should not be developed; this he 
felt should be preserved in its virgin state and although this would 
not accord with African usufructual ideas since it would not appear 
to be used, Government should acquire it because "any resentment 
about the preservation of natural resources should be directed 
against Government." Fourthly, there was land of agricultural value,
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unoccupied either by the estate owner or by African tenants; this he
believed presented the most urgent problem:
Although the extent of this land is not 
great, feeling about it is very high, and 
if serious political trouble is to be 
avoided all this land should be put fully 
under development in the course of the next 
five years, or else surrendered for African 
use: any such land which cannot be 
developed during the next five years should 
be surrendered now.
He made no reference to clearing retained land of tenant occupation.
This categorisation of private land and the way in which he 
believed each category should be handled constituted "a broad 
enunciation of the general policy which [he] consider[ed] should be 
pursued with a view to allaying African misgivings about the 
ownership of private land and their dislike of the tenant system."
By "the gradual adaptation of the use of the land in private 
ownership so as to conform as closely as possible to African 
usufructual ideas", he was attempting to do what Bell and Abrahams 
said could not be done, namely to effect a reconciliation between 
African and European concepts - or at least practices - of land 
holding.
Colby went on to say that he would require the work of 
resettlement to be done with the full agreement of the local 
Africans, their village headmen and Native Authorities, and in return 
for the land which they would receive he would require them to sign a 
document recognising that the transaction was final so as to 
strengthen the hand of future administrations and deter "profitless
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pursuit" of the way in which the original Certificates of Claim were 
issued.
Finally he dealt with the requests made in the Protectorate 
Council memorandum, and believed that his proposals covered them save 
for land near the townships, forest reserves and land owned by 
missions. He pointed out that land in and near the townships was 
controlled under the town planning legislation and, because of the 
cost involved, acquisition was not justified. In respect of forest 
reserves, he believed that only education would solve the problem 
because although most Africans said that the reserves were necessary, 
very few really believed it. He felt that mission lands presented no 
real pressing worries because tenants there lived much as they would 
on Trust Land and because there was little mission land in the 
Southern Province where real dissatisfaction existed; nonetheless he 
advised that any mission land offered for sale at a reasonable price 
should be bought by Government.
Colby7 s concluding paragraph asked for the Secretary of State7 s 
early comments on his despatch because he regarded "African concern 
over the whole land question as being of great political 
importance." Lytta I ton replied by cable the same day as he received 
Colby7 s despatch and agreed generally with the Governor7 s 
observations but did not wish to reach a final conclusion on land 
policy until after his visit to Nyas aland which was imminent. That 
he was strongly disposed to accept Colby7 s proposals is indicated by 
the fact that he asked for a reply to the Protectorate Council
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memorandum to be drafted along Colby7 s lines which could be finalised 
when he arrived in the Protectorate. ^  The resultant reply, sent 
after the Secretary of State7 s visit, did in fact follow Colby7 s
3
reasoning, policy, and often his words, very closely.
The signals which the Governor received from the disturbances,
the Protectorate Council and the early 1954 political intelligence
reports^ persuaded him, or confirmed him in his opinion, that the
policy of acquiring private land and resettling African families from
congested areas now needed urgent acceleration. He publicly and
bluntly expressed his opinion that
Africans in parts of the Southern Province 
live in a state of congestion and that 
whilst large areas of freehold land, the 
property of European estate owners, remain 
undeveloped there will exist a potential 
danger to the peace and tranquility of the 
country.
Late in 1953 and early in 1954 he made direct proposals to 
owners of several of the larger estates that except for areas already 
cultivated or to be developed within the next three to five years,
g
all land should be handed to Government for resettling Africans.
After the indelicate and boat-rocking issuing of notices to quit by 
the BCA Company earlier in 1953 and the serious disturbances in the 
areas of greatest land alienation, Colby was in no mood to beat 
around the bush. After decades of gentlemanly negotiation and giving 
in to landowners - as the Colonial Office had pointed out in 1927 - 
and after numerous hints that acquisition was the only feasible way 
forward, Colby had made an early start on settling the problem, but 
the large acquisitions of 1949 had done little to change conditions
-171-
in the heavily congested areas of the Shire Highlands, and now he was 
determined to bring matters to a swift conclusion. Many of the 
landowners were aghast at these proposals and they immediately formed 
a Landowners Association "representing the owners of a large 
proportion of the freehold land" in the country and whose members 
controlled over half that land, to resist Colby7 s proposals. '
In a note for the Secretary of State7 s visit written on 20 April
1954® Colby concluded that "the only practical means of doing away
with the tenant system, since the removal of large numbers of tenants
off estates was out of the question, was to buy the lands on which
the tenants reside" - a process started in 1949, albeit in respect of
land not heavily populated, but which had since come to a virtual
halt. He outlined the general plan of acquisition as:
designed to make as much provision for 
further European development as the present 
situation permits. It is not desired to 
acquire unoccupied land which is capable of 
and required for European development in 
the near future, but only to acquire land 
which cannot be developed by reason of 
having African settlement on it and other 
such areas as are unsuitable for 
utilisation by the owners or are clearly 
superfluous to their needs. It is 
intended that the African should also make 
his contribution to the settlement problem, 
by confining himself to those parts of 
estates bought for him, and by withdrawing 
himself from other parts required by owners 
for further development.
Colby7 s reference to European development clearly meant development
on existing holdings rather than on new holdings as, in part,
envisaged by Abrahams and the Land Planning Committee. The reference
to land "clearly superfluous to needs" was aimed at warning
landowners not to be ambitious in their claims to retain land on the
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grounds that it was to be developed: the Land Planning Committee had 
not been impressed with the BCA Company's 15 year development plan 
which they saw as being "patently impracticable". His reference to 
the African tenant "withdrawing himself" from retained land was 
somewhat firmer and more positive than the earlier references to 
"being invited to opt" to move.
He went on to say that for this policy of acquisition to be 
effectively implemented it would be necessary to start it on the 
larger estates where tenant problems were most acute. This was a 
change of mind since April 1948 when Colby7 s view was that they 
should " approach the most reasonable owners first." Most owners had 
said that they agreed in principle with his proposals but when it 
came to the point in practice they were reluctant to part with the 
land.
In May 1954, the Secretary of State, Lyttelton, visited 
Nyas aland to discuss land and constitutional reform. He received a 
long memorandum from the Landowners Association and the Convention of 
Associations who joined forces to vilify Colby and attack his land
Q
proposals. In their eyes these proposals were the culminating 
iniquity of a Governor, appointed by a socialist Secretary of State, 
who had taken systematic steps towards state control and 
nationalisation - the Acquisition of Land for Public Purposes 
Ordinance, replacing private purchasing of crops with statutory 
marketing boards, encouraging Colonial Development Corporation 
trading stores in conpetition with private shops in remote areas, 
establishing the African Press publishing company, and now land.
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The view expressed in the memorandum - which was given 
prominence in the local press - was that the claims made during the 
1953 disturbances about land were "made for political purposes and 
not ... because there is any widespread need for more land"; it was 
their "firm conviction that, judged on a territorial basis, 
congestion [did] not exist. " They were unrestrained in their 
denunciation of the Governor, accusing him of "appeasement on a grand 
scale", of following "a policy of despair", of wanting in "a much 
more statesman-like attitude", of being "inflexible" and of working 
under "false suppositions".
Joelson, editor of East Africa and Rhodesia, took the
opportunity to add that periodical7 s denigration:
The general opinion of European 
non-officials [is] that there has been no 
firm government of Nyas aland for years, 
that native agitators now expect to be 
appeased, that those who incite their 
fellows to lawlessness think the risk of 
punishment slight, and that ... Africans 
have ceased to look to the government for 
resolute leadership. ... Many Europeans in 
Nyas aland have been saying for several 
years that they have no faith in the 
Governor and no confidence in his ideas.
He conpared Colby7 s government unfavourably with the government of
Southern and Northern Rhodesia which had "a determination to be firm
with the African for the African7 s own good", and added that " such a
11doctrine is anathema" to Colby.
The landowners7 principal contention was that Colby7 s proposals 
would not provide a lasting solution because they were
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convinced that to hand over private land to African settlement would
in a few years lead to further decimation of forest areas and
ruination of the soil. Once this had occurred the demand for more
land would resume and pressure would be brought on owners to give up
any remaining undeveloped land which in turn would also be ruined.
The philosophy behind this fear of the ultimate loss of private land
and the destruction of the country's natural resources was clarified
in their demands that Colby should recognise:
that the African through lack of training, 
has by nature an irresponsible attitude 
towards the natural resources, and must 
adopt the policy that the European, by 
virtue of centuries of civilisation and 
accumulated scientific knowledge, knows the 
best way to develop the country and is 
prepared, unpleasant as it may be, to adopt 
and enforce a policy best suited to the 
country as a whole ... that the Africans of 
Nyasaland cannot be considered at present 
as being capable of directing the affairs 
of the country, and this being so the 
European must continue to govern without 
fear or favour and irrespective of race.
In this way they linked the question of land to that of
constitutional development, the two questions which Lyttelton had
come to discuss. The landowners could not realistically have
expected Colby to share their view on the role of Africans either in
agricultural or in administrative, constitutional matters, since
improved African agriculture was at the heart of his development
strategy and he had given early warnings of the need to be ready for
the inevitable political awakenings. They insisted that the African
demands for acquisition of freehold land must be resisted, that good
race relations with the Africans must not be obtained at the expense
of the Europeans and that a solution to the problem was possible
without one section of the community being sacrificed for the benefit
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of the other. They maintained that, if properly developed, Trust 
Land could adequately cater for the needs of the African people. In 
order to deal properly with the Trust Land areas, immediate steps 
should be taken to increase considerably the staff of European 
Administrative Officers and train large numbers of African 
Agricultural Instructors. Finally they said that arriving at a 
satisfactory solution would require the goodwill and unqualified 
co-operation of all races and that in establishing this goodwill and 
co-operation, the Nyas aland Government had special responsibilities. 
They said nothing about their own responsibilities.
This memorandum was sent to the Secretary of State on 1 May by 
Dixon as Chairman of the European Landowners Association. Five days 
later Lyttelton held a meeting at Government House, Zomba, with
r
landowners nominated by the Convention of Associations. It was a 
large meeting, with fifteen landowners or their managers, including 
Brook, Dixon, Barrow and Hadlow, whilst on the Government side the 
Secretary of State was accompanied by the Governor, Chief Secretary, 
Director of Agriculture, Provincial Commissioner of the Southern 
Province, the Land Settlement Officer, the Assistant Under Secretary
1 7and the Lands Adviser to the Colonial Office.
Lyttelton opened this meeting by setting out the policy of Her 
Majesty's Government. He recognised the contribution of estates to 
the agricultural development of the Protectorate and said that it was 
“settled policy" to ensure to owners security in the possession and 
management of their developed lands. This point about security was 
made in response to Alport's view expressed at a Colonial Office
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meeting on 14 April to discuss land policy and law and order in
Nyas aland: "the land-owners would hope for some concrete return in
the form of increased prospects of future security for any sacrifice
they might make". ^  At his May meeting in Nyas aland, Lyttelton
took the opportunity which this view presented to place the land
question in a much broader context and in so doing to take a clear
and firm line. He emphasised the future security sought could be
assured only if conditions were created which enabled the estate
owners to live in amity with the African population. Without these
conditions the growing unrest and political feeling would make it
impossible for the estate owners to carry on; it was not possible to
use force to implement a land policy which was not acceptable to the
mass of the inhabitants because "ultimately the necessary force was
lacking." These views on the ultimate impracticability of force were
shared by Colby who four years earlier had publicly said of
agricultural production:
we must be realistic and recognise that a
handful of Europeans can not compel 
hundreds of thousands of farmers - it just 
is not possible as there is no effective 
machinery through which orders on such a 
vast scale can be enforced.
Lyttelton continued to say: "Taking into account that there was no
ultimate backing of force, the rights of property must be harmonised
with the over-riding social contentment of the population." Few
statements could have been clearer in indicating which side the
British Government would support if the two sides - owners and
tenants, Europeans and Africans - did not sort things out themselves
amicably. Lyttelton then went on to say what was to be done:
Policy would therefore be directed to the 
progressive abolition of the "tangata"
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system which would be implemented by 
purchasing from estate owners all those 
areas of land which were occupied by 
tenants or were otherwise unsuitable for 
estate development or which could not be 
developed within a reasonable time.
The Secretary of State was anxious to secure the co-operation of
landowners and would use conpulsory acquisition only as a last
resort. Whilst small numbers of tenants could be moved to free some
estate land for development it would be "completely impossible" to
evict large numbers. It would be "impracticable" for landowners to
retain unused and unoccupied land in the congested areas for any
length of time. If it were to be retained it would have to be
developed within a reasonable time. The ultimate aim was that estate
owners would have on their estates no Africans with any rights to
land, and the substantial labour force required for tea and other
estates would be accommodated either in housing built by the estates
for permanent labour and "completely independent of subsistence
agriculture", or on neighbouring accommodation blocks. Since
executing this policy would be a lengthy process, Government would
first direct its attention to those holdings in which discontent and
political unrest were growing; thus, early action would be needed
only on a small number of estates over the next few years, since
relationships on the vast majority of estates were cordial. This
last remark was designed to reassure the majority of landowners and
to distance them from the larger owners, especially the BCA Company,
on whose estates, though relatively small in number but large in
area, the problems were much more acute.
In this carefully worded, albeit brief, statement of policy
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Lyttelton included all the essential points of the proposals which 
Colby had put to him seven weeks earlier. 15 The very succinctness 
of the statement gave it a poignancy which forcefully struck the 
estate owners present. Lyttelton ended his statement by saying that 
the existing settlement and development policy would "be continued 
and accelerated", and in order to do this, which would be "subject to 
the provision of further staff and finance, H. M. G. would be very 
ready to examine how they could render assistance, possibly through 
the new Colonial Development and Welfare Allocation." Later he said 
that Government would continue its policy "with help from H. M. G., 
with staff and C. D. and W grants." ^  In making these statements 
the Secretary of State went further than his briefing notes which 
simply said " H. M. G. will examine means of assisting e. g. by the 
provision of further staff" ^  with no reference to the CDWF. He 
then asked those estate owners present if they were agreeable to the 
line of action which he had outlined.
Dixon replied that the Secretary of State's proposals were
appeasement, that a "vigorous attitude" was required of Government
and that "drastic treatment" was necessary. It was, of course, not
the vigour and drastic nature of what was proposed to which Dixon
objected but the pro-tenant direction which the attitudes and
treatment were to take. Lyttelton was well aware of the "hard" line
adopted by the BCA Company since, for example, at the Colonial Office
meeting on 14 April, Brook had advocated that the external police
reinforcements used during the 1953 disturbances should be reimported
before trouble broke out again "to show the flag and forestall any 
18outbreak." Dixon's own solution to the land problem was that
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agricultural development on Trust Land would draw Africans away from 
the estate areas; he was "certain" that adequate Trust Land was 
available but it lacked water supplies and European development: "An 
influx of Europeans to the Vipya would be followed by an influx of 
Africans", presumably - but unrealistically - drawn away from the 
Shire Highlands congested areas hundreds of miles to the south with 
their different tribes and languages. He was silent on the impact 
which such a movement of Africans, even if it were remotely likely to 
happen, would have on labour supplies in the south.
The Secretary of State responded that Dixon's views were
"entirely unsupported by argument" and that many of his statements
were "entirely incorrect". If a solution were sought along Dixon's
lines, he foresaw the ultimate necessity for force - which he had
already ruled out:
absolute control, which would require 
wholesale evictions, would exacerbate the 
present tension, and would require the 
conjuring up of sufficient African Trust 
Land which was just not available. He was 
absolutely convinced that a solution on 
these lines was not possible.
All the estate owners present - save Barrow and Hadlow who had 
been closely associated with Government policy formation as members 
of Executive Council - were opposed to the steps proposed by 
Government to deal with the land problem, but the most vigorously 
expressed opposition came from Dixon. Part way through the meeting, 
when it was clear to everyone that Lyttelton was strongly backing the 
Governor's views and policy and was having little truck with the 
views of the large estate owners, Colby asked why the BCA Company
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wished to retain large areas of tenant-occupied land. It is likely 
that this simple question was designed to embarrass and expose Dixon 
who replied by trying to "duck" it, saying that it was incorrect that 
his Company wished to retain such land since in February - presumably 
when Colby had approached the large landowners - they had offered 
60, 000 acres to Government. Colby taunted him a little more/ saying 
he did not recollect this offer, whereupon Brook came to his General 
Manager's aid and explained that Dixon had mentioned the 60, 000 acres 
to him and he had felt prepared to discuss it subject to Government 
making it clear what would happen to the land and agreeing to 
"undesirables" being kept off the land retained. Colby pushed a 
little further, saying that it had not been made clear to him by 
Brook that he had made a firm offer. Brook quickly said that he had 
not made a firm offer, but in order to get out of what was becoming 
too detailed and confining a discussion, especially in the presence 
of other landowners, he suggested that Government should now get in 
touch with Dixon to discuss with him what land it required.
Brook's suggestion was potentially such a major shift in 
attitude that Lyttelton was quick to secure the ground which Colby's 
simple-sounding question had made available; he did not want Dixon to 
be able to wriggle out of this opportunity as Kaye Nicol had wriggled 
out of recommending to the Company the release of land following the 
deliberations of the Land Planning Committee in 1947. Lyttelton 
closed the nut-crackers around Dixon, and immediately after Brook had 
made his suggestion about further discussion on what land the 
Government required, he said:
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that was what was wanted but he had 
gathered that Mr. Dixon found such a 
solution distasteful. He was very glad to 
hear that Mr. Brook was prepared to discuss 
the sale of land ... He felt that 60,000 
acres would be a notable contribution. Mr.
Dixon had however led him to believe that 
both he and the meeting were opposed to 
acquisition of land by Government.
Colby was equally keen to secure the ground presented and 
possibly to secure even more, and - pushing the wedge between Dixon 
and Brook a little further than the Secretary of State had just 
driven it - he said that the irrpression he had gained from the 
Landowners' Association memorandum and from Dixon was that Dixon was 
opposed to handing over tenant-occupied land. He was surprised that 
Brook now said the Company had been prepared to discuss the sale of 
60, 000 acres and enquired whether they were prepared to negotiate the 
disposed of all tenant-occupied land. Brook, however, was not going 
to yield more in this discussion and said he was not prepared to 
dispose of all such land as they wished to retain some because of the 
value of tenants as labour - clearly, he had not grasped or had not 
accepted the significance of Lyttelton's statement that "all those 
areas of land which were occupied by tenants" would be purchased - 
but he did say that the Government should suggest what areas it 
required so that the Company might consider them. Nonetheless, Colby 
was well pleased: he had got the BCA Company Chairman to say that he 
was prepared to consider sales of land and to agree, in front of the
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Secretary of State and many others, that Government should suggest to 
Dixon what areas it required so that the Company could consider the 
requirements. This was a considerable piercing of Brook's otherwise 
implacable opposition to Government acquisition of tenant-occupied 
land.
For whatever reason, the BCA Company appears to have become
somewhat more amenable to Government's wishes after the May 1954 
1 Qmeeting, although the transformation was not sudden: rather,
Colby, having pierced the Company's opposition, was determined to 
exploit his advantage by isolating the Company from other landowners 
and pushing it hard. From the very beginning he had seen that the 
BCA Company would be the biggest nut to crack, they had become more 
entrenched rather than less over the years and he had been dissuaded
r
by Barrow in 1953 from exposing them in order to get public support 
on his side. He, and Hadlow, believed that African grievances over 
thancrata arose from the "situation prevailing on only four or five of 
the European estates... primarily from that prevailing on the British 
Central Africa Company land." ^  Apart from this company's 
recalcitrance, all was going fairly well, and in pursuing Brook and 
Dixon he did not wish to hinder or retard that other progress. He 
was, however, now faced with a further difficulty: the publication of 
a document setting out the Government's land policy in Nyas aland.
Less than a week after Lytt € It on's visit - a success from 
Colby s point of view because the Secretary of State had not only
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accepted the Governor's proposed policy but had firmly announced it
to the landowners - Colby went on leave to Britain, leaving Footman
71as Acting Governor.
In the summer of 1954 Colonial Office officials, after "months 
of cogitation ", embodied their provisional conclusions in a draft 
despatch showing the way in which it was intended to implement the 
policy of progressive abolition of thanoata. The draft despatch 
contained a good deal of historical background material but the 
essence of it was an amplification of what was meant by "progressive 
abolition of tangata", some of the measures to be taken and the time 
in which they were to be taken. Private land occupied by few 
Africans but otherwise capable of development should be freed of 
Africans so that development could take place by moving them onto 
neighbouring land acquired by Government or onto other parts of the 
estate. Private land heavily occupied and undeveloped and not 
required for early development should be acquired. Estate owners 
should as soon as possible make their development plans known to 
Government "so that Government could judge in estate-by-estate 
discussion with them what course would be in the interests of all 
concerned." The whole exercise should be aimed to be completed in 
four years, which Colby had said was achievable "given the necessary 
co-operation" from landowners. As each estate became cleared of 
tenants the Africans On Private Estates Ordinance would cease to 
apply. On 16 August the Colonial Office sent the draft despatch to 
Footman who agreed with it and hoped very much that it would be 
published. ^
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Colby s opinion was also sought2  ^and at a meeting which he 
and Hadlow had with the Secretary of State on 12 and 13 October2  ^
he also agreed although he wished to qualify his agreement on the 
question of the rent payable under the Africans On Private Estates 
Ordinance; he had in mind that a severe reduction in rent payable 
might so reduce the value of the land that the owners would be more 
ready to sell to Government. He emphasised his strong view,, however, 
that the despatch should not be published unless it had been 
discussed among Africans and had gained at least a degree of 
acceptance. 25 Whilst he could see that publication might reassure 
interested parties in Britain that the policy of abolishing thancrata 
would proceed, he believed that publication in Nyas aland "would 
simply stir up feelings which were now quiescent." If his Government 
could make some positive progress in acquiring estate land heavily 
occupied by tenants, that would be received by Africans as a much 
better earnest of Government's intentions than the despatch.
Mamham accepted the Governor's views, saying that if his advice 
was not to publish then they should accept it because the only reason 
for publication in the United Kingdom was to demonstrate to both 
sides of the House of Commons "that something was being done " and 
this could just as well be done in reply to a Parliamentary Question 
to which Colby objected less although he preferred the Colonial 
Office not to instigate one. 2  ^ When this advice reached Gorell 
Barnes he took a very different view:
Publication, which is also favoured by Mr
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Footman, seems to me to be essential, not 
so much in order to satisfy public opinion 
here that it is really our intention to 
implement the policy, but rather to make it 
quite clear to all concerned in Nvasaland 
what the Government's policy is.
He must have been aware that the policy was well known in Nyas aland
since the Secretary of State's visit, but he felt that if this were
not done, those landlords who had been difficult in the past would ,
continue to attempt to " avoid facing the needs of the situation."
Three views therefore existed: Mamham's which focused on reaction in
the House of Commons, Gorell Barnes' which focused on European
landowners in Nyas aland, and Colby s which focused on African
reactions in Nyas aland. Colby agreed to look closely at the question
of publication on his return to Nyas aland and give his considered
7ftopinion as soon as possible.460
There were probably three influences which made Colby reluctant 
to publish the despatch: what may well have seemed to him the 
introduction of almost academic debate at a very late stage into a 
matter which had deeply worrying practical implications and which he 
had always treated in a pragmatic way; the changed circumstances in 
Nyas aland; and his wish to have room to manoeuvre in his dealings 
with the BCA Company.
First, the introduction of almost academic debate. During his 
visit to Nyas aland in the first week of May 1954, Lyttelton had been 
accompanied by S. R. Simpson, Lands Adviser to the Colonial Office.
On his return to London, Simpson took it upon himself to write a
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report on the thancrata system which Gorell Barnes sent to Nyas aland 
on 27 May: it was possible, therefore, that it was a rather hastily 
compiled report. 29 In reading the report, one senses a somewhat 
snide, highly critical, superior, academic attitude in the writer.
In his first line he referred to the "so-called" thancrata system and 
said that notwithstanding the fact that the Secretary of State had 
recently announced that the system was to be progressively abolished, 
he wished to draw attention to certain points and to make some 
suggestions. In his view, the Nyas aland Government, unlike Abrahams, 
had "underrated" the significance of thancrata and its implications 
for land policy and development, the Land Planning Committee had not 
realised its significance and had "completely reversed the 
fundamental basis of Abrahams' whole report" by recommending that 
" far from abolishing tangata, the Natives On Private Estates 
Ordinance should be revised in such a way as to retain it." The 
Ordinance of 1952 was "reactionary and non-aggressive" and the extent 
of this had not been appreciated in Nyas aland; the retention of 
thancrata in that Ordinance was "indefensible". He felt that "a good 
deal of time and energy [had] been spent on asserting that unoccupied 
land is a national asset at the disposition of the State" and that it 
was "revealing and shaming" that the Natives on Private Estates 
Ordinance of 1928 should have been enacted "for the benefit of the 
estate owners". When Young and RLttermaster had tried to get the 
1928 Ordinance altered in the 1930s it was, of course, the Colonial 
Office which refused to re-open the question. He then turned to the 
rights of Africans under the non-disturbance clauses in the original 
Certificates of Claim and said - almost certainly incorrectly - that
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these had been swept aside by the 1928 and 1952 ordinances, adding
I am not greatly impressed by the argument 
that discrimination between residents, 
immigrants and migrant labour is 
impossible. If 'peaceable, public and 
uninterrupted possession' for a prescribed 
period conferred title... much apparent - 
and actual - injustice would be avoided.
Simpson agreed with the payment of rent: "the days are past when each
African should be considered as entitled as of right to the
occupation of a piece of Africa." He thought that the word " rent" in
the 1952 Ordinance was "strange" and a "misnomer" and more like "an
extremely heavy poll tax". In regard to Administrative Officers
being required by law to evict rent defaulters, he said that he found
it "particularly repugnant... that the prestige and good offices of
British District Commissioners should be used in such a cause." He
hinted that the estate system in Nyas aland was akin to the former
"Kaffir farming" in Southern Rhodesia.
He then came to the core of his argument: that the policy of 
acquiring estate land would not in itself offer a complete solution 
and that only by acquiring all tenant-occupied land could this method 
bring thancrata to an end. In order to reduce the incidence of 
thancrata. estate owners had to give up land and "they do not like 
doing this". He insisted that Government had lost all the advantages 
and immense bargaining power which outright abolition would give 
them, and that gradual decrease in the incidence of thancrata by the 
slow process of acquisition could have none of the affect on public 
confidence which its outright abolition would have. He did not say 
which "public", European or African, whose confidence would be
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affected he had in mind, nor did he explain why he used "gradual
decrease" rather than "progressive abolition" or why this should
necessarily be a "slow process". He believed that to retain thancrata
even if its incidence were much reduced "constitutes a very real
danger. It is an easy and fair target for the agitator or even the
mere reformer." Then he delivered his supreme insult:
It can only have survived so long because 
Nyasaland, as a queer little appendage 
hanging from the side of British Africa, is 
so much off the beaten track.
What he feared was not that acquisition by Government might lead to
further demands later - as the Landowners Association had claimed -
but rather that a fair attack on thancrata. which was inherently bad,
might readily spread to a general and unjustifiable attack on all
European land-holding. "We must put our own house in order before we
can defend it. "
Pointing out that "reduction" was not the same as "extinction", 
and ignoring the fact that the policy was one of "progressive 
abolition" which is logically at least as close to extinction as it 
is to reduction, Simpson urged that rent should be reduced to a 
nominal sum, perhaps a shilling a year, and that the provisions as to 
labour in lieu should be cancelled: "This very simply finally 
abolishes tangata". He seems not to have recalled that the 1917 
Ordinance, if enforced, would have prohibited labour as payment for 
residence rights, that is, it would have abolished thancrata without 
doing away with rent. Nor did he deal with the political 
repercussions of the inevitable European reaction to his proposals.
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His view was that there was a " fundamental distinction" between 
thancrata and the question of tenant-congested estates; the former 
should be "abolished out of hand" but the latter would "continue to 
require much sympathetic and patient cooperation between the 
Government, the landowners and the tenants".
When Footman, in Colby s absence, received Simpson's report he 
asked Executive Council to consider it, and this they did on 9 June 
1954. The Acting Governor opened the meeting by outlining what 
he saw as " the crux of the problem" - Simpson's view that thancrata 
was undesirable and should be abolished immediately - and concluded 
that the rent charged was excessive and ought to be reduced to a few 
shillings; "if it was equitable to reduce the rent, thanaata must go 
automatically because the equivalent amount of work in lieu would be 
so small as to be useless".
r
McDonald, who was invited to the meeting, was worried by
Simpson's proposal that thancrata be abolished immediately since that
would affect the negotiations for acquisition of land, acquisition
which was essential if the political problem was to be solved; the
Secretary of State had announced that the course to be taken was
progressive abolition by negotiated purchase.
Immediate abolition would render 
Government's task in removing tenants very 
difficult since they would have no 
inducement to move and the negotiations 
with landowners would be greatly 
prejudiced.
Whilst he said that he believed Footman's arguments to be "logical",
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their implementation would not be feasible and would have adverse 
repercussions. Barnes, Provincial Commissioner of the Southern 
Province, who was also present, agreed that the rent was grossly 
excessive but felt that its reduction 1 required very careful timing."
Council, whilst agreeing that the rent was excessive, found it 
difficult to reconcile Simpson's proposals with the Secretary of 
State's statement that thancrata would be progressively abolished 
preferably with the landowners' co-operation. Immediate abolition 
would run counter to this, would lack the landowners' consent and 
would prejudice the chances of co-operation and negotiation. Youens, 
Acting Chief Secretary, said that it was not possible to disagree 
with Footman's arguments on the rights of the matter but he did not 
believe that the matter was so simple that it could be solved by the 
stroke of a pen. He did not agree with Simpson that the proposal was 
supplemental to what had been agreed by the Secretary of State. To 
reduce the rent to a shilling would amount to virtual expropriation 
of estate land and would remove any incentive to Africans to move. 
Simmonds, Financial Secretary, also agreed that the thancrata system 
was indefensible but he was uncertain that thancrata could be divorced 
from rent. If rent were reduced and thancrata abolished, a degree of 
semi-permanency for tenant holdings would be created while the 
landowner would receive no advantage and this would be tantamount to 
expropriation. This, in many ways, was the most perceptive of all 
the views expressed. If residents on private land were not obliged 
to pay rent, or work, or grow crops, they lived there without 
conditions and without any obligation or inducement to move off, or
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to different parts of, the estates. How, under these circumstances, 
was the estate owner to exercise any control over settlement or 
encroachment and be able to develop his estate, and what would 
freehold title mean in Nyas aland?
Hadlow, pointing to the Secretary of State's statement that 
thancrata abolition would be progressive, felt that any "panic 
legislation" would have a bad effect on the Africans who would not be 
slow to realise the absurdity of the position. In his view the rent 
should be reduced from fifty to thirty shillings. Rumsey, the other 
unofficial member, agreed that thirty shillings seemed a reasonable 
rent. The suggestion that rent should be somewhat, rather than 
radically, reduced was a political and equitable gesture which really 
had little to do with Simpson's suggestions save that if the reduced 
rent was at a level which residents could readily afford they would 
have a genuine choice between paying rent and working in lieu rather 
than being virtually forced to work because the prevailing rates of 
rent were higher than they could reasonably afford. This was not a 
point expressed in Executive Council although members probably had it 
in mind.
Kettlewell supported this proposal to reduce rent to thirty 
shillings and added that the Africans should be told that Government 
expected them to observe their rent obligations and that any failure 
to do so, or opposition, would interrupt progress in acquiring land. 
To some extent this would be bluff but he felt it might work, as did 
McDonald. King, the Acting Attorney-General, Youens, Simmonds,
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Hadlow and Rumsey agreed with Kettlewell, and Council advised that 
the Secretary of State should have put to him the proposal that the 
Africans on Private Estates Ordinance should be amended so that a 
standard rent of thirty shillings or, at the tenant's option, a 
period of work not exceeding three months in lieu of rent should be 
imposed. Footman, faced with this unanimous advice, "did not feel 
able to dissent from the advice given and ordered that the whole 
position be reported to the Secretary of State."
Thus Footman, in Colby s absence, had been willing, possibly 
keen, to go along with Simpson's proposals, but his advisers had 
dissuaded him, countering his arguments of logic and principle with 
arguments of practicalities, and had steered the ship of policy back 
to the course on which Colby had set it: progressive abolition of 
thanqata by purchasing undeveloped private land, preferably by 
negotiation, and resettling tenants and others from congested areas - 
and from areas soon to be developed - on the purchased lands. As a 
token of Government's intentions, however, and as a means of 
facilitating or accelerating the progressive abolition of thanaata. 
rent was to be reduced by two fifths to thirty shillings a year.
Other attempts to introduce what Colby may well have felt were 
academic arguments were made by the Nyas aland Government's Lands 
Adviser, Winnington-Ingram, when he was appointed to Nyas aland in 
January 1955, from Tanganyika - having recently been seconded for two
0 1
years to the African Studies branch of the Colonial Office. Like 
Simpson, but in a lesser way, he was a specialist in African land
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tenure; neither had first-hand personal experience of circumstances 
similar to the situation in Nyas aland. On a number of 
Winnington-Ingram's early papers in Nyas aland Colby minuted such 
remarks as "He misunderstands the whole exercise", "This is all based 
on a fallacy", " They are not", " I don't think so!", " No". Later
Winnington-Ingram suggested to Williams at the Colonial Office that 
the "Africans should be encouraged to raise funds to buy back land 
from the estates." Williams' view was that this was not a "likely 
starter as the Africans would not be likely to put their hands in 
their pockets to buy land from Europeans when they disputed the 
Europeans' right to it. It was a naive suggestion with which 
Colby, had he have known, would have had little patience.
Colby must have felt that Simpson's arguments were unhelpful and 
clouded the issue. His line of advance, though not easy, was clear 
and simple, and he would not have taken kindly to arguments - 
especially from outside - which made it less clear and less simple.
On his return in November he found that Footman had already advised 
the Secretary of State that the draft despatch on land policy, when 
finalised, should be published and he set about trying to reverse 
this advice. Winnington-Ingram's input to the finalising of the 
draft and his failure in Colby s eyes to understand the exercise 
added to the Governor's increasing reluctance to have the despatch 
published. Indeed, Simpson's suggestion, coming from the Colonial 
Office, served only to throw doubt on the firmness of the policy 
decided by Colby and endorsed by Lyttelton. Simpson fundamentally 
disagreed with the policy of progressive abolition of thancrata and
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until this difference of opinion was desired up, pdicy was unclear 
and it would have been very unwise to publish the draft statement 
during such a period of uncertainty.
Another reason for his reluctance was given to Executive Council
on 10 December 1954, and later to the Colonial Office, using language
very similar to that used by the Secretary of State almost exactly
twenty years earlier in restraining Young from then re-opening the
Africans on private estates issue.
His Excellency considered that publication 
would only serve to revive interest in a 
subject which Government felt could be 
solved in the very near future by land 
acquisition and resettlement.. He felt that 
the work on the ground would do far more to 
convince the public of Government's 
intention of solving the land problem than 
the mere publication of documents such as 
the despatch from the Secretary of State.
He also felt that publication of the 
despatch might stir up trouble 
unnecessarily with the African Congress and 
might also upset European opinion both 
within Nyas aland and in Southern Rhodesia 
where a wrong interpretation might be 
placed on the terms of the despatch.
Colby believed that publication could do no good and might well do
considerable harm; and his reference to work on the ground doing far
more good than would publication, reflected a view which he had
expressed from his earliest days in Nyas aland: "I am convinced that a
35pound of examples is worth a ton of precept."
In order to help Executive Council to reverse its earlier 
advice, however, he did accept Council's compromise, initiated by 
Rumsey, that the despatch should be shown to the Convention of
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Associations and the Landowners Association with the request that 
they deal with it in committee. ^  The circumstances in Nyas aland 
had changed with Lytttlton's visit. Things were going quite well for 
Colby. The Secretary of State had publicly endorsed his policy and 
he had weathered the storm of abuse from the European landowners and 
the press. He was gradually forcing open the wound caused by 
piercing Dixon's opposition and was turning it into a fatal injury; 
and other landowners were awaiting the outcome of the negotiations 
with the BCA Company. Furthermore - a factor not yet widely known - 
constitutional amendments were soon to be made which would increase 
African representation in the legislature and these, when announced, 
would both indicate to Africans Government's intentions in their 
favour and help assuage their fears of European domination, and also 
attract further criticism from Europeans. Why risk raising the land 
issue again by publishing a major policy document when the policy was 
already well known?
Unfortunately, the Secretary of State was by now much in favour
37of publication - and in fact had formally agreed to the draft - 
presumably because the idea had originated in the Colonial Office and 
because Footman, with Executive Council's approval had initially 
advocated publication. Also, although this was not stated,
Simpson's diverting proposal had been disposed of: it was rejected 
primarily on the grounds that, firstly, it would be heavily 
criticised and opposed by landowners in Nyas aland and by Government 
back-benchers in Britain because it would deprive the owners of a 
fair rent and render much of the land valueless to the owner, and
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secondly it would make the task of resettlement much more difficult
because it would take away any incentive for the tenants to move and
leave land free for development. The Secretary of State was
particularly doubtful about showing the despatch to the Convention of
Associations and the Landowners Association because they probably
would not respect its confidentiality and Parliament in Britain would
hardly be satisfied with a simple ministerial statement in the House
when others in Nyas aland had been given much fuller information.
Rather, Parliament would insist on publication, and conceding this
39would be much more embarrassing than voluntary publication.
The Secretary of State was puzzled by Colby's strong opposition 
to publication and both Gorell Barnes and Williams doubted whether 
the policy set out in the draft enjoyed the Governor's wholehearted 
support. 40 Although the Colonial Office was firm in its view and
r
kept up the pressure on Colby to agree to publication, they were 
prepared to go to considerable pains to understand his concerns and 
to win him over to their view.
It is not surprising that the Secretary of State should be 
puzzled by Colby's reluctance because the statement made by Lyttelton 
during his May 1954 visit was of a policy designed by Colby himself 
and communicated to the Colonial Office in his despatch accompanying 
the Protectorate Council Memorandum and in his note prepared for the 
Secretary of State's visit: progressive abolition of thanaata by
purchasing private land occupied by tenants or otherwise unsuitable 
for development or not to be developed in a reasonable time;
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withdrawing of tenants from developable retained land to acquired 
land; the process to start where the problems were most acute and to 
be on the basis of negotiated acquisition and voluntary 
resettlement. Few statements of policy could have been clearer; 
they emanated from Colby who must have agreed with them.
The first disruption to the clarity of policy was made by 
Simpson only two to three weeks after Lyttelton had stated it in 
Nyas aland. Simpson argued not for progressive abolition but for 
immediate abolition of thancrata by reducing rent to a nominal figure 
and abolishing the obligation to work in lieu. This was a 
fundamental attack on the policy, not merely supplemental as he 
claimed. Footman, in Colby's absence, was prepared to go along with 
Simpson's ideas but Executive Council dissuaded him.
f
Colby, like Executive Council, saw that Simpson's proposal would 
alienate European opinion and make estate owners very reluctant to 
sell - even if under these conditions there was any point in 
Government buying the land - and would remove from the African 
tenants a major inducement to move off, or to different parts of, 
estate land, which in turn would make the economic development of the 
estate very much more difficult. He much preferred, therefore, to 
adhere to the policy of progressive abolition of thancrata through 
negotiated acquisition and voluntary resettlement which,, if 
accomplished, would retain the goodwill of both European owners and 
African tenants and lead to the fuller development of estate land. 
What the Governor feared, however, was that this - or the important
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parts of it - would take too long to accomplish. He was deeply
aware of the profound and growing African feelings of opposition and 
the political, security, dangers involved, and he knew both how much 
these feelings were focused on BCA Company land and how recalcitrant, 
dilatory and unhelpful that Company could be. He knew also that the 
BCA Company was the key which he must first turn because others would 
wait for a lead from that Company to set an example and to establish 
the general price level. He believed that Nyas aland had little time 
left in which to solve the problem if political catastrophe was to be 
avoided, and he knew that he personally had little time - not much 
more than a year before he was due to retire.
Whilst agreeing with the main policy of progressive abolition of 
thanaata through negotiated acquisition and voluntary resettlement, 
Colby wanted other levers which he could use either as alternatives 
to the main policy or as threats to secure compliance with it. The 
main policy would work with other landowners but he feared it would 
not work with the BCA Company. Furthermore, if the main policy was 
to be implemented it would require very substantial financing and it 
was unlikely that Nyas aland could provide this by itself or that the 
British Government would readily grant the additional funds needed. 
Consequently, Colby did not wish to be tied down exclusively to the 
main policy in dealing with the BCA Company but wanted room to 
manoeuvre, and it was for this reason that at the 12 and 13 October 
1954 meeting with the Secretary of State he qualified his agreement 
to the policy on the question of the rent which should be charged.
In effect he was saying, " Let me think about this because Simpson's
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idea may have some merit in it, not necessarily in itself but as a 
lever or threat to gain the BCA Company7 s compliance with the main 
policy." As other alternatives or levers he also sought the 
Secretary of State7 s support for compulsory acquisition and for 
arbitration.
It was these considerations - which Colby unfortunately did not 
make entirely clear to the Colonial Office - which brought about the 
drawn-out argument over whether or not to publish the despatch. 
Numerous telegrams - described by Williams as "not happy"4  ^- 
passed back and forth between Colby and Gorell Barnes, on behalf of 
the Secretary of State, throughout March and early April 1955, the 
Secretary of State increasing his pressure to publish, Colby 
resisting the pressure to publish. By this time, too, officials 
in the Colonial Office were beginning to lose patience: Williams 
found the Governor7 s arguments " incomprehensible" and advocated that 
they should "bring further pressure on Sir G. Colby to agree" and 
Gorell Barnes agreed to "a rather fierce draft" reply to what he saw 
as "one of the most inconsistent and incomprehensible performances I 
have witnessed for some time." Finally, the Secretary of State 
seized on Colby7 s agreement to a fairly full Parliamentary statement 
and suggested that the despatch should be published in Britain as a 
Colonial Paper "which would not necessarily attract any more 
attention than a Parliamentary statement". If this were so, Colby 
said on 6 April, then he "could raise no objection to such 
publication in the United Kingdom" although he continued to make it 
clear that it was the publication in Nyasaland against which he
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advised,
because there is a malicious European 
minority combined with a young editor of 
the local newspaper who will I think lose 
no opportunity to discredit the territorial 
government and the Colonial Office
With this issue out of the way even if it was not entirely to
the Governor7 s satisfaction and even though he continued to advise
45against too much public discussion whilst things were going well, 
he was able to continue his efforts to secure the acquisition of 
tenant-occupied tracts of BCA Conpany land.
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CHAPTER VII
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BCA COMPANY, 1954 - 1955
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Immediately following Lyttelton's May 1954 visit, "the Governor 
had a private talk with Brook before he left which obviously much 
impressed" the BCA Company Chairman: it must have been a very 
forthright talk because straightaway - Colby having now gone on leave 
- Footman found Dixon "very much more cooperative than he [had] ever 
been. " On 22 May Footman reported recent progress to Gorell 
Barnes. * When he saw Dixon on 19 May the General Manager indicated 
that in addition to the 20,000 acres immediately offered he was 
urgently sorting out what he could offer in northern Cholo and was 
putting to his Board specific proposals which he felt they would 
accept. He was also examining the southern sector to make early 
proposals. McDonald and Barnes felt that Dixon's proposals "would 
make a considerable contribution" to solving the problem particularly 
in the worst areas. Dixon was anxious that the full co-operation of
r
the Company should be made publicly known to the Africans, presumably 
for both political and public relations reasons. Footman was also 
pleased with the response he had received from the B&EA Company7 s 
General Manager when he sought his co-operation, and with Tennett's 
agreement - but no more - that McDonald should discuss with him 
details of development and acquisition of his 8,000 acre estate with 
980 families on it in the Cholo District. 2 Footman concluded that 
most estate owners "have in fact seen the red light and are now 
prepared to cooperate."
Footman's optimism over the BCA Company7s "conversion", like 
Colby7 s a few months earlier, was in the event premature. Whilst 
Dixon himself may have been willing to progress, Brook, once out of 
the country, continued to drag his feet. Sometime after the
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Secretary of State's visit the Company " voluntarily suggested three 
areas of land totalling about 20, 000 acres which might be purchased" 
by Government, but Brook, by no means fully won over, told his 
shareholders that the Government's policy would not result in any 
lasting solution of the land problem and that the whole question of 
land tenure and African immigration needed revision; "Why", he asked,
"cannot Nyasaland re-organise itself on a realistic basis?" although
3he did not say what he considered to be a realistic basis.
At Colby's request the Secretary of State wrote to Brook early 
in August urging progress but by the middle of the month he told 
Colby that "no (repeat no) meeting with BCA Company has 
been held recently or is at present proposed. " 4
On 12 and 13 October Colby, accompanied by Hadlow, discussed the 
abolition of thancrata at the Colonial Office with Mamham and 
Robertson. 5 He was disturbed that since leaving Nyas aland nearly 
five months previously he had not heard of any progress towards 
acquiring heavily occupied BCA Company land, particularly since if 
progress could be made there the core of the problem would be removed 
and other estate owners would quickly fall into line with 
Government's wishes. He impressed upon Mamham and Robertson his 
firm conviction that the most important step was to acquire a 
substantial block of BCA Company land and that once this was done 
"the back of the whole problem [would] be broken and a lot of other 
Europeans in Nyas aland would applaud in private if not in public." 
Colby asked for a meeting with Company representatives before he 
returned to Nyas aland but feared that the Board of Directors would
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remain no less unco-operative than in the past, so he asked if, in
that event, the Secretary of State would be willing to support him in
compulsory acquisition:
If the Secretary of State's support for 
compulsory acquisition were forthcoming the 
Governor believed that it would be possible 
quite soon to ease the dangerous political 
situation which had arisen out of African 
grievances over the tangata system.
Colby concluded by saying that negotiations in Nyas aland itself would
get nowhere - both he and Mamham were convinced that the Company
were " out to stall as long as they can" - that he must see the
Company whilst he was still in Britain and that he hoped the
Secretary of State would authorise him, if negotiations failed, to
make it clear that compulsory purchase would be resorted to - a
solution to the fuller acceptance of which he had gradually been
moving the Colonial Office over a period of time. He added that he
thought it best if the Secretary of State and he met the BCA Company
representatives together so as to show that they could not drive a
wedge between the Governor and the Colonial Office on this issue, and
that if this were not possible a member of the Colonial Office should
be present so that the Company could not later misrepresent what he
had said. He still deeply mistrusted the Company. Gorell Barnes
supported Colby7 s request that the Secretary of State join the
Governor in seeing the BCA Company representatives because this would
show them that Lennox-Boyd - now Secretary of State - fully supported
Lytt'aJton's policy and also because he believed that
whilst this interview will require firm 
handling, it will also require rather more 
tactful handling than it will receive if it 
is handled by Sir G. Colby alone.
In this connection Lennox-Boyd a little later had to "confess to some
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uneasiness at the number of complaints [he got] (and not only from 
difficult types) about the approach of the Governor on land and 
kindred issues." ^ Gorell Barnes advised that "if nothing else will 
bring the BCA Company to their senses, then the threat of compulsory 
acquisition will in the ultimate resort have to be used and, if 
necessary, applied" although he believed that they should avoid using
o
this weapon.
Footman reported at this time that he had made no recent 
progress with Dixon who still did not have his Board's authority to 
negotiate although he personally appeared willing to part with "a 
considerable amount of land." The main difficulty seemed to be the 
price and whether a flat rate per acre should be agreed irrespective 
of location, state and value of the land. ®
f
Colby had a preliminary meeting with the Secretary of State on 4 
November 1954 and fuller discussions took place the next day at the 
Colonial Office between Lennox Boyd, Colby, Brook, Sir John Huggins 
(a new BCA Company director), Gorell Barnes, Mamham and 
Williams. 10 This was an important meeting and most of the talking 
was done by Brook and Colby.
On Brook's side he was interested in two points: the price to be 
paid for land sold and the freeing of retained land from Africans.
On Colby7 s side he wanted to know how much land was to be developed 
so that he could acquire the remainder. The discussion moved back 
and forward between these points, Brook trying to take them his way, 
and Colby bringing them back his way.
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In respect of price, Brook said that he had to have constant 
regard to the strong views of his shareholders and that any sale 
should be on the basis of an independent valuation so that he could 
assure his shareholders that a fair price had been received; "he had 
no interest in the price to be paid by the Government so long as it 
was a reasonable one. " "Each piece of land should be examined
separately and a price worked out." He did not like the flat rate 
approach of 1948, particularly the rate of twelve shillings and 
si^ qpence an acre then paid.
Regarding the freeing of retained land from African occupation, 
Brook s basic point was that his Company had sold to Government 
186,000 acres, about half their holding, in 1948 and that "they did 
have a good deal of land that could be handed over to Government ... 
but he could not let further land go without the most stringent 
safeguards being given of the Company7 s position to avoid 
encroachment." He did not mind having the odd African village on his 
land but he did object to having "islands of African Trust Land in 
the heart of the Company7 s tea growing area." Huggins asked if 
Government could undertake to stop Africans going back onto the 
retained land since it was crucial that the Company be left in 
peaceful possession of that land. Colby said he would look into 
this and the Secretary of State added that it was clearly 
Government7 s duty "to do its utmost to keep Africans off Company 
land." Although he did not say so, Colby was prepared to use 
considerable pressure to have Africans removed from retained land but 
he knew that legally and politically he had to tread very carefully,
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and that removal would have to be, or appear to be, voluntary. 
Abrahams had used the expression in 1946 that Africans should be 
"invited to opt" to leave retained land and this wording was also 
used by the Land Planning Committee in 1947. In preparing a 
briefing note for the Secretary of State7 s May 1954 visit, Colby had 
referred to the tenant "withdrawing himself" from the retained 
land. The Colonial Office draft despatch, prepared after the May
visit, included the phrase "moving the African" from the retained
11 . land. So, a number of different expressions, hinting at varying
degrees of pressure, had been used up to this point and Colby
continued to use different expressions, striking a balance between
letting the Company know that he would see that the job was done and
the retained land freed, and at the same time saying that it would be
voluntary:
The idea was that the Government would 
clear all Africans from land immediately 
surrounding the present developed land.
Africans would be asked to move from 
[retained] areas of Company land to areas 
which were to be acquired.
[We would be] arranging to evacuate these 
people voluntarily from your land.
Government would assist to the best of its 
ability in securing the voluntary transfer 
of African tenants livina on potential tea 
land... to land acquired.
Colby insisted that the meeting should continually re-focus on 
what he saw as the really essential issue: what land was to be 
developed - to assist the economy - and therefore what land should be 
acquired - to assist political stability. The price to be paid and 
the freeing of retained land, important as they might be, especially
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to the Company, were secondary issues for him. On the question of 
preventing encroachment they discussed the practicability and expense 
of fencing the retained land - a point made by the Governor eight 
months earlier - but Colby eventually intervened to say that this 
also was a secondary issue, the main point being Government7 s anxiety 
to reach a settlement agreed by all parties which would result in 
there being no squatters left on the Company7 s land.
When they seemed to be spending too long on price Colby
intervened to say that the question of price was not of prime
importance but rather the real question was that the Company should
have a plan so that the Government could know what land they were
prepared to hand over. He asked if Dixon could be authorised to work
out a plan for acquisition in co-operation with the Government but
Brook refused: "he did not want another deal like the previous one
which had been a little unorthodox." When pressed to return to the
question of how much land was, or was soon to be, developed Brook
replied that 15,000 acres were currently developed, "including
fallow"; in the Cholo District there were another 25,000 acres
suitable for tea and although only 10% of these were currently
planted, the remainder would be required for planting tea at the rate
of 500 acres a year. Colby quickly pointed out that this would take
40 years "and that was too long": far too long.
The Government wanted to see as much tea in 
Nyas aland as was possible provided it was 
practical politics, but if Government had 
to move 10,000 Africans to release the area 
wanted by BCA for tea it was not a 
practical proposition.
He pressed Brook again to allow Dixon to negotiate with the
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Government but Brook made it clear that Government was to deal with 
him as Chairman and not with Dixon. It is likely that he felt he had 
been rash during the May 1954 meeting when, under pressure from both 
Lyttelton and Colby, he had agreed to Dixon discussing with 
Government their requirements for BCA Company land. He added that 
he was not prepared to give up all the Company7 s land " at one bite" 
but he was prepared to discuss the Cholo land. This was important 
because it was the Cholo land which the Land Planning Committee had 
pointed out in 1947 was vital to be acquired for political security 
reasons. It was in Cholo, too, that the 1953 disturbances had 
occurred.
The Secretary of State concluded the meeting by saying that if
the position at Cholo was settled it would be a very big step and -
somewhat pushing his luck - he added that discussions need, not stop
there but could go on to other areas:
All were agreed that Mr Brook and Sir G.
Colby should continue their discussions in 
Nyas aland, with particular reference to the 
BCA Company7 s land in the Cholo area. He 
emphasised that the Government attached the 
greatest importance to reaching a friendly 
settlement and he would watch the progress 
of the negotiations with the liveliest 
interest.
His reference to "a friendly settlement" indicated that he had taken 
to heart Alport7 s advice to his predecessor that if the Secretary of 
State were ready to discuss the question "in a friendly manner" a 
satisfactory solution might well emerge.
An extraneous factor now unexpectedly and briefly entered into 
the dealings with the BCA Company. Brook became aware that a " group
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of unnamed Jewish speculators" were about to try and take the Company
over. ^  Colby told the Colonial Office of this "rather alarming"
development and suggested that they and the Nyas aland Government
should combat it by going into the market straightaway and buying all
the shares they could at seven shillings and six pence "or even more
if necessary", in order to discourage or preferably prevent the
take-over. If successful they would have a good investment, the
Government proxies would strengthen Brook s hand in dealing with his
shareholders and they would secure a stake in the Company which would
give them some influence especially if they eventually had a seat on
the Board; there would in any case be an "identity of interest"
between the Company and the Government. Colby mentioned this idea to
17Brook on a strictly personal basis and the Chairman welcomed it.
The Colonial Office predictably found these proposals open to a 
number of "serious objections". Firstly, there were objections in 
principle to Government putting money into one of several competing 
concerns: Colby accepted this. Secondly, the BCA Company had a bad 
reputation with Africans and it might be politically unwise for 
Government to be identified with it: Colby agreed but felt it just 
possible that the Africans would believe that they would get a better 
deal if Government were associated with the Company. Thirdly, in the 
short term, far from exercising influence, Government might be 
required to fall in with Brook s wishes: Colby thought that this was 
a mistaken view. Fourthly, they argued that any price over six 
shillings a share would be "a doubtful investment. There are obvious 
objections to the use of Government money for a speculation of this 
type": to this Colby replied, "This is clearly a matter of opinion
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and I suggest we might resolve it in twelve months time by looking at 
the Stock Exchange quotations together !... I suppose the obvious 
objections to the use of Government money for a speculation of this 
type would fall away if the speculation was successful!" He 
concluded by outlining the dangers of an outside takeover and said 
that if the danger had receded then the proposal could be dropped, 
but if there was a risk of it becoming a reality perhaps they should 
talk it over with Brook The danger did in fact recede and the 
proposal was dropped. In the meantime Colby had shown a helpful 
friendliness to Brook and had enjoyed twisting the Colonial Office 
tail.
Brook visited Nyas aland and had meetings with Colby on 19 and 26
November which were at least in part, as the Governor saw them,
constructive; Colby found that the talks had an encouraging start
since Brook had put forward proposals which would go some way towards
accomplishing what the Government wanted in Cholo but "the snag, of
course, is the price and it will undoubtedly be heavy, though
possibly not prohibitive." Brook said that although his shareholders
had been readily persuaded in 1948 to agree to part with land at the
price then offered, the position was now' very different and his
shareholders would take a lot of persuasion and could only be
persuaded if the price was reasonable. Colby accepted this 
1Qpoint.
It is clear that, at least on the surface, Colby and Brook were 
beginning to see eye to eye and the gap between them was narrowing. 
Between their two meetings Colby wrote to Brook, explaining:
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My sole concern in this matter is to reach 
agreement with you on the basis of equity
and true value and to be in a position to
justify that value to the Legislative 
Council: I believe that your concern is 
identical except that you will wish to 
justify that value to the shareholders of 
your Company. We must therefore proceed in 
the closest consultation with the object of 
drafting a joint memorandum which will 
serve both our purposes.
Even so, Colby7 s proposals were tough. Stopping just short of 
his 1948 idea that owners should pay the Government to take the land
off their hands, he asked if Government Succeeded "in arranging to
evacuate [tenants] voluntarily" from retained areas ought not the 
Company to hand over an equivalent area without payment? Ought not 
areas occupied or cultivated by tenants to be handed over without 
payment because "such land is worthless... since statutory rights 
exist over it": a site for a dwelling, cultivable land, timber, 
firewood, brushwood, thatch grass and compensation for disturbance? 
In all other cases of the land under negotiation, ought not the Tea 
Association to be asked to categorise it in two parts: that suitable 
for tea growing and that not suitable, and the Government and the 
Company to agree to accept their valuation in both categories? Colby 
realised that these proposals were over-simplifications but he was 
concerned at this stage to establish a logical method of approaching 
the problem.
In reply, A Brook produced figures of acreages offered and a 
valuation prepared by land valuers in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, 
and argued that the valuation should be increased by way of 
compensation for loss of profits: 61, 295 acres priced on this basis
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at £250, 185 or an average of over £4 an acre together with an area of 
land adjacent to the Chisunga tea area, suitable also for tea, to be 
compensated at £562,500 or £182 an acre, "a conservative figure under 
today7 s conditions" as Brook saw it. In reporting this Colby said 
the Colonial Office would "immediately see that Brook is opening his
mouth much too wide I found it necessary to explain to Brook that
this was just "not on" and that we could not possibly contemplate a 
figure of such magnitude."
Their conversations nonetheless continued to be friendly and the
Governor returned to his formula of 22 November but it became quite
clear that they were not going to find an agreed basis for
negotiations primarily because Brook refused to accept that the
rights of tenants had any bearing on negotiations for compensation or
that the land they occupied "was sterilised for development and that
no development could take place unless the Africans were removed."
After several hours discussing these points and concluding that no
agreement on price was to be reached, they provisionally agreed to
proceed under the Acquisition Of Land For Public Purposes Ordinance
but to use the procedure only to arrive at a price rather than
formally and actually to acquire the land compulsorily. The Governor
asked for the Secretary of State7 s approval of this proposal and for
quick action:
it is only by making a move that we can 
quiet the fears and anxieties of the 
Africans in the area and unless we do 
something soon it will be inevitabl e that 
there will be, if not a recurrence of 
agitation, at any rate a considerable 
exacerbation of feeling. 3
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Although the provisional agreement between them had been
recorded in a note, ^  Brook changed his mind soon after leaving
Nyas aland and sent a letter to the Governor from Nairobi on 29
November^3 reviving a suggestion which Colby had made earlier but
which had then not found favour with Brook: that the Tea Association
should value the land. Brook proposed that the two nominees from the
Association appointed by the Company should view their task of
valuation on the assumption that the land was completely free of
African tenants. Father than argue this point, the Nyas aland
Government included in the terms of reference of their two nominees
the obligation to have particular regard to the statutory rights of
7fitenants and the extent of land covered by those rights.
The four nominees wrote to the two parties expressing their
concern over the differences in their terms of reference especially
since they were anxious to produce a single report and 
27valuation. In reply, the Chief Secretary quickly - on 31
December - said that they were keen to reach a price which was fair
to the BCA Company and which would protect the interests of the
Nyas aland tax payer who would have to pay the bill. They were
content for the nominees to draw up their own terms of reference, to
include a request for a firm valuation of the land, and if the BCA
Company did the same, to accept the valuation as an award binding on
both parties. Colby7 s anxiety continued and he told the Colonial
Office that
Matters are becoming increasingly urgent as 
signs of unrest are apparent among the 
local community who attribute delay 
entirely to the Government. BCA Company7s 
lands are the focal point and early action
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to demonstrate the Government7 s intention 
to acquire the land therefore is 
essential.
Brook, who thought that the Nyas aland Government was being 
" tiresome",3  ^was rather slower in responding and did not do so 
until 7 February 19553* by which time the nominees were becoming 
worried and considered asking to be absolved of their 
responsibilities. 32 Brook now told Colby that he had intended his 
reference to valuation on the assumption that the land was free of 
tenants to apply only to the potential tea land leaving the remainder 
free, in theory, for resiting huts, gardens and fuel plantations. He 
hoped that this explanation would enable the nominees to proceed with 
their task. He found the Government7 s suggestion that the nominees 
should form their own terms of reference and that their award should 
be binding unacceptable as going "far beyond what was originally 
contemplated." He would agree to being bound only if the question 
of statutory rights was treated as a separate issue, largely because 
the nominees were not legally expert in this field. In respect of 
non-tea land - approximately 56, 000 acres - he felt that the only 
basis of valuation should be the value of rents which the Company 
should receive for the huts on the land; he already had a valuation 
from the Salisbury firm on this basis. The Land Planning Committee in 
the confidential appendix to their draft report had dismissed this 
basis of valuation seven years earlier because it would mean that 
estates heavily populated with tenants would be more valuable than 
those which had succeeded in excluding tenants. If agreement 
could not be reached, Brook suggested that private arbitrators should 
decide the matter on the lines recommended in the Abrahams
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Report. 3^
In consequence of this, and on Colby7 s instructions, Footman 
told the nominees that since Brook would not accept the revised terms 
of reference, the Governor, "with great regret", had concluded that 
it was difficult to see how they could usefully pursue their 
task. 33
In replying3** to Brook s letter, Colby challenged the 
rationality of basing a valuation on the assumption that the 
potential tea land was free of tenants. Such a valuation, he said, 
would bear no relation to reality because the land was not free of 
tenants and if it were Government would not be negotiating for its 
acquisition. The tea land should be valued according to what it
r
would fetch on the open market as it stood and this is what he had 
asked the nominees to do. In respect of the non-tea land Colby could 
also not accept Brook7 s proposals because the income actually 
received from rents was reduced from its full potential by relief 
from payment obtainable by a period of work, and because where large 
numbers of defaulters existed, evictions were impracticable unless 
the Company employed a very large and costly staff to effect them.
He doubted if the Salisbury valuers had any real appreciation of the 
situation actually prevailing.
Confessing to being somewhat at a loss as to how to proceed, 
Colby now offered twelve shillings and sixpence an acre for the whole 
60, 000 acres, together with the tea land, and added that he would do 
his best to secure the voluntary transfer of African tenants from the
- 217 -
retained potential tea land to the Government-acquired land. If this 
was not acceptable to Brook he made it clear that he would ask the 
Secretary of State to proceed under the Acquisition Of Land For 
Public Purposes Ordinance, "with all the disadvantages and expense 
which that entails."
When Colby reported the current position to the Colonial Office 
on 27 February 19553  ^he admitted that he and Brook were "poles 
apart regarding an agreed basis of assessment of compensation for the 
land he offers" and that unless he was bluffing he did not think that 
there was any point in Brook coming out to Nyas aland as he had 
suggested because he would only insist on consulting shareholders in 
Britain and this would cause further delay. Colby asked Gorell 
Barnes to see Brook and seek to persuade him to accept that the four 
nominees should draw up their own terms of reference including a firm 
valuation and that this award should be binding on both parties so 
that they could make a start on the tea land and negotiate for the 
remaining 56,000 acres, or accept an overall figure of twelve 
shillings and six pence an acre for the lot, or proceed to compulsory 
acquisition. Colby preferred the flat rate of twelve shillings and 
six pence an acre, arguing that this was not ungenerous since this 
was the figure paid in 1949 for land which was much less densely 
occupied.
Early in March 1955 the nominees, having in the meantime got on 
with their task, reported on the value of the BCA Company land, and 
on three estates they recommended that 500 acres were useless and not 
valued, 800 acres valued at £5 an acre were suitable for tea, 1, 790
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acres valued at seventeen shillings and six pence an acre were "fair" 
and 1, 276 acres valued at ten shillings an acre were badly eroded.
The average price was, therefore, a fraction under thirty shillings
oo
an acre.
Brook and John Huggins - upon whom the Colonial Office thought 
the Chairman was "leaning" and who they felt was being "less than 
helpful", ^  - continued to negotiate strongly over price and 
preferred arbitration if agreement was not possible. ^  By early 
April Brook was offering the 60,000 acres at a flat rate of thirty 
three shillings and sixpence an acre and Colby was able to beat him 
down to twenty three shillings but no lower. Hie Governor was 
worried that such a figure, "which would undoubtedly set the tone for 
all subsequent purchases", was too high. Even so, he told the 
Secretary of State that a week earlier he would have accepted this 
offer but in the meantime he had been told what Nyas aland's CDWF 
allocation for the coming year was to be and since it was "so 
unexpectedly small" and would necessitate scrapping territorial 
development plans he could not contemplate spending the quarter to 
half a million pounds required to acquire the 500,000 acres necessary 
to abolish thancrata. Consequently he reluctantly returned to the 
earlier idea that it might be better to abolish thancrata by reducing 
rent to a nominal figure and removing the obligation to work. It
A 1
would, as he was aware, bring strong protest from the Europeans, 
incur all the disadvantages which Executive Council had outlined the 
previous year in considering Simpson's advocacy of a similar solution 
and be contrary to the policy of progressive abolition of thancrata.
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In replying, the Secretary of State said that twenty-three 
shillings an acre was too much and would create an embarrassing 
precedent for the future as well as cause resentment among those who 
had already parted with their land for less. 42 He thought that 
fifteen to sixteen shillings an acre "is about as far as you should 
go. But of course I must leave this to your own judgement." If the 
Company were unable to accept what Colby believed to be a fair price, 
he should consider arbitration. As to the effect of the CDWF 
allocation of £1M, he "thought that expenditure on land acquisition 
should be accorded as high a priority as all but the most urgent 
development projects."
A week after receiving the Secretary of State's letter 
indicating that fifteen to sixteen shillings would be nearer the
r
mark, Colby offered fifteen shillings an acre but Brook would not go
lower than £1 and the discussions ended in deadlock. Colby told the
Secretary of State of this and added that he was opposed to
arbitration because the arbitrated price would be likely to exceed £1
and they would be entering into an unlimited liability. He was now
worried by sales of land by the BCA Company to Indians:
Whilst [the] great bulk of land cannot be 
developed the fact remains that 
tenant-infested land has attractions to 
certain types of buyer (notably Indians) in 
view of prospective revenue from rents.
Moreover, landlords can purchase produce 
from tenants particularly maize at 
sub-economic prices and, if dishonest, can 
use freehold land as a base from which to 
pirate produce from trust land.
He instanced two recent cases where land under offer to 
Government had been withdrawn during negotiations and sold to
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Indians, totalling 6,035 acres with 2,010 tenants on them: "I do not 
know the price for these blocks but it is clearly higher than 
anything we can pay." He also said that during his visit, Brook had 
purchased an estate of thousands of acres adjoining BCA Company 
property, free from tenants, containing 100 acres of immature tea 
" for an allegedly high figure."44
Since it seemed to Colby that Government could not buy any 
worthwhile amount of congested land at a price they could afford,
A C
they should seriously consider compulsory purchase. The Colonial 
Office were disappointed at the deadlock and decided that they should 
take advantage of Colby7 s imminent visit to London to re-examine 
their land policy and agree a course of action. Although neither 
side mentioned it, this was really a vindication of Colby7 s 
reluctance to have the draft despatch on policy published because, as 
it now transpired, to have done so would have been premature. Gorell 
Barnes was recommending to the Secretary of State that rent should be 
reduced to one shilling and the obligation to work in lieu should be 
removed, despite the well rehearsed arguments against such a course 
of action. 4  ^ Williams believed that they had " not got a policy" 
but Morgan disagreed: "to go on buying tenant-infested land'as and 
when we can, and as and when it can be afforded, does constitute a 
policy." 48
When he arrived in Britain Colby had a meeting at the Colonial
Office with the Secretary of State, Gorell Barnes, Morgan, Simpson 
4Qand Williams. They first considered Simpson7 s suggestion - to 
which Colby and Gorell Barnes had recently returned - that rent
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should be radically reduced and the obligation to work in lieu should 
be removed. When Footman had responded to this suggestion he had 
assumed that if rent were reduced to a shilling a year there would be 
no further acquisition of land, but whilst this would remove the 
worst evils of thancrata the political problem of large undeveloped 
areas of alienated land would persist since the Africans resented the 
1 andlord-tenant relationships altogether. They discussed the 
possibility of the BCA Company lowering the price demanded in the 
face of a threat to seriously reduce rents, and agreed that this 
"would be taken as sharp practice", and that it was a course they 
should not take. Colby made the point that it was very likely that 
the price which the BCA Company, and others, would ask would go up as 
land became more and more difficult to buy; consequently the policy 
of acquisition would probably prove too expensive. He thought also 
that going to arbitration would be unwise as it would probably also 
be too expensive.
The Secretary of State and Colby then concluded that the 
deadlock at £1 an acre was unlikely to be broken by Brook reducing 
the price still further and they agreed that they should settle at 
this level which was well below the average price recommended by the 
four nominees. They felt that the BCA Company held all the cards and 
that there was no alternative but to pay the price. Colby7 s view was 
that £1 an acre should be the average price paid. The Secretary of 
State agreed and himself telephoned Brook on 4 May to put this 
decision to him; Brook also agreed subject to his Board7 s
cn
acceptance. Colby confirmed the offer in a letter of 11 May and 
was at pains to spell out what was meant by an average of £1 an acre:
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to average the price over blocks of 
different quality for which we would pay 
prices above and below £1 as the case may 
be. The total price received by your 
company would, of course, be the equivalent 
of £1 per acre for all the land 
involved.
There was no real need for Colby to spell it out in detail and it is 
most likely that since he knew he was on the verge of succeeding he 
wanted to be quite sure that Brook could not escape an apparent 
agreement by saying he did not understand what the offer was. He 
asked that once Brook7 s Board had agreed Dixon should be authorised 
to complete the details of negotiations in Nyas aland and he 
concluded, "I am anxious to announce locally as early as possible 
that these negotiations have been completed." Colby7 s wish to make 
an early announcement was designed to reassure Africans that a major 
step forward had been agreed and - with Dixon7 s local detailed help - 
was about to be implemented, and also to encourage other landowners 
to come forward and offer their land for sale. Brook7 s Board agreed 
at some time before 20 June 1955 by which date local discussions had 
started in Nyas aland to finalise the details.
Brook had become worried that rents might be reduced to a
nominal sum and the obligation to work removed, and, realising that
he was not going to win the battle no matter what delaying tactics he
adopted and that he should get the best deal he could, had agreed on
an average price of £1 an acre. His view as reported to the
shareholders then was:
We consider this arrangement satisfactory 
and in the best interests of the Company, 
as we shall still have all the land we 
require for our immediate needs and for 
development. Furthermore, if, as we hope,
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Government is correct as to the effect of 
adopting this policy, the Company should be 
better off by reason of an atmosphere of 
greater contentment among the population in 
the vicinity of our estates, from which our 
labour is to a large extent drawn. 53
In August 1955 the Government announced that the purchase of the 
area negotiated with the BCA Company had been agreed - now 
re-assessed at 48,750 acres. 54 Brook, who visited the country at 
that time, found that the removal of tenants from Company land to 
newly acquired Government land was proceeding "smoothly and 
satisfactorily. " In some cases removal was preceded by organised 
visits of tenants to the acquired land so that they could assure 
themselves that the land to which they were being moved was at least 
as good as the land retained by the Company. 88 In other cases 
small parcels of unoccupied land sold by the Company to Government in 
1949 were returned to the Company in order to secure larger occupied 
areas under new agreements. 88 On his return to Britain the 
Chairman sent a letter to his shareholders, dated 21 September 1955, 
saying:
My colleagues and I would like to pay 
tribute both to the Government Officers and 
to the members of our own Staff concerned 
for the excellent manner in which they are 
carrying out this most delicate operation.
Government has given an undertaking that, 
as and when our estates are cleared, the 
Africans On Private Estates Ordinance will 
cease to apply to the land in question.
This means that any encroachment can be 
dealt with and that, in future, our land 
can be kept clear. 57
Colby took very swift action to remove Africans from the land 
retained by the BCA Company in the Cholo District and to resettle 
them on purchased land: before the sale on 8 August 1955, the Company
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owned 74, 622 acres with 36, 400 residents. Government then purchased
36, 470 acres and automatically emancipated 24, 600 residents. They
then moved 3,240 of the remaining 11,800 residents onto acquired land
so that by 30 September 1955, the RCA Company retained 38, 143 acres
(as compared with 74, 622 two months earlier) with 8, 560 residents (as
compared with 36,400 two months earlier). 55 This process, taking
place as it did in the very area where the 1953 disturbances had
occurred and at a time when many of those convicted for their part in
the disturbances were being released from prison, brought with it
security worries. The Political Intelligence Reports for August 1955
and for several months thereafter5  ^included sections on African
discontent and on the agitation of local Congress leaders who were
affecting a number of others although there was "much evidence of the
enthusiastic agreement of the great majority of the people to move
onto land which [had] been acquired." The discontent was centred on
a belief of some that the land to which Africans were being removed
was less fertile than that from which they were being moved and this
without compensation. The resettlement nonetheless proceeded
smoothly and without untoward incident save in the Bvumbwe area where
the "hard core of Congress agitators" was to be found. In December,
dealing with the Bvumbwe situation, the Report said,
A generally hostile attitude is noted in 
the area towards Europeans and Government 
and any evictions on a large scale for 
failure to pay rent might cause a local 
security situation
particularly since the Chairman of the Bvumbwe Branch of Congress was
served with an eviction notice in November for seven years' rent
default. Tension continued to grow in January 1956 as "a number of
European settlers in the area [were] becoming increasingly
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apprehensive of possible disturbances in the not too distant
future". There were worries also in February and March with "the
marked hostility on the part of Africans affected by the scheme and
threats of forceful resistance to any attempts... to move them from
their present sites". However, in April it was reported that the
situation had recently shown signs of easing, and this more
favourable atmosphere persisted until the land was cleared and
Armitage, Colby's successor, was able to report on the Bvumbwe area
to the Secretary of State in September 1956 that "only 35 families
now remain and they are all making preparations to move. The leading
personalities [who threatened forceful resistance and upon whom
eviction notices had been served] have all moved without forceful
eviction"; indeed they had all moved before the expiry of the 
finnotices. The Secretary of State, much relieved, cabled back,
"This is good news and reflects great credit on the persuasive powers
61of the officers concerned."
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CHAPTER VIII
LAND ACQUISITION AND RESETTLEMENT, 1955 - 1964
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The 1955 agreement with the BCA Company to sell almost 50, 000 
acres at £1 an acre, following the Secretary of State's endorsement 
of Colby's policy proposals and 15 months of hard negotiation 
thereafter, was a major step forward and removed a log jam which had 
held up other progress in the abolition of thancrata. By October 
1955 Colby believed that there was "a reasonable prospect of reducing 
the problem of resident Africans on private estates to very small 
proportions within the next four or five years... and prospects of a 
permanent and satisfactory solution are now in sight." The 
landowners generally were now much more ready to sell. The tenants 
generally were more willing to move off estate land now that they 
received reassuring reports from those who had already moved, 
although the delay in paying them compensation tended, naturally, to
i
hold some of them back.
The attitude of most estate owners changed quite quickly. 
Impressed with the ease with which Government officers moved large 
numbers of families in 1956 without disrupting the supply of labour 
and without the petty sabotage by former tenants which some had 
feared, several landowners in the Cholo and Blantyre Districts sought 
Government help in freeing their retained land of tenants. In 1957 
23 estates were conpletely cleared, leaving the retained land in a 
much more readily developable condition. In principle most owners 
were unwilling to sell their land to Government, but in practice the 
benefits were being appreciated and many saw the wisdom, or 
necessity, of selling part of their land to raise sufficient capital 
to develop the remainder. The Government was gratified by the ready 
co-operation of the owners in clearing their land - generally they
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gave re-settlement officers a free hand - but were surprised by how 
little the owners knew about the number and location of their 
tenants. There was an increasing awareness that undeveloped land - 
whether now free of tenants such as the BCA Company's Cholo estates, 
or still " over-run by tenants" such as the B&EA Company's Zomba 
estate and Conforzi' s Magomero estate - was a liability and one of 
which it would be wise to divest themselves.
The attitudes of the tenants varied. There was a general 
resignation to the inevitability of the situation: "We've got to move 
sometime, let's get it over". There was also, however, a general 
resentment which smouldered beneath the surface and which the 
Government recognised could be sparked off either by natural 
hardships such as drought and famine, or deliberately by political 
activists. The volume of families moving off private estates caused 
nervousness and unrest among those remaining who had lived on the 
estates, undisturbed, for many years, and among squatters who had
o
entered illegally in recent years.
The general acceptance of the accelerated progress in abolishing 
thancrata. by both Europeans and Africans, during the peak year of 
1956 lasted into 1957 but thereafter dwindled.
On the European side some estate owners with large numbers of
tenants continued to refuse to sell their land to Government.
Armitage privately recorded:
This is an annoying sword hanging over the 
heads of many landowners, some of whom 
refuse to treat with the Government for the 
solution of the problem.
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The short point is that the land with 
resident Africans on it, or vacant land, is 
a political liability and will not be 
solved until the problem has been further 
reduced.
In his Report on Land Acquisition and Resettlement for 1956-7 he 
commented on the intransigence of Conforzi and Tennent in refusing to 
sell their estates in Cholo and Blantyre Districts notwithstanding 
the fact that the former held 58,000 acres with 4, 850 tenant families 
and the latter 14,000 acres with 980 tenant families. A number of 
other, small, landowners also continued to refuse to release their 
undeveloped land. 5 Although Conforzi showed signs of belatedly 
changing his mind, the position in regard to these estates remained 
unchanged in 1958 and this persuaded the Government to amend the 
Africans on Private Estates Ordinance. They were worried by the 
slow-down in acquisitions and the increase in cost per family 
emancipated: 17, 949 families averaging £7 each in 1956, 5, 516
averaging £13 in 1957 and 3, 227 averaging £29 in 1958. It was also
much concerned about the outstanding 1, 000 applications for eviction
p.
and the inpracticability of enforcing them. The law was changed
so as to make compensation payable in suitable cases for eviction on
grounds of rent default. In this way they hoped that there would be
less resentment among rent defaulters ordered to leave private land,
that the number of applications for eviction would drastically
decline, that the price of land heavily occupied by tenants would
also decline, and that there would be
an appreciation on the part of those owners
who so far have been reluctant to cooperate
that it is in their best interests to
dispose of land [heavily] occupied at [a
realistic] figure. '
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In addition to some owners refusing to sell their tenant-
occupied land others hardened their position and considered sale only
at inflated prices. In this latter category were a number of well
developed large estates, and a number about to be developed for
residential purposes in or near the Blantyre-Limbe urban areas
without regard for the African occupants who had spent all their
lives on the land, generally without disturbance and without rent
being demanded of them:
The Government is now, therefore, being 
offered large tracts of land, which are at 
present politically unimportant and which 
it has not at present sufficient cash to
acquire while, at the same time, the 
Government is being asked to evict as rent
defaulters without payment of compensation 
families from land which the owners refuse 
to sell or will sell only at unreasonable 
prices.
It was this latter land, the urban residential land, which Government
felt formed "the present political trouble centres" and at which the
amendment to the law to require compensation even in some cases of
rent default, was aimed. The refusal of a few landowners to
consider selling their land and the willingness of others to do so
only at high prices was accompanied by a general disquiet among
Europeans. Armitage first noticed this feeling very late in 1956
and reported it more fully to the Colonial Office in April 1957:
estate owners and the non-African public 
generally are becoming restive and are 
enquiring when the process of acquisition 
is going to cease; this attitude has 
become more noticeable during the past few 
months.
The Governor thought that it would help if, in his reports and in 
Government's publicity generally, instead of focusing on the amount
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of land which had been, was being and would be acquired - which might 
be too much for the Europeans and too little for the Africans readily 
to accept - he should enphasise the reduction in the number of 
Africans subject to thancrata. There was not always a direct 
relationship between the acreage acquired and the number of families 
emancipated; indeed, the early very large acquisitions at Chingale 
and Magomero had been in non- conges ted areas and resulted in 
relatively few tenants being freed from thancrata. The landowners' 
restiveness later turned to anxiety over the security of tenure in 
any constitutional changes which might increase African 
representation in the legislature, an anxiety which Chief Mwase 
stimulated in 1957 by agreeing that the Africans would take away 
freehold land when they got a chance to do so. **
On the African side, as the number of tenants decreased, their
influence as a group declined but the potential influence of
ex-tenants correspondingly increased; many of these would have liked
to return to their former homes on private estates and Government was
aware that they were an easy target for political activists:
those who have moved far away, especially 
those who have returned to their ancestral 
lands, are likely soon to forget, but those 
who can see regularly their former gardens, 
especially if they have cultivated them all 
their lives and now see them unused, could 
form fertile crowds for agitators. There 
is evidence that in a few cases agitation 
is already [in 1958] beginning to take its 
effect.
The Nyasaland Situation Report for October 1958 took up the point 
expressly in relation to the removal of tenants from estates: "no
one enjoys being moved and... although extreme care has been taken to
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reduce hardship to a minimum, a further tool is being placed in the
13hands of political agitators."
African political pressures on Government increased considerably
after 1956 when African representation in Legislative Council was
increased to five elected members, as against six non-African elected
members and eleven officials. 14 During the Secretary of State's
visit to Nyasaland in January 1957, representatives of the African
Associations claimed that freehold title was not valid and - in terms
similar to those used in the African Protectorate Council memorandum
three years earlier - they strongly urged that "all land not in
occupation and use by the owners should be acquired by the
Government." *5 Lennox-Boyd quickly reaffirmed the validity of
freehold title and added:
The question of further acquisition of 
unoccupied or unused land by Government was 
related to the "tangata" problem and it was 
not agreed that it would be wise to acquire 
more land than was needed to carry out the 
declared policy of progressively abolishing 
" tangata." ... The policy... was in the best 
interest of the country as a whole. 16
He also said that acquired land automatically became Public Land,
under the African Trust Land Order in Council, but that when
arrangements had been made for settling Africans on it on "sound land
use principles" and they had "received secure title to holdings" then
the land would be declared African Trust' Land. This response did
not satisfy the African representatives and at the February 1957
1 7meeting of Legislative Council a concerted attack was made on
thangata by the African members who proposed that
all land occupied by Africans, and all land 
used by Africans on private estates
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[should] be taken over by Government and be
proclaimed Trust Land by law. That the
estate-owners whose land [was] taken over
by Government [should] be compensated at a 
normal minimum rate of costs per acre.
They attacked the validity of title based on Certificates of Claim
and felt that the pace of abolition of thangata was " slow ... mighty
slow." They spoke of the tenants being " pushed like a ball", of
bitterness and of "a sort of slavery" resulting from the removal of
tenants from estates. They referred pointedly to the 1915 Chilembwe
Rising and the 1953 riots both of which resulted from land
grievances, and to the "mistakes and blunders in the handling of land
problems in Kenya" which precipitated a rebellion in the form of Mau
Mau "aiming at the expulsion of the Europeans from the surface of
Africa." This last point would not have been lost on Armitage whose
early service from 1929 to 1948 had been in Kenya and whose
1 ft rbrother-in-law still lived there, nor on Ingham who had also
1 Qserved m  Kenya, from 1947 to 1954. It was particularly to the 
removal of tenants from their homes on estates that they objected and 
which they felt created most distress, especially when compensation 
was low or absent, and it was for this reason that they advocated 
that Government acquire all the land occupied by Africans on private 
estates. It was not progressive abolition of thancrata which they 
wished for but its immediate abolition by virtually expropriating the 
land and declaring it African Trust Land. The Secretary for African 
Affairs pointed to the loss of confidence in the security of tenure 
and the fragmentation of holdings and of Trust Land in "which the 
motion, if carried, would result." He pointed to the way in which 
the current policy of progressive abolition of thangata was avoiding 
these two evils - bearing in mind European disquiet over security of
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tenure - and he particularly regretted that African leaders should 
introduce a motion "which strikes at the very root of security of 
rights in private property and also at the sanctity of contractual 
relations." Although the motion was defeated by eighteen votes to 
four, the speeches in its favour significantly contributed to the 
growing unease among Europeans, and the reluctance of estate owners 
to develop retained land when selling off other parts to Government.
This failure to develop the retained freehold land was a source
of considerable worry to the Government and to the Colonial Office.
Many of the reasons for the failure were valid - lack of capital; low
primary product prices; the considerable increase in cleared,
developable, land; and the need for a fallow period - but these did
"not lessen the dangers of deliberate mass trespass" and of political
70agitation and violence.
Armitage's Report on Land Acquisition and Resettlement for
1957-8 was received at the Colonial Office early in March 1959 at the
very time that he declared a State of Emergency in Nyasaland to
control the widespread rioting and other disturbances which had been
building up during the second half of 1958 and the early part of 
7\1959. Colonial Office officials, naturally, were particularly 
sensitive to political dangers which might stem from the land issue, 
being mindful of the Mau Mau troubles in Kenya and the part which 
land grievances had played in the 1953 disturbances in Nyas aland.
They were especially worried about the failure of landowners to 
develop retained land and of the Nyas aland Government to fully 
control, from a land use point of view, settlement on the acquired
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areas, a matter about which they had been at least mildly concerned, 
for agronomic rather than for political reasons, in the past.
Colonial Office views on the failure of the Nyas aland Government
to use the acquired land properly were significantly moulded by
representations made to them by the Chairman of the Nchima Tea and
Tung Estates Company and the Michiru Company, Rolf Gardiner who had
frequent personal meetings with, and wrote frequent personal letters
to, Lennox-Boyd. 22 Gardiner's basic stance was indicated in a
letter written to Lennox-Boyd in October 1955:
I think we are entitled to know... what 
Government intends to do to improve 
[acquired] land and prevent its becoming a 
desiccated wilderness, and to be assured 
that steps will be taken without 
intolerable delays... I would consider that 
I was betraying an obligation if I enabled 
Government to take over any land and 
allowed it to become a rural slum. Rather 
than do that I would prefer to retain the 
land and improve it at my Company's 
expense... provided some compensation was 
paid when the land was eventually handed 
over... [we must] save the country from 
developing its, we hope much milder, 
version of Mau Mau. Here is a danger 
which must be met by foresight and not when 
the situation has drifted from bad to worse 
and from worse to tragic. I implore you 
to take this plea most seriously.
Colby's relationships with Gardiner were not always of the best and
although they were usually civil to each other, 24 Gardiner was
"dismayed by the adamant position of [the Governor's] mind: it
seemed impervious to fresh ideas",25 and Colby felt that
" Gardiner's main trouble is that he seems quite unable to appreciate
that the problem which faces us is ... one of formidable proportions
which will never be solved by the expression of pious generalities
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26.. . He is ... quite unrealistic - to use a mild word. " On
Colby's behalf Footman requested Gorell Barnes to ask "that
Gardiner1 s prolixity may be discouraged; it causes much waste of time
to already overworked officers. We are fully alive to all these
problems and within the limits of staff -and finances they are being
tackled with great determination." Although the Colonial Office
thought Gardiner was an idealist they were significantly influenced
by his views - indeed they adopted some of his expressions in writing
to the Governor - and they thought that Colby ought to have 'done more
to handle the acquired land in accordance with sound land use
principles. They hoped that Armitage might react more 
7ftpositively.
Armitage had himself warned the Colonial Office of the dangers a
year earlier when, on 10 February, 1958 he had pointed out that the
great strides made over the previous two years in resettlement work
had increased population pressure on Trust Land at the same time as
neighbouring areas of undeveloped, cultivable, private land were 
7Qbeing enlarged. He regarded "this problem of undeveloped 
freehold land as very serious and one which cannot fail to Gause 
political unrest". He also felt that the aggravation of the 
political problem of undeveloped land caused by resettling Africans - 
as opposed to simply buying the land on which they were already 
settled - corid undo the political advantage gained by emancipating 
them from thancrata. Regarding development on acquired land, he said 
that a good deal of it had been so filled with families resettled 
from retained estates that "for the time being it is impracticable to 
do anything" much about strict land use planning. Policy, however,
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remained to keep all acquired land as Public Land until it had been
conserved and reorganised and the people had accepted the idea of
individual title thereby reducing the likelihood of large-scale
continued objection to freehold land in principle. Armitage was
aware of the growing feelings of insecurity among European landowners
and believed that their only safeguard once eventual self-government
was granted was "to give more and more Africans a stake as
30freeholders in the maintenance of freehold tenure. " The point
about the dangers of not developing retained and acquired land was
also made in the Situation Report for October 1958:
If the present fairly extensive areas of 
land in private ownership remain unoccupied 
and undeveloped while population pressure 
on African Trust Land and in the acquired 
resettled areas develops, the inevitable 
result is a miniature Kikuyu Kenya highland 
problem in embryo.
The Colonial Office had not really pursued the early worries
about the failure of private owners to develop retained land and the
inability of Government to resettle acquired land on good land use
principles, but Armitage's Report for 1957-8, arriving at the time it
did and following the Kenya references in the October Report,
highlighted the problem, and Gorell Barnes wrote to the Governor on
17 March 1959 saying that he found these two factors "extremely
worrying" and their combination potentially "quite fatal":
The first is the failure of the landowners 
to develop land from which tenants have 
been moved. The second is the inability of 
Government to develop properly much of the 
land which has been acquired. If my memory 
serves me aright the original conception 
was that large acreages of land occupied by 
African tenants under the tangata system 
would be acquired with the dual purpose of 
freeing the Africans from tangata and
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redeveloping the land in such a way that 
its carrying capacity would be increased.
This in turn would enable the Government to 
move from land which landowners wished to 
develop tenants for whom there would then 
be plenty of room on the land acquired by 
the Government. It seems that this 
conception is not being fulfilled in two 
respects and there is therefore the danger 
of the land acquired by Government 
developing into a rural slum whilst land 
from which some of the people on it have 
been moved is not being used by the 
landowners ... it seems to me most urgent 
that something should be done very quickly 
to alter it.
Gorell Barnes failed to adjust the original concept to the fact that 
in the most seriously congested areas of the Shire Highlands there 
was not "plenty of room" on which to resettle Africans from retained 
private estate land no matter how well the acquired land was 
developed. He concluded by asking the Governor to let him know what 
plans he had to deal with these worries.
Armitage, inevitably much occupied in handling the State of
Emergency, replied a month later and said that whilst the Colonial
Office fears were "substantially accurate" a great deal of soil
conservation had taken place, tree planting was proceeding well and
"substantial blocks" of land had been closed completely to settlement
in order to declare them as forest reserves.
Apart from one or two areas in Cholo and 
North Blantyre it has not - as yet - proved 
possible to conduct resettlement on the 
basis of a satisfactory detailed land use 
plan. All that we have been able to do is 
ensure that houses are situated in areas 
which enable the maximum amount of 
agricultural land to be made available and 
to close to cultivation those areas which, 
in the interest of soil conservation,
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should in no circumstances be 
cultivated.
He went on to explain that there were two main reasons for this.
Firstly, insistance on resettlement on a planned layout - which would
have been costly in staff training and mapping terms - would have
been received by the Africans as a degree of control at least as
great as, and probably greater than, that which they had so deeply
resented on private land and would have reduced the incentive to
voluntary movement. To have insisted would have made it doubtful
whether any progress in moving people could have been made: as he had
told the Colonial Office two and a half years earlier, "regimented
settlement would have meant much slower progress and considerable
immediate discontent, which could have led to a complete
breakdown."34 Secondly, since most of the resettlement land
already had "a fair measure of African settlement on it" those
already there would have resented reorganisation even more strongly
than any newcomer.
The necessity for removing the basic 
grievance of Resident Africans was 
considered to be so urgent that the slow 
process of obtaining acceptance to 
reorganisation could not be adopted. This 
was the reason which finally decided for us 
that resettlement on a properly planned 
basis was not possible.
Armitage also explained that he was using his limited resources and
expertise to effect agricultural improvement, including land
reorganisation, in the most promising areas of the country and this
included many areas of Trust Land, for example at Ntaja's, and
excluded many areas of acquired land, for example in the peri-urban
areas which were used as dormitories rather than as agricultural
holdings. "The need for reorganisation of holdings is certainly as
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great on African Trust Land as it is on ex-private estate land". He 
was also doubtful whether it was still prudent to keep acquired land 
as Public Land on which to force through reorganisation which was 
likely to create "considerable antagonism". He thought it might be 
better to convert acquired land into Trust Land (which might result 
in increased confidence and co-operation from the African people) and 
seek to secure the support and assistance of traditional leaders and 
"African settlers of long standing" in land reorganisation. In his 
1957-58 Report Armitage had explained that the feeling of Africans on 
Public Land was that they had little if any more security than they 
had when resident on private estates, and the Chiefs, similarly, felt 
that they had little control over their people. 35 Consequently 
there was less development of the acquired land than there might 
otherwise have been and it was these factors which the Governor had 
in mind in suggesting that acquired land might be better converted to 
Trust Land than remaining Public Land.
Concerning the failure of estate owners to develop retained 
land, Armitage felt that the current disturbed political conditions 
made them reluctant to invest further capital in their estates, and 
he could not blame them for this attitude.
He summed up by saying that given three factors - reducing the 
number of tenants on private estates still further, settling the 
major political problems and thereby restoring confidence to both 
Africans and Europeans, and making " finance... available not only on a 
considerable scale but on terms which will not greatly add to our 
recurrent expenditure budget" - he was confident that "substantial
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and rapid headway" with land reform could be made, irrespective of 
the status of the land.
The Colonial Office, alarmed by what they saw as an extremely
explosive situation, were not reassured by Armitage's arguments and
3fiexplanations. At a meeting in London on 17 April 1958 Simpson
and Hall again raised the issue with Armitage who explained that in
respect of not developing retained land
this danger was fully appreciated and the
British Central Africa Company, as the main 
culprit, had been made aware of this and 
was being urged to remedy the position in 
the case of its own estates.
Indeed, he was already discussing with Brook the possibility of
37African tenants growing tea on the Company's undeveloped land. In 
respect of the failure to resettle Africans on acquired land in 
accordance with good land use principles he said that although this 
had been the case the situation was better now that tenants were 
leaving the estates in smaller numbers which enabled Government to 
exercise better control over their resettlement.
Sinpson, in particular, found these explanations unsatisfactory
and revived a proposal which he had made in 1954: an ordinance should
be made requiring landowners to develop their undeveloped land or
dispose of it. 33 Gorell Barnes also continued to be worried and
felt that the Nyas aland Government was "not handling this matter with
the energy and imagination required and that their failure to do so
39[was ] capable of having serious consequences." He felt that 
they should not leave the Governor " unprodded" for very long and 
consequently Morgan wrote to Armitage in September 1959 and
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suggested:
Ought we not... to consider... bringing in an 
ordinance to compel land owners to develop 
their property within a short time or else 
surrender it to Government on valuation?
Should this measure of compulsion be 
accompanied with arrangements for granting 
of loans to landowners for development 
purposes... ?
Morgan's suggestion was not adopted, and the difficulties over the 
failure to develop retained land and properly resettle Africans on 
acquired land were tackled firstly by the Government continuing to 
persuade estate owners of the political dangers involved and 
encouraging them to develop their estates with the proceeds of 
sale. The large estate owners, particularly the BCA Company, the 
B&EA Company and, belatedly, Conforzi responded well to this 
encouragement to invest the income from sale of land in their other 
property in Nyas aland. 4* Secondly, the Government maintained the
staffing levels in the Land Settlement Section of the Provincial and 
District Administration. 42 Maintaining these levels despite the 
very considerable fall in the acreage of land acquired in 1959 and 
1960 enabled the Section to devote its resources to ensuring better 
land usage of the acquired areas.
Despite - and to some extent because of - the increased African 
political pressures, which received considerable additional impetus 
after Dr. Banda's return to Nyas aland in 1958, and notwithstanding 
the failure to develop retained land and properly to resettle 
acquired land, the work of progressively abolishing thancrata. of 
acquiring land and resettling Africans on it, continued both in 
respect of BCA Company land and in respect of other land.
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By the end of 1956 all the BCA Company estates in the tea
growing area of the Shire Highlands had been freed of tenants. In
all, 3, 240 families had been resettled from the Company's Cholo
estates "without incident of any description". A further 850 tenants
remained to be removed, mainly from their tobacco estates in the
Blantyre District and the Company were prepared for Government to
acquire further land to accomplish this.- Whilst the Company had
feared a severe shortage of labour on the tea estates they were
pleased that these fears turned out not to be justified, and although
there was some decline in labour supplies they were building houses
in compounds, together with some garden space, for their labour - as
Colby had advocated much earlier - which was proving successful in
attracting workers. The Company also was pleased that the money
received from acquisitions had enabled them to build "the fine new
Chisunga factory" and to open up new tea gardens at Cholo: 43 again,
Colby had argued from a very early date that such development would
be made possible through sales of other land. The Government
recognised that the ease of resettlement was in large measure due to
the "extreme cooperation" given by the Company:
They have been generous in the provision of 
transport, timber and other facilities, and 
they have no doubt taken the attitude that 
the sooner the tenants are resettled on 
Government land the better, from their 
point of view.
In 1957 Government asked to purchase more land to complete 
resettling Africans from the Company's estates and they had in mind 
7, 457 acres of tobacco land - which the Company proposed to close 
down - in the Lunzu area of the Blantyre District. Brook and Dixon
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saw this as an excellent solution to their difficulties because no 
alternative profitable crop was available, and the Government agreed 
on a price of £5 an acre on the understanding that the sum received 
would be re-invested in other BCA Company estates. The Chairman was 
sure that this arrangement was in the Company's best interests since 
it allowed them to dispose of an area which had produced 
disappointing tobacco crops and at the same time to proceed more 
quickly with tea development. 45 In Colby's words of almost a 
decade earlier, the Company was “getting it both ways" but, as he had 
also pointed out, Government expenditure in purchasing private land 
would be very much more justifiable if the proceeds were invested in 
Nyas aland so as to further its economic development.
In 1960 Government told the Company that they wished to purchase
r
another 4, 980 acres adj acent to the land purchased at Lunzu. This 
land also had proved uneconomic for tobacco growing, was somewhat 
isolated from the Company's other estates and was already partly 
occupied by squatters, so agreement was not difficult to reach and 
the Government bought the land for £15, 700. The Company paid this 
sum into the Capital Reserve and from it was able to build a third 
tea factory - another step in the right direction in accordance with 
Government's " reinvestment in Nyas aland" wishes - and to recommend a 
Capital Distribution to its members. 45 By the end of 1958 ho 
tenants remained on the Company's land in the Cholo District, and the 
only tenants - 480 families - were in the Chikwawa District. Between 
1954 when Dixon first mentioned the 60, 000 acres which might be 
offered to Government, and the early 1960s the Government purchased 
61, 210 acres of BCA Company land. 4^
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The BCA Company's conversion to Government's policy was
indicated in the Chairman's statement to the shareholders in 1963,
the year in which the Company was taken over by Lonrho. Colby might
have drafted the statement himself!
In my view it would be entirely unrealistic 
today to envisage that the Company can 
retain large tracts of land which are 
surplus to its requirements .-.. there is an 
ever growing hunger for land... and in these 
circumstances we may expect to be 
approached by Government with a view to the 
acquisition of all land at present owned by 
the Company and not required for its tea 
and sisal operations. The extension of 
Government areas may be expected to help in 
the very pressing problem of encroachment 
on the Company's existing plantations.
Whilst the BCA Company land was being dealt with, work continued
on acquiring other estate land. Between 1946 and 1955 Government
acquired 296, 977 acres and emancipated 20, 158 families. In 1956,
following Colby's breakthrough with the BCA Company, a further
155, 622 acres were acquired, emancipating 17, 943 families. In 1957
the figures were 23,317 acres and 5, 516 families, and in 1958, 31, 157
4Qacres and 3, 227 families.
At the end of 1958 only 20, 460 families remained on estate land 
as tenants. Of these, 6, 700 were in the Magomero share-cropping 
tenant tobacco area, and 3, 500 were in the Mlanje tea estate area. 
Only 3,100 remained in Cholo. Armitage had decided in 1956 that 
it would be unwise to purchase the Magomero lands because the 
share-cropping system was not unpopular and the tobacco crops 
contributed " considerably ... to the economic benefit of the country
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as a whole ... The acquisition of further freehold land in this area 
... is hard to justify, particularly when the financial cost to
Cl
Government is also taken into consideration." In practical 
terms therefore only 13, 760 families remained under the thancrata 
system.
As the retained parts of the estates were cleared of tenants 
they were individually certified as free of resident Africans and the 
Africans on Private Estates Ordinance ceased to apply to them. By 
the end of 1958, 38 estates, covering 61, 956 acres were certified.
On these estates African residents had no statutory rights, .only 
those entered into by contract; and encroachment could be dealt with
CO
as trespass and the land kept clear for development.
At the end of 1958, after detailed enquiry, the Government had 
calculated that only 20, 460 families remained on private estates. It 
is probable that the number of families emancipated since 1946 was 
greater than the 46, 856 claimed by the Government because it is 
likely that they underestimated the number of families on private 
estates in 1946 by taking into consideration only those in the Shire 
Highlands. The 1945 Census Report gives the number of Africans 
living on private estates in the Protectorate as 211,394 or (by 
assuming an average family size of four) 52, 848 families, as opposed 
to the figure of 49, 600 used by the Government. At an annual rate 
of natural increase of 3%, and ignoring the continued, if small, 
immigration onto private estates, the 1958 figures would have been 
310, 428 people or 77, 607 families (as against the Government figures 
of 269,200 and 67,305). Using the 1945 Census figures, an annual
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rate of increase of 3% and an average family size of four, by 1960, 
had it not been for the policy of land acquisition and tenant 
resettlement, there would have been 328, 932 people or 82, 233 families 
resident on private estates; the policy had by this time resulted in 
there being only about 80, 000 people or 20,000 families. 53 Almost 
a quarter of a million Africans had been emancipated and 467,073 
acres of private land had been acquired in the 14 years following the 
Abrahams Report, or more importantly the 12 years following Colby's 
appointment as Governor.
After 1958 the disturbed political situation, the civil unrest 
and the State of Emergency effectively put a stop to the policy of 
progressive abolition of thancrata. and in neither 1959 nor 1960 were 
any further private estates acquired or African tenants resettled:
r
the owners were deeply reluctant to sell, the tenants refused to move 
voluntarily and the Government, under the circumstances prevailing, 
did not feel able to compel them. 54
These unsettled conditions continued into 1961 and then abated 
somewhat with the General Election of 15 August 1961 which produced 
an overwhelming majority for the Malawi Congress Party under Dr.
Banda. In September the new Legislative Council was appointed with 
23 Malawi Congress Party members, five other - European - members and 
five official members, and Executive Council now had the Governor as 
President, five official members and five Malawi Congress Party 
members, all being Ministers. 55
Government - now essentially an African Government - was
- 248 -
concerned about the lack of progress over the past three years, not 
so much because of the potential for political violence and ‘civil 
disturbance since this had already been minimised by the earlier 
acquisitions and resettlement especially in the period 1954-1958, but 
because thancrata still existed as a system and because there was 
still a good deal of alienated land not fully developed. Thancrata 
was an irritant which earlier steps had not yet fully abolished. 
Consequently, the Government introduced a new Africans on Private 
Estates Bill in June 1962. 55
In the debate on the Bill, there was inevitably a good deal of 
rhetoric and verbal abuse of thancrata. reminiscent of the 1957 debate 
but without the innuendos of violence. The greatest worry was that 
of "certain evil practices by estate owners and these practices are 
the eviction of children or dependants of resident Africans who 
become of age." This had been a long-standing grievance not tackled 
by earlier legislation. The offspring of resident Africans were not 
entitled to their parents' status and rights once they reached 18 
years of age, which was a particular and acute hardship in the 
Southern Province where uxorilocal residence after marriage prevailed 
among the matrilocal peoples; on reaching the age of 18 years, 
offspring and the husbands of women offspring could be, and often 
were, treated as trespassers and were liable to eviction. Whereas 
the 1952 Ordinance - in order to lessen the increase in Africans on 
private estates - had confined the status of resident African to 
those then on the estates, the 1962 Bill now gave the status to all 
those on estates on 1 January 1962, and entitled all children and 
dependants of resident Africans to register as residents as of
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right. In moving the second reading, Dr, Banda explained:
In the past it was the habit and practice 
of at least some if not all of the estate 
owners to evict anyone that they did not 
like or thought was troublesome and who was 
not on that estate in 1952 by simply 
declaring him a trespasser ... There will 
be no trespassers of this class now It is 
my intention to have as few trespassers as 
possible. In the past it was the practice 
of many estate owners to declare children 
and dependants of resident Africans when 
they became of age trespassers, or else 
force them to pay rent or work on their 
estates as labourers. I am putting a stop 
to that.
Additionally, the 1952 restrictions were removed or eased concerning 
the right only to a site for a dwelling and the amount of 
agricultural land which was then under cultivation, efficiently used 
and cultivable by a family without assistance, and the right to take 
building material and firewood only from areas allocated by the 
landowner. The 1962 Bill restored the rights of residents, including 
children and dependants, to cut building materials and firewood 
apparently without restraint as to where it came from on the estate 
except from areas protected under natural resources legislation.
The 1962 Bill reduced the rent payable by each family to £1 a 
year and exempted from payment a significant number of residents: 
unmarried women; wives of resident Africans; those exempted from 
paying tax; those without the means of paying because of sickness, 
age, infirmity or preoccupation with the care of infants; and all 
those who were resident Africans under the 1928 Ordinance on 30 June 
1942. This last category finally recognised that some Africans still 
held rights of non-disturbance under the Certificates of Claim and 
should not be liable to pay rent. There was also to be a period of
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six months, July-December 1962, during which rent was not to be 
payable.
The object of the Bill was the abolition of thancrata but it did
not do this directly because it retained the right of residents to
"elect to work for wages" with which, presumably, they could pay
their rent. The owner could no longer reject requests for work
outside the rainy season or at any other time, for sufficient wages
at normal rates to pay the rent, save by providing facilities for
growing economic crops or by foregoing the rent. Rather, the Bill
aimed to abolish thancrata by putting considerable pressure on estate
owners to sell their land to Government for resettling African
families. This pressure was to be exercised through a number of
elements in the Bill: reducing the rent, declaring a six months' rent
holiday; protecting those who between 1952 and 1962 could have been
treated as trespassers; introducing extensive categories of exemption
from paying rent; adding children, dependants and spouses to those
entitled to resident status; lifting the restrictions on the cutting
of building materials and firewood; obliging owners to provide work
at normal wages, or facilities for crop growing if asked, or forego
the rent. No longer would it be worthwhile for estate owners to hold
on to land unless it was sufficiently well worked and profitable to
pay proper wages and to put up with the pressures applied by the 1962
Bill. As Dr Banda said at the close of the debate:
I have drafted this Bill to meet estate
owners, the Europeans in this country, half 
way. My intention is to abolish thancrata 
altogether but I have drafted this Bill to 
give [them] a chance... to sell their land 
wherever there are Africans on it, to 
Government... any clause in this Bill which
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seems not so good for the estate owners is 
giving them a warning. Sell the land. Not 
that I don't want private land in this 
country, not at all. I want private 
owners... to employ direct labour and pay 
wages rather than this vested system... If 
they have not enough money to pay 
labourers, they must disgorge those 
estates... I won't prevent [them] from 
making money if [they] employ labour and 
pay... people a living wage on these farms.
That the warning was heeded and the chance taken is indicated by 
the fact that to the figure of 600,490 acres of freehold land 
acquired by Government up to the end of 1962, a further 102, 272 acres 
were acquired in 1963 and 12, 203 in 1964, the year of independence. 
Shortly after this the Government announced that no new resettlement 
acquisitions were to be undertaken. By this time 714, 965 acres had 
been acquired since 1946, leaving only 431, 770 acres in private 
hands, and the application of the Africans on Private Estates 
Ordinance had been withdrawn from 47 estates, totalling 72, 780 acres, 
in the Southern Province, 40 of the estates, totalling 64, 721 acres, 
being in the Cholo District. 57 Although no details were then 
given of the number of Africans remaining on private estates still 
subject to the Ordinance, it is likely that, other than the Magomero 
tobacco share croppers, those still there were either employees or, 
in a few cases, illegal squatters.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
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Increasingly through Nyasaland's colonial history two political 
issues became important: closer association with Southern Rhodesia, 
and land. Constitutional advancement, from the Africans' point of 
view, became an active issue only very late in colonial times but 
land and closer association were fears which troubled them for 
decades and more acutely as time passed. From the Europeans' point 
of view, constitutional advancement was intimately connected with the 
quest for closer association which they pursued over a long period 
and which many of them believed would consolidate their dominant 
position both politically and - including questions of land 
alienation and use - economically.
In the Africans' mind these two issues - closer association and
land - were closely linked: the fear of Southern Rhodesians depriving
them of their land and subjugating them both politically and
economically. The fears were long-standing and were well known, as
the following examples show. At the time of the Native Reserves
Commission in 1929 "One Chief did not object to Europeans coming but
wanted to know what kind of Europeans they would be. ' Will they be
Europeans of Nyasaland or of British South Africa?' he asked." *
Politically the Africans feared the removal of British protection, a
halt to their own political advancement and, particularly, white
domination. Welensky, who, in the late 1940s and early 1950s urged
o
widespread immigration of Europeans into Central Africa, was
nonetheless aware that the Nyasaland Africans:
were afraid that if there were any closer 
links with Southern Rhodesia - which was 
their big bogey - they would lose their 
land. They were afraid that political 
progress would be curtailed. They were
- 254 -
afraid that there would be an extension to 
their territories of what they regarded as 
Southern Rhodesia's rigid and reactionary 
pass laws. Finally they feared that there 
would be social and educational 
discrimination against them.
In 1954 Colby's view was that "European landowners are already
beginning to hope for amalgamation rather than federation with the
Rhodesias and the day when they imagine that they will be able to
turn their African tenants off their land at will. " * In a letter
written to his imminent successor only a week before he left
Nyasaland in March 1956, Colby wrote to Armitage and said that he did
not want to inflict a lot of handing-over notes on him but after
eight years it would be unusual if he had not formed very strong
views on certain subjects: he devoted his letter to only two subjects
- federation and land. ** Very soon after his arrival Armitage
recorded that the Africans were "fearful of losing their land to
European occupation"0 and he told Lennox-Boyd:
The underlying tone of the utterances of 
the new African Members of the Nyasaland 
legislature has consistently indicated 
their fear of an extension of a South 
African form of apartheid to the Federation 
and the possibility of land alienation7
Indeed Armitage believed that it was the "feared threat to their land
[which contributed] largely to their insistent emphasis on attaining
o
African self-government." A senior Nyasaland civil servant many
years later said:
the implied threat of deprivation of land 
was at the very taproot of the nation-wide 
opposition to federation in 1953 - much 
more so than any other single factor. It 
should have surprised no experienced 
administrator ... when the 1953 eruptions 
in Cholo and Blantyre occurred. What is 
more to the point, perhaps, is that in my 
view similar eruptions were inevitable,
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even with no federal issue, if any attempt 
were made at large-scale evictions of 
tangata tenants.
In addition to these political and social fears there were deep 
economic concerns. The Africans resented the holding of large 
undeveloped areas in the hands of Europeans whilst neighbouring 
African Trust Land was heavily populated. Those living on private 
estates additionally resented having to work for the owner or pay him 
rent, and the poor treatment meted out by some owners. They feared 
that these matters - all of which restricted their ability or 
incentive to increase their economic productivity - would become more 
oppressive with closer association.
The resentment was intensified by the frustration arising from 
African political impotence, since for most of the colonial era the 
Europeans were much more powerful. The Europeans had seats in 
Legislative Council from 1907 but there were no African seats until 
1948. The European unofficials outnumbered the Africans on 
Legislative Council until 1959. There were European unofficial 
members of Executive Council from 1940 but no Africans until 1959.
The Europeans had strong and influential contacts in London, through 
Members of Parliament, Ministers and leading Conservative Party 
figures, and through the directors of large companies with 
headquarters in Great Britain. In contrast, the African contacts 
were few, late in being developed and much less effective. European 
political organisation was also much stronger: the Chamber of
Commerce was formed in 1895 from associations which had started in
1 o1892; the Convention of Associations was founded in 1928 from an
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amalgamation of seven existing bodies; ^  and the Landowners 
Association was created in 1954. All these, and the unofficial 
elements of Legislative Council had interlocking membership. Whilst 
there were a number of African Associations dating from the first in 
1912, they did not become numerous until the 1920s, their influence 
on Government was small, and the African National Congress was not 
formed until 1944. The Europeans also commanded support from the 
press; the Central African Planter was first published in 1895 and 
its successors, the Central African Times and the Nyasaland Times, 
were the only regular newspapers in Nyasaland, being published 
eventually twice a week: the publishers were European and the
editorial stance was strongly pro-European. In contrast, Msimbi, 
the Government vernacular newspaper, was not regularly published 
until 1949 and was both small in size and limited in circulation. 
Attempts by Government to establish a commercial African newspaper in 
1950 were soundly defeated by the powerful objections of the 
Nyasaland Times, the Convention of Associations, the Chamber of
1 9Commerce and unofficial members of Legislative Council.
In respect of land, what the European estate owners wanted was, 
firstly, to enjoy undisturbed possession of their private land to 
develop it immediately or in the future, or simply to hold on to it 
for sale later as its value increased; and secondly an adequate and 
readily available, preferably exclusive, source of labour with which 
to develop the land. What the African tenants wanted was a site and 
materials for a dwelling, garden space - and time to cultivate it 
during the rainy season - access to firewood and water, and 
particularly freedom to live undisturbed in their traditional
- 257 -
fashion. They also wanted work in order to earn money for consumer 
goods and to pay taxes and rent; to this extent there was a common 
interest in labour between landlord and tenant save that, especially 
as employment opportunities increased, the Africans did not want to 
be bound to work only for the owner of the land on which they lived 
but wanted freedom to chose their own employer and whether and when 
they would work. There was also a common interest in labour between 
the Government and both the European owners and the African tenants 
in respect of labour because by working on the estates the tenants 
earned the money with which to pay their tax - indeed in many cases 
the owners paid the tax instead of wages: Government revenue was
more assured and much more easily collected this way.
Because of the greater political strength of the Europeans, the 
major contribution which the European estates made to the 
Protectorate's economy, and the tax-earning aspects of estate 
employment, the British Government - and at its behest the Nyasaland 
Government - for most of the time favoured the estate owners 
especially in respect of labour. They did nothing de facto about 
the rights of African original occupants under the non-disturbance 
clauses whilst acknowledging them de jure: they persistently
declined to remove the obligation or pressure on tenants to work for 
the owners during the rainy season; and for long they ignored the 
advice that Government should acquire private land for settling 
African tenants: even when the British Government accepted this
advice they consistently avoided providing the funds with which to 
implement it until the last moment. This general stance, favouring 
European interests, began to change only when the political dangers
- 258 -
became really pressing after the disturbances of the early 1940s and 
especially of 1953 and when the contribution of African agriculture 
to the Protectorate's economy began significantly to increase - and 
that of Europeans proportionally to decline - after Colby's arrival 
in 1948 as his development strategy began to take effect.
In times particularly of political unrest - especially during 
the later years of colonial rule when nationalist aspirations and 
Government resistance to them almost always led to conflict and often 
violence - land grievances could be a very dangerous issue, for a 
number of reasons. In an agrarian society such as Nyasaland, land 
directly and intimately affected everyone: it was the source, and
generally only source, of their livelihood, essential to life; it had 
a direct and vital effect on the national economy and on individual 
welfare. Land was also a highly emotive issue, it was understood by 
all, it was tangible and could lead to eruptions of conflict at any 
time whether as the result of a natural catastrophe, or of deliberate 
agitation, or of isolated provocative incidents. Furthermore, in 
Nyasaland land ownership was race-based: private estates were almost 
exclusively owned by Europeans - only one Certificate of Claim was 
issued to a non-European*^ - and tenants were Africans; indeed, the 
legislation governing the relationships in 1904, 1917, 1928, 1952 and 
1962 consistently included the word Natives or Africans in the 
title. Racial conflicts, of all conflicts, are particularly 
dangerous.
The need, from the Government's point of view, to settle the 
problem of Africans on private estates became a good deal more urgent
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after the Second World War as it became clearer that the colonial 
territories would move to self-government more quickly than had 
previously been assumed - the result of the eclipse of the imperial 
will in British society and politics, the opposition to colonialism 
of the United States and the United Nations, the increase in African 
political organisation and power, the granting of independence to 
India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Palestine - often accompanied by 
violence - and the emerging view in British political circles that 
continued colonial male against the wishes and active opposition of 
the colonial peoples could be maintained only by significant force, 
which Britain was not prepared to use, certainly not in too many 
places at once. Long before Macmillan's wind of change speeches 
in Accra and Cape Town in January and February 1960, presaged a dozen 
years earlier by Colby's own speeches, there was a zephyr of change: 
the wind was undoubtedly blowing where it listed. There would be 
enough difficulties, enough sticks with which the African politicians 
and people could beat the Nyasaland Government, without the 
unresolved land grievances of Africans on private estates being left 
as a hefty and readily available cudgel.
For years the Government had vacillated and inconclusively 
investigated the problem, committee after committee had looked into 
it and made recommendations, legislation had been changed on numerous 
occasions, and yet the problem - which became progressively more 
acute with population increase and with greater African political 
awareness over the years - was very little nearer being solved than 
at any other time since Johnston's original, and in many ways 
farseeing and sound, settlement in 1892. As Marnham of the Colonial
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Office said: "it is a problem as intractable as it is of long 
standing. It has baffled generations of Governors and Secretaries
I K
of State since the beginning of the century."
Successive Governors knew where their duty ultimately rested -
with the Africans since Nyasaland was a protectorate and the Royal
Instructions from 1907 required that:
The Governor ... is especially to take care 
to protect [the African inhabitants] in 
their persons and in the full enjoyment of 
their possessions, and by all lawful means 
to prevent and restrain all ... injustices 
which may in any manner be practised or 
attenpted against them.
Yet the Europeans were politically far better organised and it was
they who had played the dominant role both in economic development
upon which the country's wealth and the Government's revenue
significantly depended and in maintaining the status cruo in respect
of Africans on private estates.
Inpatient to begin work after a long leave in Britain since 
leaving Nigeria, with little time at his disposal and deeply 
conscious of the rising tide of African nationalism, Colby, who 
arrived as Governor early in 1948, was influenced by three important 
factors. First, he was abundantly aware that the balance of 
political power between Europeans and Africans was changing.
Although the 1915 Chilembwe foretaste of African power had been 
forgotten or ignored, a reminder had been given in Blantyre in 1942 
and 1943, and the Nyasaland African Congress, formed in 1944, had 
been sufficiently well organised to make a significant inpression on 
Abrahams in 1946. Additionally, there was the growing, if still
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limited, influence of communism on the African population of which 
Colby was acutely aware. Secondly, he recognised that the greatly 
increased economic power which would accompany the marked upswing in 
African agricultural production, which he was determined his policies 
should bring, would further increase their political power as the 
economic balance moved in the Africans' favour. Thirdly, and the 
result of these other two factors, he was determined that, so far as 
he was able, political activity should not hamper the rapid increase 
in agricultural production and economic development which he saw as 
essential to the Protectorate's future.
With these factors in mind, Colby moved quickly towards 
beginning to solve the problem. Although the balance of power was 
shifting, Government still very much held the scales and Colby was
r
not reluctant to hold them firmly and, if necessary, to tilt them. 
Bell and Abrahams had both said that the resolution of the difficulty 
was a policy question for the Government to decide one way or the 
other: it was a nettle to be grasped, a nettle which, as Colby saw
it, was held mainly by Europeans but increasingly by Africans, a 
nettle with a sting in it which would become much more severe and 
disabling - possibly even fatal - the longer it was left ungrasped. 
None of his predecessors - Johnston and Thomas (who had far too short 
a period in Nyasaland to effect any major change) excepted - had been 
the significant type of nettle-grasper which Colby now began to show 
himself to be. The time for dithering was passed.
Colby s starting point in 1948 was the Abrahams Report, the 
significance of which lies not in the quality of its recommendations
- 262 -
since it expressed few if any significant new ideas and grossly
glossed over details crucial to the success of implementing the
recommendations. Rather, the significance lies elsewhere.
Firstly, the Report so raised African expectations of the problems
soon being seriously tackled and solved as to make it difficult for
Government to continue to avoid reaching solutions and making
decisions - especially under a Governor like Colby who was not in the
habit of avoiding making decisions:
A Governor's task is not difficult provided 
he is prepared to make decisions because 
nothing happens until a decision is 
made.
As Dr. Banda was later to say, "Sidney Abrahams' report pricked and 
has pricked ever since the conscience of the Government of this 
country, in London and Zomba". Secondly, since Abrahams was the 
first outsider to consider formally the question of Africans on 
private estates and since he was currently, and for several years 
continued to be, the Colonial Office's Adviser on Land Tenure, the 
British Government could scarcely ignore or under-play his 
recommendations as they had those of earlier enquiries, or so easily 
yield to the large land-owning companies' opposition. Thirdly, the 
Report provided the new Governor with the platform from which to 
launch his attack on the thancrata system.
In this attack Colby quickly recognised that successfully 
tackling the BCA Company was the key which he must turn if the 
remainder of the problem was to be solved, and this for a number of 
reasons. African criticism of the Company was severe because they 
owned huge areas of land, much of it in some of the most densely
- 263 -
populated and politically sensitive parts of the Protectorate; the 
treatment of tenants by the estate managers left much to be desired; 
205, 000 acres of the 546,000 acres publicly recommended by the Land 
Planning Committee for acquisition belonged to them; through the 
General Manager the Company exercised much influence over the 
opinions and activities of the Chamber of Commerce and the Convention 
of Associations; and other estate owners looked to the Company for 
leadership. Colby niggled away at them and, after 1953, 
persistently hammered away at them. He was quick to acquire their 
Chingale Estate in 1949 and although this did little immediately to 
relieve congestion or increase emancipation, it was a large area 
purchased at a reasonable price; his successor found the land 
settlement scheme there, with its poor soils, "depressing" but it was
1 Q
nonetheless an early, politically important purchase. Colby 
skilfully turned the Landowners Association meeting with the 
Secretary of State in 1954 against the Company and was able to 
exploit the falterings in their arguments and the concessions which 
they then made. Thereafter he persuaded the Colonial Office and the 
Secretary of State to intervene directly with Brook and Huggins and 
to support him much more actively and positively than in the past.
Colby employed a number of methods to attack the thancrata 
system. He used the Abrahams Report as a platform for launching his
attack. He made two very large early purchases - Chingale and
Magomero - which very substantially reduced the acreage in private 
hands. He made a number of early speeches warning of the rising 
tide of nationalism and the need to be ready for it. He used the 
1953 disturbances to remind Europeans of the dangers of land
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grievances, and he was severe with the African activists to keep them 
quiet for a while although he immediately took up the issue with 
renewed vigour and used the African Protectorate Council memorandum 
to express his views and plans in an accompanying despatch. He 
secured additional African seats in Legislative Council to indicate 
to both Africans and Europeans that the former's interests would 
become paramount. He frequently warned of the political and 
security dangers and played on Colonial Office and local European 
fears of "another Mau Mau", goading the Colonial Office into a more 
positive response after the 1953 disturbances. He used a battery of 
levers, or the threat of them, in dealing with the BCA Company: 
negotiated purchase, compulsory acquisition, arbitration, undeveloped 
land tax, reduction in rents and the removal of the labour 
requirement. He engaged in personal and direct confrontation with 
the prominent landowners particularly Brook and Dixon. He deployed 
a number of very able officers to deal with the Africans on private 
estates problem: McDonald who was on good terms with the Cholo
planters, Ingham who had been Secretary to the Abrahams Commission, 
Reeve as successor to McDonald, and - admired by the Colonial Office 
if not by Colby himself - Winnington-Ingram. He used the easing of 
the BCA Company log-jam to win over other landowners. Having 
secured the Secretary of State's agreement to policy which he himself 
had designed, Colby used the occasion of the Secretary of State's 
visit and announcement of the policy to tease out the BCA Company.
He pushed the estate owners between the 1953 disturbances and the 
1954 Secretary of State's visit by attempting direct and individual 
negotiations with them thereby provoking them into firstly forming 
the Landowners Association which provided him with an audience before
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which to tackle the BCA Company, and secondly petitioning the 
Secretary of State who then had to make up his mind one way or the 
other whether to support fully the Governor's policy proposals. He 
made very clear to the British Government the cost of containing the 
1953 disturbances and thereby made them still further aware of the 
impracticability of imposing by force a land policy, or any other 
major policy, against the wishes of the majority of the people. 
Finally, he made Dixon a member of Executive Council thereby 
virtually forcing him to take a more favourable view of Government's 
actions and wishes. Dixon may well have been conscious of the fact 
that both previous senior unofficial members of Executive Council had 
been owners or managers of large estates and both had been knighted.
Even with these various methods of tackling the general problem 
and particularly that of the BCA Company, the important and worrying 
question existed throughout of how the solution was to be financed.
Of those who over the years had suggested that private land 
should be acquired for African settlement, none until 1946 had 
specifically turned their mind to how the land was to be paid for.
The 1904 Native Locations Ordinance would have recompensed the land 
owners for setting aside locations with the payment of rent by those 
residing on the perpetually leased land. Hetherwick was silent on 
funding the acquisitions which he advocated. Bowring in 1925 simply 
warned that acquisition would " cost money" and his comment that the 
evils of their fathers had to be paid for implied that Government 
would have to pay for it. Since, however, he was already relying 
upon British grants-in-aid to balance his budget, the chances of
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either the Nyasaland Government finding the money or the British 
Government increasing its grant, were extremely slight. The 1928 
Natives on Private Estates Ordinance provided that the payment for 
land compulsorily acquired by Government should be in the form of an 
exchange of land "of equivalent total value". The Legislative 
Council's proposals in 1934 did not envisage that land surrendered to 
the Native Authorities should be paid for because they saw it more a 
matter of handing over land equivalent to that to which the original 
occupants were entitled under the non-disturbance clauses; in effect 
the owners would be buying out and extinguishing the rights of 
original occupants. Hailey in 1939 did not mention the financial 
aspects of acquiring land.
In his Report Abrahams felt it
incumbent upon [him] to consider whether 
any contribution towards the expenses of 
[acquisition] could be fairly exacted from 
loth or either of the [European landlords 
or African tenants] and in that event 
whether it would be practicable to do so.
He briefly examined the possibility of estate owners compensating
Africans leaving their land, in which case some "landowner[s] might
be mulcted a heavy sum", and he concluded that "it would be hopeless
to try to propound a scheme for contributing which would be both
equitable and practicable." He then turned to the possibility of
African contributions and dismissed the suggestion that for a number
of years the former tenants should continue to pay rent, but now to
Government, as also being " neither fair nor practicable." He did,
however, have two positive suggestions. Firstly the expense could
be lessened if owners of acquired land were offered "a piece of
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reserved land or ... a right of occupancy of native trust land 
without rent", and secondly he suggested obtaining money from the 
Native Development and Welfare Fund(NDWF).
Although the Land Planning Committee in 1947 estimated the cost 
of purchase - £328, 149 - they made no recommendations as to the 
source of funding, so the new Governor received no quidance from that 
quarter, notwithstanding the fact that the Financial Secretary was a 
member of the Committee.
Colby had always been concerned about the cost of acquisition.
He had three main views. One was that the land in question was 
generally incapable of being developed because it was heavily 
congested with squatters, it had but little market value and 
consequently only a nominal sum should be paid; he had even argued 
that the owners should pay the Government to relieve them of the 
burden. The second view was that he did not want funds which could 
be used for other, economic, development to be diverted to 
acquisition of land for basically political, security, purposes and 
he made this point in his very first address to Legislative Council. 
The third view was that the British Government should be prepared to 
pay for, or at least make a major contribution towards, these 
purchases. When, at the end of 1949 he had asked Cohen if there was 
any chance of getting support from the general reserve in the CDWF, 
he added:
The fact is that unless a great deal more 
money than is now envisaged is spent on the 
development of the Protectorate, there will 
be little chance of our making any real 
progress within a reasonable time and our
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resources as they now stand when compared 
with our commitments are unlikely to be 
able to contribute very much ... the 
problems with which we are confronted and 
which Abrahams tried to solve, arise from 
past policy and it seems very hard, at a 
time when we are striving to set the 
Protectorate more firmly on its feet, that 
we should be faced with expenditure of this 
nature ... I very much fear that, without 
considerable further financial assistance, 
there is little prospect of this territory, 
potentially so prosperous, being put on a 
sound footing.
Colby was, of course, aiming his remarks only partly at the 
acquisition of private land - and was really introducing the thin end 
of a wedge of an argument which he was to pursue repeatedly later for 
general development purposes: in essence "The British Government has
neglected Nyasaland far too long. It7 s now in a mess and if you want 
me to get the country out of it, you ought to pay for it". In the 
event, it was to be several years before the British Government did 
use the CDWF to support Colby7 s land acquisition policy.
In the period after 1946, three sources of financing were 
used. Firstly, during the late 1940s and very early 1950s, Central 
Government revenue account funds were used to purchase land. In 
1946 the Ntonda estate price of £3, 781 was met from this source. In
1948 Colby allocated £100,000 for land purchase from the revenue 
account - and incurred a deficit in doing so - and in 1949 a further 
£150,000, sums which were used to make the early purchases of the 
large Chingale and Magomero estates.
From about late 1952 the Government found their finances 
becoming more restricted and instead of using Central Government
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funds they used NDWF monies - as Abrahams had suggested - although
scarcely any land was bought at this time and any drain on the Fund
could have been only slight because the Fund increased at a steady
rate and indeed doubled, from £655,000 in 1952 to £1, 244, 000 five
years later. ^  In March 1954 McDonald7 s view on whether they
should use NDWF sources was quite clear:
Government should have no hesitation in 
continuing to draw on NDW funds for the 
purpose of resettlement of land if it suits 
it to do so. I cannot think of any better 
way of providing for the welfare of the 
African than buying land for him and in his 
eagerness to acquire the land he is not 
likely to worry about the source from where 
the money comes to pay for it.
Others, including mission leaders, however, firmly believed that the
NDWF, derived exclusively from African sources, should not be used to
purchase land but rather that Central Government funds, derived from
both African and European sources, should be used.
When papers on land were prepared for the April 1954 meeting of 
Executive Council it was said that on the basis of two shillings and 
six pence an acre - which was what was bring offered in some cases, 
for example to the ALC - some £37, 550 would be required to purchase 
300, 000 acres, and Council was to be asked to advise whether 
Protectorate funds should again be used. Colby, presumably aware 
that two shillings and six pence an acre was far too low a price to 
contemplate realistically, and reluctant to use NDWF monies, knowing 
that the Africans would resent paying from their own funds for land 
to which they were convinced they had a right, made a note in regard 
to financing: " I do not want to take to Ex. Co: please put in a
token £25,000 in the Estimates." He was keeping his counsel and
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making some provision for land purchases, as a holding move whilst he 
tried again to secure money from the British Government's CDWF.
Although Colby7 s request for CDWF assistance received some 
support in the Colonial Office, they received more opposition. 
Officials in London took refuge in Colby7 s projected budgetary 
surplus - which was slightly greater than the sum then needed for 
land purchases - and in the potential but unspecified support from 
federal sources. This gave the British Government a temporary 
respite but - presumably once it was apparent both that the Nyasaland 
surplus would be run down rapidly and that the Federal Government 
would not provide the support needed for land purchases - eventually 
they supplied the grants from the CDWF needed to solve the problem of 
Africans on private estates. In 1957 and 1958, following requests 
from Armitage, three linked grants, totalling £300,000, were made 
for land purchase and resettlement; 2  ^this was precisely the sum 
estimated and requested ten years earlier as being required to 
purchase the estates which the Land Planning Committee had 
recommended for immediate or early acquisition. In 1959 and 1960 
another grant was received totalling £120, 000 to complete 
transactions of land already agreed for acquisition. 2  ^ In 1961 
the Governor announced that a further £108, 000 was to be received 
from the CDWF to purchase 32 blocks of private land and reduce the 
number of families on estates to 14,000. 2® The Government7 s 
Development Plan for 1962-1965 provided £450, 000 for further 
acquisitions and nearly all of this was spent, or committed, by the 
end of 1964. 29
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Colby knew that the money for land acquisition would eventually 
be forthcoming since both he and the Colonial Office placed the very 
highest priority on abolishing thancrata. He himself had said that 
"the settlement of this problem is worth a lot of money"/ and the 
Colonial Office had said that "this has in one way or another simply 
got to be done" and the money found. The important point about 
finance was not that it would not be forthcoming but that there might 
be too long and too damaging a delay in it being provided. It was 
this delay which rendered the political security aspects extremely 
worrying.
He was deeply coijpious of the prospect of politically motivated 
violence/ which would hamper economic development/ lead to individual 
suffering, consume resources and put his personal reputation at 
risk. The possibility of violence had been warned of since as early 
as 1892 when Hetherwick told Johnston that the land situation could 
not "fail to produce friction between natives and Europeans which 
will end in catastrophe one day";*^ the -1915 Chilembwe rising gave 
a very clear indication of the inherent danger; Fiddes in 1917 had 
warned of the use which "agitators" might make of the Native Rents 
Ordinance; Jackson in 1920 referred twice to the "numerous dangers" 
and spoke of "real anxiety" and of the probability that mass 
evictions would cause "serious disturbances"; Ormsby-Gore in 1925 
said that the state of affairs was "likely before long to lead to 
agitation"; Hailey in 1939 referred to the "many possibilities of 
friction"; in 1942 and 1943 there were "serious incidents in the 
Blantyre District and even more serious incidents were only narrowly 
avoided in Cholo in 1945; Abrahams in 1946 himself wrote of the
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"poisoned relationships" between estate owners and their tenants and 
warned that the relationships and those between Europeans and 
Africans generally contained "the seeds of many forms of trouble". 
Colby himself, from the earliest days of his Governorship, tried to 
bring before the public the inevitability of rising nationalism and 
pleaded for attempts to be made to "guide and harness" it. Few paid 
sufficient attention to his warnings, and even the fears raised by 
the 1953 disturbances soon abated in the European public's mind as 
they anticipated that federation would support their cause, protect 
their property and persons and stem the tide of nationalism. Not 
only was Colby already convinced otherwise, but the political 
intelligence reports early in 1954 reinforced this conviction, and he 
determined to renew the attack on thancrata and to do so vigorously 
and relentlessly. First he needed to get the British Government 
publicly to commit itself to his policy and to back him in 
implementing it, and secondly he needed to crack the BCA Company 
nut. These he set about doing in the early months of 1954, building 
on the fears raised by the 1953 disturbances, not so much in the 
Nyasaland European mind as in the mind of the Colonial Office.
Colby realised from the outset that Nyasaland did not have much 
time in which to solve the problem of Africans on private estates 
before it became a dangerous grievance in the hands of African 
nationalist activists opposing powerful and inflexible Europeans, and 
he knew that, with an initial five year appointment, he personally 
had little time: he had hoped to move on to a larger colony to 
complete his service before retiring after a further three
•3 1
years. In the event, Colby solved, or sufficiently solved, the
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problem in the nick of time, if one takes the relevant " time" to be 
1959-1960.
1959 opened with riots in Zoiriba in January and February, 
followed by the declaration of a State of Emergency, with many 
hundreds of arrests and political detentions, and the appointment of 
the Devlin Commission in March; the boycotting of produce markets and 
the publication of the Devlin Report in June; interim constitutional 
arrangements giving Africans a majority of unofficial seats in 
Legislative Council, and the setting up of the Mbnckton Commission in 
August; and the appointment of the first African Members of Executive 
Council in October. 1960 opened with Prime Minister Macmillan's 
visit to Nyasaland, the accompanying disturbances and massively 
unfavourable press coverage in January, which led to the appointment 
of the Southworth Commission and Macmillan's summary dismissal of the 
Chief Secretary in February. In March, Macleod, Colonial Secretary, 
arrived to discuss revisions to the constitution, and on 1 April Dr. 
Banda was released from detention. June saw a number of industrial 
strikes and the enactment of security and detention legislation prior 
to ending the State of Emergency, and the Lancaster House Nyasaland 
Constitutional Conference the same month. In July, Macleod told the 
Governor that his period of office would not be extended and nine 
months later Armitage left. In September, October and November there 
was a series of disturbing incidents of arson, assault, strikes, 
unlawful assembly and stabbings. In September all the remaining 
political detainees were released, and in October the Mbnckton Report 
was published. 1960 ended with the Federal Review Conference at 
Lancaster House in December. ^
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The period 1959-1960 was, then, one of intense political 
activism and activity. In none of this was the question of land in 
general or of Africans on private estates in particular, a live 
grievance or a worrying political issue. ^  That cudgel with which 
to beat the colonial Government, so readily available and dangerous 
only a few years earlier, had by this time been whittled down to 
insignificant political proportions.
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